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Case No. CV 07-8274 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL 
ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-1 
342 05000.0047.2123037.1 
Defendant/Counterclaimant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC 
("Residential"), by and through its counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, 
moves for summary judgment against PlaintiffParkWest Homes LLC ("ParkWest"), pursuant to 
Idaho Code Sections 56(b) and 56( c). The basis for summary judgment is that because ParkWest 
did not commence an action against Residential's predecessor in interest to the property at issue 
(the "Property") within six months of filing the Mechanic's Lien (the "Lien") at issue in this case 
as required by Idaho Code section 45-510, the Lien is void as to Residential. 
On November 28, 2006, when ParkWest recorded its Lien, Transnation Title was the 
Trustee under a Deed of Trust (the "Deed of Trust") that ParkWest asserted was junior to 
ParkWest's Lien. On August 7, 2007 when ParkWest commenced this action to foreclose its 
Lien, First American Title Insurance Company ("First American") was the Trustee under the 
Deed of Trust. At the time ParkWest commenced this action, First American was a necessary 
party to the Lien foreclosure action, and ParkWest was required to name First American as a 
Defendant under Idaho Code section 45-510 and long standing case law in Idaho and 
jurisdictions across the Country. ParkWest did not then, and never has, named First American as 
a Defendant in this case, and therefore, the Lien became void as to First American. When, on 
July 20,2009, the Trustee's Deed to the Property was recorded, Residential obtained title to the 
Property free and clear of the Lien and any claim of Park West. 
This motion is supported by the accompanying memorandum and Affidavit of Ryan T. 
McFarland. 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S MOTION 
FORSUMMARYJUDGMENT-2 
343 05000.0047.2123037.1 
DATED THIS \<)~ day of November, 2010. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & LEYLLP 
By ____ +-__ ~~ __ -------------------
Ryan 
Atto e for DefendantiCounterc1aimant 
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
344 05000.0047.2123037.1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1~J). day of November, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
each of the following: 
Robert B. Bums 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
David E. Wishney 
Attorney at Law 
300 W. Myrtle Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, ID 83701-0837 
[Attorney for Defendant Julie G. Barnson] 
-+ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
'fJ-- U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
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Stephen C. Hardesty ISB No. 4214 
Ryan T. McFarland ISB No. 7347 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: (208) 344-6000 
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Case No. CV 07-8274 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL 
ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL 
ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
346 05000.0047.2123040.1 
, , 
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential"), by and through its 
counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, hereby files this Memorandum in 




When ParkWest commenced this action over three years ago, it failed to follow firmly-
rooted Idaho statute and case law in that ParkWest failed to name all of the parties with an 
interest in the property at issue (the "Property"). Specifically, ParkWest, though asserting 
priority over a certain Deed of Trust (the "Deed of Trust"), failed to name the Trustee of the 
Deed of Trust, the party with the legal interest in the Property, as a party defendant. Instead, 
ParkWest named only the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust and the property owner as defendants. 
Under Idaho law, which is consistent with the virtually-universal rule throughout the United 
States for over 100 years, ParkWest's failure to name the Trustee of the Deed of Trust voided the 
Lien as to the Trustee, including the Trustee's successor-in-interest, Residential. Because 
ParkWest failed to name the Trustee of the Deed of Trust, when Residential took title to the 
Property from that Trustee, Residential took title free and clear of any claim of Park West, 
including ParkWest's mechanic's lien (the "Lien"). For that reason, Residential respectfully 
requests that this Court enter summary judgment in its favor. 
II. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The facts and procedural history ofthis over-four-year dispute are set forth in numerous 
places in the record; the undisputed facts relevant to this instant Motion for Summary Judgment 
are as follows: 
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1. On March 15, 2006, Park West contracted with Defendant Julie Barnson 
("Barnson") to build a home on the Property. See Plaintiffs Supplemental Amended Complaint 
To Foreclose Lien (the "Complaint") filed in this action, ~ 6. 
2. On November 14, 2006, Barnson caused two Deeds of Trust to be recorded as 
Instrument Nos. 200690998 and 200690999, official records of Canyon County, Idaho. The first 
of those, Instrument No. 200690998, is the "Deed of Trust" referred to in this Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Affidavit Of Ryan T. McFarland In Support Of Residential Funding Real 
Estate Holdings, LLC's Motion For Summary Judgment ("McFarland Aff."), filed concurrently 
herewith, ~ 2, Exh. A. 
3. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. was the beneficiary under the 
Deed of Trust. McFarland Aff., ~ 2, Exh. A. 
4. Transnation Title ("Transnation") was listed as the "Trustee" of the Deed of 
Trust. McFarland Aff., ~ 2, Exh. A. 
5. Homecomings Financial, LLC (f/k/a Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.) was 
listed as the "Lender" under the Deed of Trust. McFarland Aff., ~ 2, Exh. A. 
6. On November 28,2006, ParkWest filed its Lien against the Property as 
Instrument No. 200694511, Official Records of Canyon County, Idaho. Complaint, ~ 8. 
7. On June 28,2007, First American Title Insurance Company ("First American") 
was appointed the Trustee of the First Deed of Trust, by virtue of the Appointment Of Successor 
Trustee recorded as Instrument No. 2007044840, Official Records of Canyon County, Idaho. 
McFarland Aff., ~ 3, Exh. B. 
8. On August 7, 2007, ParkWest filed a Verified Complaint To Foreclose Lien 
commencing the above-captioned action, naming as party defendants only Barnson and 
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Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for Homecomings Financial, LLC 
(flk/a Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.) ("MERS"). 
9. ParkWest never named Transnation or First American as a Defendant in this 
action. 
10. On July 20,2009, First American conveyed the Property to Residential via 
Trustee's Deed. McFarland Aff., ~ 4, Exh. C. 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56( c). In a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the 
burden of establishing the lack ofa genuine issue of material fact. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 
130 Idaho 597,600,944 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1997). To meet this burden, the moving party must 
challenge in its motion and establish through evidence that no issue of material fact exists for an 
element of the nonmoving party's case. Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No.2, 128 Idaho 714, 
719,918 P.2d 583,588 (1996). The nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided 
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56( e). 
The nonmoving party must submit more than just conc1usory assertions that an issue of 
material fact exists to establish a genuine issue. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 
388,401, 987 P.2d 300,313 (1999). "[AJ mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to 
the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary 
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judgment." Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 
306 (2000). 
Because there is no genuine issue of fact i.e., it is undisputed and undisputable that 
ParkWest failed to name Transnation or First American - the effect of the failure to name the 
Trustee of the Deed of Trust is purely a question oflaw and is properly before the Court. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. ParkWest's Lien Is Void As To All Persons Not Named As Defendants In This 
Action. 
Idaho Code section 45-510 states that: 
No lien provided for in this chapter binds any building, mining 
claim, improvement or structure for a longer period than six (6) 
months after the claim has been filed, unless proceedings be 
commenced in a proper court within that time to enforce such lien. 
Idaho courts strictly construe this six-month deadline. The lien claimant must commence an 
action within six months, naming as a party defendant each party whose interest the lien claimant 
seeks to foreclose; the failure to do so, or the failure to name an interested party within six 
months of recording the lien, voids the lien as against unnamed parties. 
In Willes v. Palmer, 78 Idaho 104, 298 P.2d 972 (1956), the plaintiff properly recorded a 
mechanic's lien to secure an unpaid balance due on a home improvement project. The plaintiff 
then timely filed an action to foreclose the mechanic's lien; however, the lien claimant only 
named as a defendant the husband owner of the property and did not name the wife, who co-
owned the residence as community property. Nearly thirteen months after the claim of lien was 
filed, the plaintiff was pennitted to amend his complaint by adding the wife as a party defendant. 
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On appeal, the wife contended that since she was not made a party defendant until after 
the expiration of the six month period - that "proceedings [had not been] commenced" against 
her within "six months after the claim ha[ d] been filed" the lien expired as to her interest in the 
property and could not thereafter be foreclosed against her, even though the action had been 
brought against her husband, a co-owner of the property. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed, 
holding: 
We have held that the lien is lost as against the interest of a 
mortgagee not made a party to an action to foreclose the lien 
within the six month period. Western Loan & Building Company 
v. Gem State Lumber Company, 32 Idaho 497, 185 P. 554. It was 
held in that case, and in the cases cited therein, that the period is 
more than a mere statute oflimitations which is waived ifnot 
pleaded; that it is a limitation, not alone upon the remedy, but upon 
the right or liability itself; and that the lien is lost as against the 
interest of any person not made a party to an action to enforce it 
within the six month period. 
In most jurisdictions having mechanic's liens statutes fixing the 
time within which the lien may be enforced, the time fixed is 
regarded as a limitation upon the right as well as upon the remedy, 
and that the lien is lost if the action is not brought within the 
specified time. Crandall v. Irwin, 139 Ohio St. 253, 39 N.E.2d 
608, 139 A.L.R. 895, Id., 139 Ohio St. 463, 40 N.E.2d 933, 
annotation 139 A.L.R. 903. At page 913 the annotator says: 
"Where the time prescribed by the lien statute for bringing 
enforcement suits fixes the duration of the right, the lien 
becomes void for all purposes as to any person not made a 
party to an enforcement suit within that time." 
See also Annotation 75 A.L.R. 695, at page 713. 
The action not having been brought against [the wife] within the 
six month period, the lien as to her interest in the property was 
wholly lost. 
Willes v. Palmer, 78 Idaho at 108. As noted in the dissent, the fact that the wife had notice of 
both the lien and the foreclosure action did not excuse the lien claimant's failure to name her as a 
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defendant: "[the] wife[] actually directed the improvements made on the property. There could 
be no surprise or prejudice." Id, 78 Idaho at 111. Still, the Court held that the lien was void as to 
the wife under Idaho Code section 45-510 because the lien claimant failed to name her as a 
defendant within six months of the filing of the lien. 
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Palmer v. Bradford, 86 Idaho 395,401,388 
P.2d 96 (1963) that: 
The statute [Idaho Code section 45-510] creates and limits the 
duration of the lien. The statute also gives jurisdiction to the court 
to foreclose or enforce a lien on certain conditions - the filing of a 
claim of lien, and the commencement of the action within the time 
specified after such claim is filed. If these things are not done no 
jurisdiction exists in the court to enforce the lien. When the limit 
fixed by statute for duration of the lien is past, no lien exists, any 
more than if it had never been created. 
(internal citations omitted). See also Western Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Gem State Lumber Co., 32 
Idaho 497,501, 185 P. 554 (1919) (lien void as against mortgagee when suit not timely filed); 
D. W Standrod & Co. v. Utah Implement-Vehicle Co., 223 F. 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1915) (lien is 
void as against all subsequent encumbrancers who were not made parties to an action to 
foreclose the lien within six months from the date of the filing thereof); Continental & 
Commercial Trust v. Pacific Coast Pipe Co., 222 F. 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1915) (holding that the 
predecessor to Idaho Code section 45-510 requires that a timely foreclosure action must be 
brought against all of those whose rights, estates, or interests are claimed to be adverse and 
subordinate; otherwise they could not be added); Utah Implement- Vehicle Co. v. Bowman, 209 F. 
942, 947-48 (D. Idaho 1913) (where mortgagee of property was not made a party to suit to 
enforce mechanic's lien within statutory period the lien was of no effect against mortgagee's 
interest). 
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Under this long standing and uncontroverted Idaho law, ParkWest's Lien is void as to all 
persons and entities who claim a right in the Property and who were not named in ParkWest's 
Lien foreclosure action within six months of the filing of the Lien. As the Trustee of the Deed of 
Trust, First American held a legal interest in the Property at the time ParkWest commenced this 
action. Because ParkWest has never named First American as a party defendant, the Lien is void 
as to First American and all persons who claim under First American, including Residential. 
B. First American Was A Necessary Party To ParkWest's Lien Foreclosure Action. 
Presumably, ParkWest will argue that because it named MERS, the beneficiary of the 
Deed of Trust, it "commenced proceedings" sufficient to foreclose its interest as to all persons 
connected with the Deed of Trust, including First American and now Residential, and that 
ParkWest was not required to name the Trustee of the Deed of Trust, First American. Such an 
argument has two fatal flaws: (1) Residential acquired title to the Property from First American, 
the unnamed party, not MERS, and (2) such an argument is directly contrary to Idaho law and 
the nearly universal law across the Country. 
Idaho Code section 45-1513 states: "A deed of trust or transfer of any interest in real 
property in trust to secure the performance of any obligation shall be a conveyance of real 
property." Idaho Code section 45-1502 clearly states that this "conveyance" is a transfer of legal 
title to a trustee, not a beneficiary: 
"Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity with this act 
and conveying real property to a trustee . .. 
"Trustee" means a person to whom the legal title to real property is 
conveyed by trust deed, or his successor in interest. 
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As the person with the legal interest in the property, the trustee of a deed of trust is a necessary 
party to a mechanic's lien foreclosure action, and the failure to timely name a trustee means that 
the mechanic's lien is void as to the trustee and all persons claiming under the trustee. 
That a trustee of a deed of trust is a necessary party to a mechanic's lien foreclosure 
action is, quite literally, hornbook law: 
In a jurisdiction in which a deed of trust or mortgage is effective as 
a transfer of legal title to the secured party [and Idaho is such a 
jurisdiction, per 45-1502 and 45-1513], the trustee ofa deed of 
trust recorded before attachment of a mechanic's lien is a 
necessary party to a suit to enforce the mechanic's lien; if the 
trustee is not a party to the enforcement suit, the mechanic's lien 
cannot be enforced. Thus, the court in such a case must have 
jurisdiction over the person ofthe trustee before the court can 
divest the trustee oftitle. . 
52 AM. JUR. 2D Mechanics' Liens § 369 (2010). Under this rule, any lien or right of foreclosure 
that ParkWest may have had against First American's interest, even if otherwise valid, has been 
lost for failing to name First American within the six-month statutory period. First American 
was a necessary party to this action by ParkWest to foreclose its Lien. As the plain language of 
Idaho Code sections 45-1502 and 45-1513 instructs, First American held legal title to the 
Property at the time ParkWest initiated this lawsuit in 2007, and held legal title until it conveyed 
the Property to Residential in 2009. See also Defendant A v. Idaho State Bar, 132 Idaho 662, 
665, 978 P.2d 222, 225 (Idaho 1999) ("Legal title to the property is conveyed by the deed of trust 
to the trustee .... Only after the obligation secured by the deed of trust is satisfied is the deed of 
trust re-conveyed to the grantor."). The Court must, therefore, have jurisdiction over First 
American or Residential before it can enter a judgment foreclosing on the Property and ordering 
a judicial sale pursuant to the Lien. Absent such jurisdiction, the Court cannot enter a decree 
divesting Residential, or its predecessor in interest, First American, of title. 
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Courts across the country have come to the same conclusion. The Supreme Court of 
Virginia addressed this precise issue and concluded that because the deed of trust trustee was a 
necessary party in a proceeding to enforce a mechanic's lien, the failure to name such trustee 
defeats the enforcement suit. In Walt Robbins, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 232 Va. 43, 348 S.E.2d 223 
(1986), the court considered whether a mechanic's lien was unenforceable because it failed to 
name the deed of trust trustee as a party defendant. The court, on appeal from a chancery 
commissioner's report, considered and rejected the plaintiffs argument that the trustee was not a 
necessary party; instead, the court concluded: 
We are of opinion that a trustee in an antecedent deed of trust 
recorded on unimproved land is a necessary party in a suit to 
enforce a mechanic's lien on the improvements. Where, as here, a 
mechanic's lien is to be enforced by judicial sale, title is conveyed 
to the successful bidder by a special commissioner appointed for 
that purpose. If legal title is vested in the trustee of an antecedent 
deed of trust, and the property is to be sold free of the trust lien, the 
chancellor must have jurisdiction over the person of the trustee 
before he can enter a decree divesting him of title. 
We hold, therefore, that [the] mechanics' liens were not 
enforceable because the trustees and the beneficiary of the deed of 
trust were not made parties to the suits to enforce. 
!d. 232 Va. at 48. See also Lunsfordv. Wren, 64 W.Va. 458, 63 S.B. 308,311 (1908) ("The 
trustee in a deed of trust, holding the legal title, is a necessary defendant to such suit, and his 
absence renders the bill fatally defective."). 
Although the Walt Robbins court only expressly addressed whether a trustee in an 
antecedent deed of trust was a necessary party, the Supreme Court of Virginia subsequently 
clarified that its analysis applied with equal force to an interest that arose subsequent to the 
mechanic's lien. See James T Bush Construction Co. v. Patel, 243 Va. 84,412 S.E.2d 703 
(1992) (rejecting argument that the holder of an interest arising subsequent to a mechanic's lien 
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is not a necessary party); Heyward & Lee Construction Co., Inc., v. Sands, Anderson, Marks, & 
Miller, 249 Va. 54, 58,453 S.E.2d 270,273 (1995) (clarifying that Bush court had held that 
trustee of deed oftrust recorded subsequent to the filing of the mechanic's lien but prior to the 
filing of the enforcement suit was a necessary party). The Heyward & Lee court also discussed 
an earlier ruling in that case in which it had entered judgment for the defendants because a 
necessary party to an enforcement suit - a trustee of a subsequent deed of trust - had not been 
joined as a party "in a timely manner, i.e., within six months after the mechanics' liens were 
filed." Id. 249 Va. at 57. 
California case law also enforces the rule that the trustee of a deed of trust which 
otherwise might be junior to a mechanic's lien is a necessary party to a lien foreclosure action. 
In Riley v. Peters, 194 Cal.App.2d 296,15 Cal.Rptr. 41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961), the 
plaintiff/respondent ("Buyer") was, just like Residential here, a purchaser of property at a 
trustee's sale who thereafter brought, like Residential's counterclaim here, a quiet title action 
against mechanics' lien claimants who had filed liens and "obtained judgments against the 
former owners [of] the property." !d., 194 Cal.App.2d at 297. Subsequent to the mechanics' lien 
claimants' judgments, the trustee of a deed of trust on the property foreclosed and "the trustee 
executed and delivered to [Buyer] a trustee's deed." Id. The mechanic's lien claimants had not 
joined "either [Buyers] or the trustee under the deed of trust as parties to any of the actions to 
foreclose their mechanic's liens." Id. The California Court framed the issue then before the 
court, which is the precise issue now before this Court, as follows: 
The parties concede that since appellants had commenced work 
prior to the recording of the deed of trust, appellants' liens prevail 
over the deed of trust through which [Buyers] obtained their 
interest. The sole issue, therefore, may be thus stated: Is 
commencement of an action against only the owner, and not also 
against the trustee or the subsequent holder under a deed of trust, 
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effective ... to preserve the lien and to prevail over the rights of 
interested persons who have not been named as parties? 
Id. at 297-298. The California Court concluded that: 
Id., at 297. 
[as to] holders of mechanics' liens on the property, who have failed 
in their lien foreclosure actions to join as parties the trustee under a 
deed of trust or to join the subsequent owners under that deed ... 
such failure precludes [such mechanics' lien claimants] from 
claiming priority over such owners. 
For over one hundred years, courts across the United States have similarly held that a 
trustee under a deed oftrust is a necessary party to a lien foreclosure action. See Johnson v. 
Bennett, 6 Colo.App. 362,367,40 P. 847,849 (Ct. App. 1895) (citing a Colorado statute 
virtually identical to Idaho Code section 45-510 and holding that "the suit must embrace all 
persons against whom priority oflien is claimed .... To establish a lien as superior to an 
incumbrance, the cestui que trust and the trustee must be made parties within six months"); 
Schillinger Fire-Proo/Cement & Asphalt Co. v. Arnott, 14 N.Y.S. 326, 329 (N.Y. Spec. Term 
1891) (reversing a judgment foreclosing a mechanic's lien because of the failure of the 
mechanic's lien claimant to name as a party defendant the "trustee under the mortgage on the 
premises"); and Columbia Building & Loan Ass 'no v. Taylor, 25 II1.App. 429, (1887) (holding 
that where the property owner "executed a trust deed ... to one Philip Maas, as trustee, thereby 
conveying the legal title in said premises to him," and where the subsequent action for 
foreclosure brought by a mechanic's lien claimant "made the cestui que trust, under the trust 
deed, a party," the lien claimant "should also have made the trustee, in whom the legal title was 
vested, a party. The rule is inflexible in such a case as this, that both the trustee and cestui que 
trust should be made parties"). 
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The principle that a court must have jurisdiction over a deed of trust trustee before it can 
enter a judgment foreclosing on the property is consistent with jurisdictional principles of Idaho 
law. For example, in Weyyakin Ranch Property Owners' Ass 'n, Inc. v. City of Ketchum, 127 
Idaho 1,2-3,896 P.2d 327, 328-29 (1995), the court held that a trial court never obtained 
jurisdiction over elected city officials where "only the City of Ketchum was named as a party" 
and the plaintiffs "failed to name the elected officials individually[.]" And in Collier Carbon & 
Chemical Corp. v. Castle Butte, Inc., 109 Idaho 708, 710, 710 P.2d 618,620 (Ct. App. 1985), the 
court found that the trial court "lacked jurisdiction initially to enter such a judgment" against 
persons where the complaint failed to name persons in their individual capacity as defendants. 
Likewise here: the failure to name First American as a party defendant deprives this Curt of the 
power to enter a judgment against First American, or its successor in interest, Residential, and 
any judgment against First American or Residential would necessarily be void. 
C. ParkWest's Lien Is Void As To Residential. 
As set forth above, because ParkWest never named the Trustee ofthe Deed of Trust as a 
party Defendant, the Lien became void as to the Trustee. Therefore, when the Trustee conveyed 
the Property to Residential via Trustee's Deed nearly two years after the case was commenced, 
First American conveyed the Property free and clear of the Lien and of any interest of Park West. 
Presumably, ParkWest will argue that First American held only a contingent power of 
sale, and therefore, ParkWest was excused from naming First American and the Lien survives 
the Trustee's Sale. Such an argument would find no support in Idaho or its sister-states' laws. 
As set forth above, Idaho case law is clear that the result of a lien claimant's failure to name a 
defendant in a lien foreclosure action is that the claimant loses its lien against the property in 
regard to the unnamed party's interest. Further support for this rule can be found in the factually 
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similar Bonner Building Supply, Inc. v. Standard Forest Products, Inc., 106 Idaho 682, 682 P.2d 
635 (Ct. App. 1984). In that case, Standard Forest Products, Inc. ("Standard") purchased the 
property there at issue via sheriffs sale. !d., 682 P.2d at 637. Subsequently, Bonner Building 
Supply, Inc. ("Bonner") recorded a mechanic's lien that otherwise would have been superior to 
Standard's interest. Id. Bonner then brought its lien foreclosure action, but "Standard was not 
made a party to the foreclosure action or the ensuing sale." Id. The Court of Appeals held: 
Id., at 639. 
although Bonner was not required to name Standard as a party to 
the foreclosure action ... the failure to do so left Standards' 
interest in the property unaffected by the foreclosure. Because 
Bonner failed to foreclose against Standard within six months of 
the filing ofthe claim of lien, it lost its lien against the property in 
regard to Standard. For the purpose of this instant case, Bonner's 
lien was extinguished. Standard's interest in the property should 
be confirmed by the district court, free of Bonner's lien. 
A California case, also virtually identical to this one, reaches the same conclusion. In 
Sawyer Nurseries v. Galardi, 181 Cal.App.3d 663, 226 Cal.Rptr. 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), 
Sawyer Nurseries "provided labor and materials to improve certain real property located in 
Malibu, California." Id., 181 Ca1.App.3d at 665. Approximately six months later, the property 
owner executed a deed of trust against the property in favor of Cambridge. !d., at 666. Less than 
two weeks later, Sawyer Nurseries recorded its mechanic's lien. Id. Five months later, the 
property owner filed bankruptcy (as Barnson did in this case). Id. Thereafter Cambridge 
obtained relief from the bankruptcy stay, foreclosed on the property, and recorded a trustee's 
deed conveying title to the property there at issue. Id. at 667. Sawyer Nurseries then filed an 
action to foreclose its mechanics' lien, some eight months after the bankruptcy court granted 
Cambridge relief from stay, and 166 days after the recordation ofthe trustee's deed. Id. 
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In applying California law, which required mechanic's lien claimants to commence an 
action within 90 days of the recordation of the lien, the California court held that the mechanic's 
lien foreclosure action was untimely and therefore barred: "once the automatic stay tolling [the 
mechanic's lien foreclosure statute] terminated, [the lien claimant] was required to act within the 
... statutory time limitation set forth therein on order to protect its mechanic's lien rights." Id., 
at 671. Notwithstanding the fact that the property owner filed bankruptcy, and notwithstanding 
the fact that the lien was of record at the time of the execution ofthe trustee's deed, Sawyer 
Nurseries was not absolved of its duty to commence its action to foreclose against all interested 
parties, and Sawyer Nurseries' failure to comply with its duties meant that Cambridge could 
convey the property via trustee's deed free and clear of Sawyer Nurseries' mechanic's lien. 
Similarly, here: nothing excused ParkWest from commencing its foreclosure action 
against all interested parties. Because ParkWest failed to name First American, First American 
was able to and did convey the Property, via the Trustee's Deed, free and clear of Park West's 
Lien. That First American held legal title to convey the property upon Barnson's default on the 
Deed of Trust does not absolve ParkWest of its statutory obligations, nor does it mean that 
Residential holds less than clear title to the Property. Under the rule articulated in Bonner 
Building Supply, Inc. v. Standard Forest Products, Inc. and elsewhere, ParkWest was not strictly 
required to name First American or Residential as Defendants in this action, but the failure to do 
so left First American's interest in the Property unaffected by ParkWest's foreclosure action. 
ParkWest's lien is extinguished as to First American and Residential, and Residential's interest 
in the property is free of Park West's Lien. 
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For the reasons stated herein, Residential respectfully requests that this Court enter 
summary judgment in favor of Residential. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF RYAN T. 
MCFARLAND IN SUPPORT OF 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL 
ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Ryan T. McFarland, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
AFFIDAVIT OF RYAN T. MCFARLAND IN SUPPORT OF RESIDENTIAL 
FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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1. I am counsel for Defendant/Counterc1aimant Residential Funding Real Estate 
Holdings, LLC ("Residential") in the foregoing action and make this affidavit on my own 
personal knowledge. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a certified copy of a Deed of Trust (the "Deed of 
Trust") recorded by Defendant Julie G. Barnson ("Bamson") against the property at issue in this 
case (the "Property") on November 14, 2006, as Instrument No. 200690998, official records of 
Canyon County, Idaho. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a certified copy of the Appointment Of Successor 
Trustee, by which First American Title Insurance Company ("First American") became the 
Trustee of the Deed of Trust, recorded June 28, 2007, as Instrument No. 2007044840, Official 
Records of Canyon County, Idaho. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a certified copy of the Trustee's Deed by which 
First American conveyed the Property to Residential, recorded July 20,2009 as Instrument No. 
2009036841, Official Records of Canyon County, Idaho. 
5. Further your affiant sayeth naught 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
I, Teri French, a Notary Public, do hereby certify that on this ~ day of November, 
2010, personally appeared before me Ryan T. McFarland, who, being by me first duly sworn, 
declared that he is an attorney of record for DefendantiCounterclaimant Residential Funding 
Real Estate Holdings, LLC in the foregoing action, that he signed the foregoing document as an 
attorney for Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC, and that the statements therein 
contained are true. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the 
day and year in this certificate first above written. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My commission expires June 27, 2014 
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true copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF RYAN T. MCFARLAND IN SUPPORT OF 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Robert B. Bums 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
David E. Wishney 
Attorney at Law 
300 W. Myrtle Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, ID 83701-0837 
[Attorney for Defendant Julie G. Barnson] 
-f- U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
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__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
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Words used. in multiple sections of this document are defined. below and other words are defmed. in 
Sections 3, 11 , 13, 18, 20 and 21. Certain rules regarding the usage of words used. in this document are 
also provided. in Section 16. 
(A) "Security Instrument" means this document, which is dated NOVEMBER 10TH, 2006 
together with all Riders to this document. . 
(B) "Borrower" is 
JULIE G. BARNSON, AN UNMARRIED WOMAN 
Borrower is the trustor under this Security Instrument. 
(C) "Lender" is HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL, LLC (F/K/A HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL 
NETWORK, INC.) 
Lender is a LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
organized and existing under the laws of DELAWARE 
IDAHO·Single Family-Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac UNIFORM INSTRUMENT WITH MERS 
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Lender's address is 1687 114THAVE., SE, SUITE 100 
BELLEVUE, WA 98004 
(D) "Trustee" is TRANSNATION TITLE 
(E) "l\1ERS" is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. MERS is a separate corporation that is 
acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns. l\1ERS is the beneficiary 
under this Security Instrument. MERS is organized and existing under the laws of Delaware, and has an 
address and telephone number of P.O. Box 2026, Flint, MI 48501-2026, tel. (888) 679-MERS. 
(F) "Note" means the promissory note signed by Borrower and dated NOVEMBER 10TH, 2006 
The Note states that Borrower owes Lender THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN THOUSAND SIX 
HUNDRED AND NO/lOa Dollars 
(U . S. $ 3 3 7 I 6 0 a . 00 ) plus interest. Borrower has promised to pay this debt in regular Periodic 
Payments and to pay the debt in full not later than DECEMBER 1ST I 2036 
(G) "Property" means the property that is described below under the heading "Transfer of Rights in the 
Property. " 
(H) "Loan" means the debt evidenced by the Note, plus interest. any prepayment charges and late charges 
due under the Note, and all sums due under this Security Instrument, plus interest. 
(I) "Riders" means all Riders to this Security Instrument that are executed by Borrower. The following 
Riders are to be executed by Borrower [check box as applicable): 
[XI Adjustable Rate Rider 
D Balloon Rider 
DVARider 
D Condominium Rider [i] Second Home Rider 
D Planned Unit Development Rider D 1-4 Family Rider 
D Biweekly Payment Rider 0 Other(s) [specify] 
(J) "Applicable Law" means all controlling applicable federal, state and local statutes, regulations, 
ordinances and administrative rules and orders (that have the effect of law) as well as all applicable fInal, 
non-appealable judicial opinions. 
(K) "Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments" means all dues, fees, assessments and other 
charges that are imposed on Borrower or the Property by a condominium association, homeowners 
association or similar organization. 
(L) "Electronic Funds Transfer" means any transfer of funds, other than a transaction originated by 
check, draft, or similar paper instrument, which is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephonic 
instrument, computer, or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize a fInancial institution to debit 
or credit an account. Such term includes, but is not limited to, point-of-sale transfers, automated teller 
machine transactions, transfers initiated by telephone, wire transfers, and automated clearinghouse 
transfers. 
(M) "Escrow Items" means those items that are described in Section 3. 
(N) "Miscellaneous Proceeds" means any compensation, settlement, award of damages, or proceeds paid 
by any third party (other than insurance proceeds paid under the coverages described in Section 5) for: (i) 
damage to, or destruction of, the Property; (ii) condemnation or other taking of all or any part of the 
Property; (iii) conveyance in lieu of condemnation; or (iv) misrepresentations of, or omissions as to, the 
value and/or condition of the Property. 
(0) "Mortgage Insurance" means insurance protecting Lender against the nonpayment of, or default on, 
the Loan. 
(p) "Periodic Payment" means the regularly scheduled amount due for (i) principal and interest under the 
Note, plus (ii) any amounts under Section 3 of this Security Instrument. 
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(Q) "RESPA" means the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (12 U.S.C. Section 2601 et seq.) and its 
implementing regulation, Regulation X (24 C.F.R. Part 3500), as they might be amended from time to 
time, or any additional or successor legislation or regulation that governs the same subject matter. As used 
in this Security Instrument, "RESP A" refers to all requirements and restrictions that are imposed in regard 
to a "federally related mortgage loan" even if the Loan does not qualify as a "federally related mortgage 
loan" under RESPA. 
(R) "Successor in Interest of BOlTowerll means any party that has taken title to the Property, whether or 
not that party has assumed Borrower's obligations under the Note and/or this Security Instrument. 
TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IN THE PROPERTY 
The beneficiary of this Security Instrument is MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender's 
successors and assigns) and the successors and assigns of MERS. This Security Instrument secures to 
Lender: (i)the.repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions and modifications of the Note; and (ii) 
the performance of Borrower's covenants and agreements under this Security Instrument and the Note. For 
this purpose, Borrower irrevocably grants and conveys to Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the 
following described property located in the COUNTY [Type of Recording Jurisdiction) 
of CMf,{ON [Name of Recording Jurisdiction] : 
LOT Z'IN BLOCK 1 OF RlVERBEND SUBDIVISION, CANYON COUNTY I IDAHO, 
ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF, FILED IN BOOK 34 OF PLATS, AT 
PAGE 2, RECORDS OF SAID COUNTY. 
Parcel ID Number: 6R074790010040 
28123 SILO WAY 
WILDER 
("Property Address"): 
which currently has the address of 
[City]. Idaho 83676 
[Street} 
[Zip Code] 
TOGETHER WITH all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all 
easements, appurtenances. and fIxtures now or hereafter a part of the property. All replacements and 
additions shall also be covered by this Security Instrument. All of the foregoing is referred to in this 
Security Instrument as the "Property. " Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title 
to the interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or 
custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any 
or all of those interests, including, but not limited to. the right to foreclosure and sell the Property; and to 
take any action required of Lender including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this Security 
Instrument. 
BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed and has 
the right to grant and convey the Property and that the Property is unencumbered, except for encumbrances 
of record. Borrower warrants and will defend generally the title to the Property against all claims and 
demands, subject to any encumbrances of record. 
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THIS SECURITY INSTRUMENT combines uniform covenants for national use and non-uniform 
covenants with limited variations by jurisdiction to constitute . a unifonn security instrument covering real 
property. 
UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender covenant and agree as follows: . 
1. Payment of Principal, Interest, Escrow Items, Prepayment Charges, and Late Charges. 
Borrower shall pay when due the principal of, and interest on, the debt evidenced by the Note and any 
prepayment charges and late charges due under the Note. Borrower shall also pay funds for Escrow Items 
pursuant to Section 3. Payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument shall be made in U.S. 
currency. However, if any check or other instrument received by Lender as payment under the Note or this 
Security Instrument is returned to Lender unpaid, Lender may require that any or all subsequent payments 
due under the Note and this Security Instrument be made in one or more of the following forms. as 
selected by Lender: (a) cash; (b) money order; (c) certified check. bank check, treasurer's check or 
cashier's check. provided any such check is drawn upon an institution whose deposits are insured by a 
federal agency, instrumentality, or entity; or (d) Electronic Funds Transfer. . 
Payments are deemed received by Lender when received at the location designated in the Note or at 
such other location as may be designated by Lender in accordance with the notice provisions in Section 15. 
Lender may return any payment or partial payment if the payment or partial payments are inSufficient to 
bring the Loan current. Lender may accept any payment or partial payment insufficient to bring the Loan 
current. without waiver of any rights hereunder or prejudice to its rights to refuse such payment or partial 
payments in the future. but Lender is not obligated to apply such payments at the time such payments are 
accepted. If each Periodic Payment is applied as of its scheduled due date, then Lender need not pay 
interest on unapplied funds. Lender may hold such unapplied funds until Borrower makes payment to bring 
the Loan current. If Borrower does not do so within a reasonable period of time, Lender shall either apply 
such funds or return them to Borrower. If not applied earlier, such funds will be applied to the outstanding 
principal balance under the Note immediately prior to foreclosure. No offset or claim which Borrower 
might have now or in the future against Lender shall relieve Borrower from making payments due under 
the Note and this Security Instrument or performing the covenants and agreements secured by this Security 
Instrument. 
2. Application of Payments or Proceeds. Except as otherwise described in this Section 2, all 
payments accepted and applied by Lender shall be applied in the following order of priority: (a) interest 
due under the Note; (b) principal due under the Note; (c) amounts due under Section 3. Such payments 
shall be applied to each Periodic Payment in the order in which it became due. Any remaining amounts 
shall be applied first to late charges, second to any other amounts due under this Security Instrument, and 
then to reduce the principal balance of the Note. 
If Lender receives a payment from Borrower for· a delinquent Periodic Payment which includes a 
sufficient amount to pay any late charge due, the payment may be applied to the delinquent payment and 
the late charge. If more than one Periodic Payment is outstanding, Lender may apply any payment received 
from Borrower to the repayment of the Periodic Payments if. and to the extent that, each payment can be 
paid in full. To the extent that any excess exists after the payment is applied to the full payment of one or 
more Periodic Payments, such excess may be applied to any late charges due. Voluntary prepayments shall 
be applied first to any prepayment charges and then as described in the Note. 
Any application of payments, insurance proceeds, or Miscellaneous Proceeds to principal due under 
the Note shall not extend or postpone the due date, or change the amount, of the Periodic Payments. 
3. Funds for Escrow Items. Borrower shall pay to Lender on the day Periodic Payments are due 
under the Note, until the Note is paid in full. a sum (the "Funds") to provide for payment of amounts due 
for: (a) taxes and assessments and other items which can attain priority over this Security Instrument as a 
lien or encumbrance on the Property; (b) leasehold payments or ground rents on the Property, if any; (c) 
premitims for any and all insurance required by Lender under Section 5; and (d) Mortgage Insurance 
premiums. if any, or any sums payable by Borrower to Lender in lieu of the payment of Mortgage 
Insurance premiums in accordance with the provisions of Section 10. These items are called "Escrow 
Items." At origination or at any time during the term of the Loan, Lender may require that Community 
Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments. if any, be escrowed by Borrower, and such dues, fees and 
assessments shall be an Escrow Item. Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender all notices of amounts to 
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be paid under this Section. Borrower shall pay Lender the Funds for Escrow Items unless Lender waives 
Borrower's obligation to pay the Funds for any or all Escrow Items. Lender may waive Borrower's 
obligation to pay to Lender Funds for any or all Escrow Items at any time. Any such waiver may only be 
in writing. In the event of such waiver, Borrower shall pay directly, when and where payable, the amounts 
due for any Escrow Items for which payment of Funds has been waived by Lender and, if Lender requires, 
shall furnish to Lender receipts evidencing such payment within such time period as Lender may require. 
Borrower's obligation to make such payments and to provide receipts shall for all purposes be deemed to 
be a covenant and agreement contained in this Security Instrument, as the phrase "covenant and agreement" 
is used in Section 9. If Borrower is Obligated to pay Escrow Items directly, pursuant to a waiver, and 
Borrower fails to pay the amount due for an Escrow Item, Lender may exercise its rights under Section 9 
and pay such amount and Borrower shall then be obligated under Section 9 to repay to Lender any such 
amount. Lender may revoke the waiver as to any or all Escrow Items at any time by a notice given in 
accordance with Section 15 and, upon such revocation, Borrower shall pay to Lender all Funds, and in 
such amounts, that are then required under this Section 3. 
. Lender may. at any time, collect and hold Funds in an amount (a) sufficient to permit Lender to apply 
the Funds at the time specified under RESPA. and (b) not to exceed the maximum amount a lender can 
require under RESPA. Lender shall estimate the amount of Funds due on the basis of current data and 
reasonable estimates of expenditures of future Escrow Items or otherwise in accordance with Applicable 
Law. 
The Funds shall be held in an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, 
instrumentality, or entity (including Lender, if Lender is an institution whose deposits are so insured) or in 
any Federal Home Loan Bank. Lender shall apply the Funds to pay the Escrow Items no later than the time 
specified under RESPA. Lender shall not charge Borrower for holding and applying the Funds, annually 
analyzing the escrow account, or verifying the Escrow Items, unless Lender pays Borrower interest on the 
Funds and Applicable Law permits Lender to make such a charge. Unless an agreement is made in writing 
or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on the Funds. Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower 
any interest or earnings on the Funds. Borrower and Lender can agree in writing, however, that interest 
shall be paid on the Funds. Lender shall give to Borrower, without charge, an annual accounting of the 
Funds as required by RESPA. 
If there is a surplus of Funds held in escrow, as defmed under RESPA, Lender shall account to 
Borrower for the excess funds in accordance with RESPA. If there is a shortage of Funds held in escrow, 
as defined under RESPA, Lender shall notify Borrower as required by RESPA, and Borrower shall pay to 
Lender the amount necessary to make up the shortage in accordance with RESPA. but in no more than 12 
monthly payments. If there is a deficiency of Funds held in escrow, as defmed under RESPA, Lender shall 
notify Borrower as required by RESPA, and Borrower shall pay to Lender the amount necessary to make 
up the deficiency in accordance with RESPA, but in no more than 12 monthly payments. 
Upon payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall promptly refund 
to Borrower any Funds held by Lender. 
4. Charges; Liens. Borrower shall pay all taxes, assessments, charges, fines, and impositions 
attributable to the Property which can attain priority over this Security Instrument, leasehold payments or 
ground rents on the Property, if any, and Conununity Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments. if any. To 
the extent that these items are Escrow Items, Borrower shall pay them in the manner provided in Section 3. 
Borrower shall promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this Security Instrument unless 
Borrower: (a) agrees in writing to the payment of the obligation secured by the lien in a manner acceptable 
to Lender, but only so long as Borrower is performing such agreement; (b) contests the lien in good faith 
by, or defends against enforcement of the lien in. legal proceedings which in Lender's opinion operate to 
prevent the enforcement of the lien while those proceedings are pending, but only until such proceedings 
are concluded; or (c) secures from the holder of the lien an agreement satisfactory to Lender subordinating 
the lien to this Security Instrument. If Lender determines that any part of the Property is subject to a lien 
which can attain priority over this Security Instrument, Lender may give Borrower a notice identifying the 
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lien. Within 10 days of the date on which that notice is given, Borrower shall satisfy the lien or take one or 
more of the actions set forth above in this Section 4. 
Lender may require Borrower to pay a one-time charge for a real estate tax verification and/or 
reporting service used by Lender in connection with this Loan. 
S. Property Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing or hereafter erected on 
the Property insured against loss by fire, hazards included within the term "extended coverage," and any 
other hazards including, but not limited to, earthquakes and floods, for which Lender requires insurance. 
This insurance shall be maintained· in the amounts (including deductible levels) and for the periods that 
Lender requires. What Lender requires pursuant to the preceding sentences can change during the term of 
the Loan. The insurance carrier providing the insurance shall be chosen by Borrower subject to Lender's 
right to disapprove Borrower's choice, which right shall not be exercised unreasonably. Lender may 
require Borrower to pay, in connection with this Loan; either: (a) a one-time charge for flood zone 
determination. certification and tracking services; or (b) a one-time charge for flood zone determination 
and certification services and subsequent charges each time remappings or similar changes otcur which 
reasonably might affect such determination or certification., Borrower shall also be responsible for the 
payment of any fees imposed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in connection with the 
review of any flood zone determination resulting from an objection by Borrower. 
If Borrower fails to maintain any of the coverages described above, Lender may obtain insurance 
coverage, at Lender's option and Borrower's expense. Lender is under no obligation to purchase any 
particular type or amount of coverage. Therefore, such coverage shall cover Lender, but might or might 
not protect Borrower, Borrower's equity in the Property, or the contents of the Property, against any risk. 
hazard or liability and might provide greater or lesser coverage than was previously in effect. Borrower 
acknowledges that the cost of the insurance coverage so obtained might significantly exceed the cost of 
insurance that Borrower could have obtained. Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 5 shall 
become additional debt of Borrower secured by this Security Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest 
at the Note rate from the date of disbursement and shall be payable. with such interest, upon notice from 
Lender to Borrower requesting payment. 
All insurance policies required by Lender and renewals of such policies shall be subject to Lender's 
right to disapprove such policies, shall include a standard mortgage clause, and shall name Lender as 
mortgagee and/or as an additional loss payee. Lender shall have the right to hold the policies and renewal 
certificates. If Lender requires, Borrower shall promptly give to Lender all receipts of paid premiums and 
renewal notices. If Borrower obtains any form of insurance coverage, not otherwise required by Lender, 
for damage to, or destruction of, the Property, such policy shall include a standard mortgage clause and 
shall name Lender as mortgagee and/or as an additional loss payee. 
In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender. Lender 
may make proof of loss if not made promptly by Borrower. Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree 
in writing, any insurance proceeds, whether or not the underlying insurance was required by Lender, shall 
be applied to restoration or repair of the Property, if the restoration or repair is economically feasible and 
Lender's security is not lessened. During such repair and restoration period, Lender shall have the right to 
hold such insurance proceeds until Lender has had an opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure the 
work has been completed to Lender's satisfaction, provided that such inspection shall be undertaken 
promptly. Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs and restoration in a single payment or in a series 
of progress payments as the work is completed. Unless an agreement is made in writing or Applicable Law 
requires interest to be paid on such insurance proceeds, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any 
interest or earnings on such proceeds. Fees for public adjusters. or other third parties, retained by 
Borrower shall not be paid out of the insurance proceeds and shall be the sole obligation of Borrower. If 
the restoration or repair is not econOmically feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, the insurance 
proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with 
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the excess, if any, paid to Borrower. Such insurance proceeds shall be applied in the order provided for in 
Section 2. 
If Borrower abandons the Property, Lender may me, negotiate and settle any available insurance 
claim and related matters. If Borrower does not respond within 30 days to a notice from Lender that the 
insurance carrier has offered to settle a claim, then Lender may negotiate and settle the claim. The 30-day 
period will begin when the notice is given. In either event, or if Lender acquires the Property under 
Section 22 or otherwise, Borrower hereby assigns to Lender (a) Borrower's rights to any insurance 
proceeds in an amount not to exceed the amounts unpaid under the Note or this Security Instrument, and 
(b) any other of Borrower's rights (other than the right to any refund of unearned premiums paid by 
Borrower) under all insurance policies covering the Property, insofar as such rights are applicable to the 
coverage of the Property. Lender may use the insurance proceeds either to repair or restore the Property or 
to pay amounts unpaid under the Note or this Security Instrument, whether or not then due. 
6. Occupancy. Borrower shall occupy. establish, and use the Property as Borrower's principal 
residence within 60 days after the execution of this Security Instrument and shall continue to occupy the 
Property as Borrower's principal residence for at least one year after the date of occupancy, unless Lender 
otherwise agrees in writing, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, or unless extenuating 
circumstances exist which are beyond Borrower's control. 
7. Preservation, Maintenance and Protection of the Property; Inspections. Borrower shall not 
destroy, damage or impair the Property, allow the Property to deteriorate or commit waste on the 
Property. Whether Or not Borrower is residing in the Property, Borrower shall maintain the Property in 
order to prevent the Property from deteriorating or decreasing in value due to its condition. Unless it is 
determined pursuant to Section 5 that repair or restoration is not economically feasible, Borrower shall 
promptly repair the Property if damaged to avoid further deterioration or damage. If insurance or 
condenmation proceeds are paid in connection with damage to, or the taking of, the Property. Borrower 
shall be responsible for repairing or restoring the Property only if Lender has released proceeds for such 
purposes. Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs and restoration in a single payment or in a series of 
progress payments as the work is completed. If the insurance or condemnation proceeds are not sufficient 
to repair or restore the Property. Borrower is not relieved of Borrower's obligation for the completion of 
such repair or restoration. 
Lender or its agent may make reasonable entries upon and inspections of the Property. If it has 
reasonable cause, Lender may inspect the interior of the improvements on the Property. Lender shall give 
Borrower notice at the time of or prior to such an interior inspection specifying such reasonable cause. 
8. Borrower's Loan Application. Borrower shall be in default if, during the Loan application 
process. Borrower or any persons or entities acting at the direction of Borrower or with Borrower's 
knowledge or consent gave materially false, misleading, or inaccurate information or statements to Lender 
(or failed to provide Lender with material information) in connection with the Loan. Material 
representations include. but are not limited to, representations concerning Borrower's occupancy of the 
Property as Borrower's principal residence. 
9. Protection of Lender's Interest in the Property and Rights Under this Security Instrument. If 
(a) Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument. (b) there 
is a legal proceeding that might significantly affect Lender's interest in the Property andlor rights under 
this Security Instrument (such as a proceeding in bankruptcy, probate, for condenmation or forfeiture, for 
enforcement of a lien which may attain priority over this Security Instrument or to enforce laws or 
regulations), or (c) Borrower has abandoned the Property, then Lender may do and pay for whatever is 
reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender's interest in the Property and rights under this Security 
Instrument, including protecting and/or assessing the value of the Property, and securing andlor repairing 
the Property. Lender's actions can include, but are not limited to: (a) paying any sums secured by a lien 
which has priority over this Security Instrument; (b) appearing in court; and (c) paying reasonable 
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attorneys' fees to protect its interest in the Property and/or rights under this Security Instrument, including 
its secured position in a bankruptcy proceeding. Securing the Property includes, but is not limited to. 
entering the Property to make repairs, change locks, replace or board up doors and windows. drain water 
from pipes, eliminate building or other code violations or dangerous conditions, and have utilities turned 
on or off. Although Lender may take action under this Section 9, Lender does not have to do so and is not 
under any duty or obligation to do so. It is agreed that Lender incurs no liability for not taking any or all 
actions authorized under this Section 9. 
Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 9 shall become additional debt of Borrower 
secured by this Security Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from the date of 
disbursement and shall be payable, with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting 
payment. 
If this Security Instrument is on a leasehold. Borrower shall comply with all the provisions of the 
lease. If Borrower acquires fee title to the Property, the leasehold and the fee title shall not merge unless 
Lender agrees to the merger in writing. 
10. Mortgage Insurance. If Lender require4 Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making the Loan, 
Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain the Mortgage Insurance in effect. If. for any reason, 
the Mortgage Insurance coverage required by Lender ceases to be available from the mortgage insurer that 
previously provided such insurance and Borrower was required to make separately designated payments 
toward the premiums for Mortgage Insurance, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to obtain 
coverage substantially equivalent to the Mortgage Insurance previously in effect, at a cost substantially 
equivalent to the cost to Borrower of the Mortgage Insurance previously in effect, from an alternate 
mortgage insurer selected by Lender. If substantially equivalent Mortgage Insurance coverage is not 
available, Borrower shall continue to pay to Lender the amount of the separately designated payments that 
were due when the insurance coverage ceased to be in effect. Lender will accept. use and retain these 
payments as a non-refundable loss reserve in lieu of Mortgage Insurance. Such loss reserve shall be 
non-refundable, notwithstanding the fact that the Loan is ultimately paid in full, and Lender shall not be 
required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such loss reserve. Lender can no longer require loss 
reserve payments if Mortgage Insurance coverage (in the amount and for the period that Lender requires) 
provided by an insurer selected by Lender again becomes available. is obtained, and Lender requires 
separately designated payments toward the premiums for Mortgage Insurance. If Lender required Mortgage 
Insurance as a condition of making the Loan and Borrower was required to make separately designated 
payments toward the premiums for Mortgage Insurance, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to 
maintain Mortgage Insurance in effect, or to provide a non-refundable loss reserve, until Lender's 
requirement for Mortgage Insurance ends in accordance with any written agreement between Borrower and 
Lender providing for such termination or until termination is required by Applicable Law. Nothing in this 
Section 10 affects Borrower's obligation to pay interest at the rate provided in the Note. 
Mortgage Insurance reimburses Lender (or any entity that purchases the Note) for certain losses it 
may incur if Borrower does not repay the Loan as agreed. Borrower is not a party to the Mortgage 
Insurance. 
Mortgage insurers evaluate their total risk on all such insurance in force from time to time, and may 
enter into agreements with other parties that share or modify their risk. or reduce losses. These agreements 
are on terms and conditions that are satisfactory to the mortgage insurer and the other party (or parties) to 
these agreements. These agreements may require the mortgage insurer to make payments using any source 
of funds that the mortgage insurer may have available (which may include funds obtained from Mortgage 
Insurance premiums). 
As a result of these agreements, Lender. any purchaser of the Note, another insurer, any reinsurer, 
any other entity, or any affiliate of any of the foregoing, may receive (directly or indirectly) amounts that 
derive from (or might be characterized as) a portion of Borrower's payments for Mortgage Insurance, in 
exchange for sharing or modifying the mortgage insurer's risk, or reducing losses. If such agreement 
provides that an affiliate of Lender takes a share of the insurer's risk in exchange for a share of the 
premiums paid to the insurer, the arrangement is often termed "captive reinsurance." Further: 
(a) Any such agreements will not affect the amounts that Borrower has agreed to pay for 
Mortgage Insurance, or any other terms of the Loan. Such agreements will not increase the amount 
Borrower will owe for Mortgage Insurance, and they will not entitle Borrower to any refund. 
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(b) Any such agreements will not affect the rights Borrower has - if any - with respect to the 
Mortgage Insurance under the Homeowners Protection Act of 1998 or· any other law. These rights 
may include the right to receive certain disclosures, to request and obtain cancellation of the 
Mortgage Insurance, to have the Mortgage Insurance tenninated automatically, and/or to receive a 
refund of any Mortgage Insurance premiums that were unearned at the time of such cancellation or 
termination. 
11. Assignment of Miscellaneous Proceeds; Forfeiture. All Miscellaneous Proceeds are hereby 
assigned to and shall be paid to Lender. 
If the Property is damaged, such Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to restoration or repair of 
the Property, if the restoration or repair is economically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened. 
During such repair and restoration period, Lender shall have the right to hold such Miscellaneous Proceeds 
until Lender has had an opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure the work has been completed to 
Lender's satisfaction, provided that such inspection shall be undertaken promptly. Lender may pay for the 
repairs and restoration in a single disbursement or in a series of progress payments as the work is 
completed. Unless an agreement is made in writing or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on such 
Miscellaneous Proceeds, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such 
Miscellaneous Proceeds. If the restoration or repair is not economically feasible or Lender's security would 
be lessened, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be· applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, 
whether or not then due, with the excess, if any, paid to Borrower. Such Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be 
applied in the order provided for in Section 2. 
In the event of a total taking, destruction, or loss in value of the Property, the Miscellaneous 
Proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with 
the excess, if any, paid to Borrower. 
In the event of a partial taking, destruction, or loss in value of the Property in which the fair market 
value of the Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value is equal to or 
greater than the amount of the sums secured by this Security Instrument inimediately before the partial 
taking, destruction, or loss in value, unless Borrower and Lender otherwise agree in writing, the sums 
secured by this Security Instrument shall be reduced by the amount of the Miscellaneous Proceeds 
multiplied by the following fraction: (a) the total amount of the sums secured immediately before the 
partial taking, destruction, or loss in value divided by (b) the fair market value of the Property 
immediately before the partial taldng, destruction, or loss in value. Ally balance shall be paid to Borrower. 
In the event of a partial taking, destruction, or loss in value of the Property in which the fair market 
value of the Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value is less than the 
amount of the sums secured immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value, unless 
Borrower and Lender otherwise agree in writing, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to the sums 
secured by this Security Instrument whether or not the sums are then due. 
If the Property is abandoned by Borrower, or if, after notice by Lender to Borrower that the 
Opposing Party (as defined in the next sentence) offers to make an award to settle a claim for damages, 
Borrower fails to respond to Lender within 30 days after the date the notice is given, Lender is authorized 
to collect and apply the Miscellaneous Proceeds either to restoration or repair of the Property or to the 
sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due. "Opposing Party" means the third party 
that owes Borrower Miscellaneous Proceeds or the party against whom Borrower has a right of action in 
regard to Miscellaneous Proceeds. 
Borrower shall be in default if any action or proceeding, whether civil or criminal, is begun that, in 
Lender's judgment, could result in forfeiture of the Property or other material impairment of Lender's 
interest in the Property or rights under this Security Instrument. Borrower can cure such a default and, if 
acceleration has occurred, reinstate as provided in Section 19, by causing the action or proceeding to be 
dismissed with a ruling that, in Lender's judgment, precludes forfeiture of the Property or other material 
impairment of Lender's interest in the Property or rights under this Security Instrument. The proceeds of 
any award or claim for damages that are attributable to the impairment of Lender's interest in the Property 
are hereby assigned and shall be paid to Lender. 
All Miscellaneous Proceeds that are not applied to restoration or repair of the Property shall be 
applied in the order provided for in Section 2. 
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12. Borrower Not Released; Forbearance By Lender Not a Waiver. Extension of the time for 
payment or modification of amortization of the sums secured by this Security Instrument granted by Lender 
to Borrower or any Successor in Interest of Borrower shall not operate to release the liability of Borrower 
or any Successors in Interest of Borrower. Lender shall not be required to commence proceedings against 
any Successor in Interest of Borrower or to refuse to extend time for payment or otherwise modify 
amortization of the sums secured by this Security Instrument by reason of any demand made by the original 
Borrower or any Successors in Interest of Borrower. Any forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or 
remedy including, without limitation, Lender's acceptance of payments from third persons, entities or 
Successors in Interest of Borrower or in amounts less than the amount then due, shall not be a waiver of or 
preclude the exercise of any right or remedy. 
13. Joint and Several Liability; Co-signers; Successors and Assigns Bound. Borrower covenants 
and agrees that Borrower's obligations and liability shall be joint and several. However, any Borrower who 
co-signs this Security Instrument but does not e~ecute the Note (a "co-signer"): (a) is co-signing this 
Security Instrument only to mortgage, grant and convey the co.-signer's interest in the Property under the 
terms of this Security Instrument; (b) is not personally obligated to pay the sums secured by this Security 
Instrument; and (c) agrees that Lender and any other Borrower can agree to extend. modify, forbear or 
make any accorIimodations with regard to the terms of this Security Instrument or the. Note without the 
co-signer's consent. 
Subject to the provisions of Section 18, any Successor in Interest of Borrower who assumes 
Borrower's obligations under this Security Instrument in writing, and is approved by Lender, shall obtain 
all of Borrower's rights and benefits under this Security Instrument. Borrower shall not be released from 
Borrower's obligations and liability under this Security Instrument unless Lender agrees to such release in 
writing. The covenants and agreements of this Security Instrument shall bind (e~cept as provided in 
Section 20) and benefit the successors and assigns of Lender. 
14. Loan Charges. Lender may charge Borrower fees for services performed in connection with 
Borrower's default, for the purpose of protecting Lender'S interest in the Property and rights under this 
Security Instrument, including. but not limited to, attorneys' fees, property inspection and valuation fees. 
In regard to any other fees, the absence of express authority in this Security Instrument to charge a specific 
fee to Borrower shall not be construed as a prohibition on the charging of such fee. Lender may not charge 
fees that are expressly ~rohibited by this Security Instrument or by Applicable Law. 
If the Loan is subject to a law which sets ~imum loan charges, and that law is fmally interpreted so 
that the interest or other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with the Loan exceed the 
permitted limits. then: (a) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the .amount necessary to reduce the 
charge to the permitted limit; and (b) any sums already collected from Borrower which exceeded permitted 
limits will be refunded to Borrower. Lender may choose to make this refund by reducing the principal 
owed under the Note or by making a direct payment to Borrower. If a refund reduces principal, the 
reduction will be treated as a partial prepayment without any prepayment charge (whether or not a 
prepayment charge is provided for under the Note). Borrower's acceptance of any such refund made. by 
direct payment to Borrower will constitute a waiver of any right of action Borrower might have arising out 
of such overcharge. 
15. Notices. All notices given by Borrower or Lender in connection with thiS Security Instrument 
must be in writing. Any notice to Borrower in connection with this Security Instrument shall be deemed to 
have been given to Borrower when mailed by first class mail or when actually delivered to Borrower's 
notice address if sent by other means. Notice to anyone Borrower shall constitute notice to all Borrowers 
unless Applicable Law expressly requires otherwise. The notice address shall be the Property Address 
unless Borrower has designated a substitute notice address by notice to Lender. Borrower shall promptly 
notify Lender of Borrower's change of address. If Lender specifies a procedure for reporting Borrower's 
change of address. then Borrower shall only report a change of address through that specified procedure. 
There may be only one designated notice address . under this Security Instrument at anyone time. Any 
notice to Lender shall be given by delivering it or by mailing it by first class mail to Lender's address 
stated herein unless Lender has designated another address by notice to Borrower. Any notice in 
connection with this Security Instrument shall not be deemed to have been given to Lender until actually 
received by Lender. If any notice required by this Security Instrument is also required under Applicable 
Law, the Applicable Law requirement will satisfy the corresponding requirement under this Security 
Instrument. 
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16. Governing Law; Severability; Rules of Construction. This Security Instrument shall be 
governed by federal law and the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located. All rights and 
obligations contained in this Security Instrument are subject to any requirements and limitations of 
Applicable Law. Applicable Law might explicitly or implicitly allow the parties to agree by contract or it 
might be silent. but such silence shall not be construed as a prohibition against agreement by contract. In 
the event that any provision or clause of this Security Instrument or the Note conflicts with Applicable 
Law, such conflict shall not affect other provisions of this Security Instrument or the Note which can be 
given effect without the conflicting provision. 
As used in this Security Instrument: (a) words of the masculine gender shall mean and include 
corresponding neuter words or words of the feminine gender; (b) words in the singular shall mean and 
include the plural and vice versa; and (c) the word "may" gives sole discretion without any obligation to 
take any action. .. 
17. Borrower's Copy. Borrower shall be given one copy of the Note and of this Security Instrument. 
18. Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. As used in this Section 18, 
"Interest in the Property" means any legal or beneficial :interest in the Property, including, but not limited 
to. those beneficial interests transferred in a bond for deed, contract for deed, installment sales contract or 
escrow agreement, the intent of which is the transfer of title by Borrower at a future date to a purchaser. 
If all or any part of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or transferred (or if Borrower 
is not a natural person and a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred) without Lender's prior 
written consent, Lender may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security 
Instrument. However, this option shall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise is prohibited by 
Applicable Law. 
If Lender exercises this option, Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration. The notice shall 
provide a period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given in accordance with Section 15 
within which Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If Borrower fails to pay 
these sums prior to the expiration of this period, Lender may invoke any remedies permitted by this 
Security Instrument without further notice or demand on Borrower. 
19. Borrower's Right to Reinstate After Acceleration. If Borrower meets certain conditions, 
Borrower shall have the right to have enforcement of this Security Instrument discontinued at any time 
prior to the earliest of: (a) five days before sale of the Property pursuant to any power of sale contained in 
this Security Instrument; (b) such other period as Applicable Law might specify for the termination of 
Borrower's right to reinstate; or (c) entry of a judgment enforcing this Security Instrument. Those 
conditions are that Borrower: (a) pays Lender all sums which then would be due under this Security 
Instrument and the Note as if no acceleration had occurred; (b) cures any default of any other covenants or 
agreements; (c) pays all expenses incurred in enforcing this Security Instrument, including, but not limited 
to, reasonable attorneys' fees. property inspection and valuation fees. and other fees incurred for the 
purpose of protecting Lender's interest in the Property and rights under this Security Instrument; and (d) 
takes such action as Lender may reasonably require to assure that Lender's interest in the Property and 
rights under this Security Instrument, and Borrower's obligation to pay the sums secured by this Security 
Instrument, shall continue unchanged. Lender may require that Borrower pay such reinstatement sums and 
expenses in one or more of the following forms, as selected by Lender: (a) cash; (b) money order; (c) 
certified check, bank check, treasurer's check or cashier's check, provided any such check is drawn upon 
an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality or entity; or (d) Electronic 
Funds Transfer. Upon reinstatement by Borrower. this Security Instrument and obligations secured hereby 
shall remain fully effective as if no acceleration had occurred. However. this right to reinstate shall not 
apply in the case of acceleration under Section 18. 
20. Sale of Note; Change of Loan Servicer; Notice of Grievance. The Note or a partial interest in 
the Note (together with this Security Instrument) can be sold one or more times without prior notice to 
Borrower. A sale might result in a change in the entity (known as the "Loan Servicer") that coHects 
Periodic Payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument and performs other mortgage loan 
servicing obligations under the Note, this Security Instrument, and Applicable Law. There also might be 
one or more changes of the Loan Servicer unrelated to a sale of the Note. If there is a change of the Loan 
Servicer. Borrower will be given written notice af the change which will state the name and address of the 
new Loan Servicer. the address to which payments should be made and any other information RESP A 
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requires in connection with a notice of transfer of servicing. If the Note is sold and thereafter the Loan is 
serviced by a Loan Servicer other than the purcbaser of the Note, the mortgage loan servicing obligations 
to Borrower will remain with the Loan Servicer or be transferred to a successor Loan Servicer and are not 
assumed by the Note purchaser unless otherwise provided by the Note purchaser. 
Neither Borrower nor Lender may commence,· join, or be joined to any judicial action (as either an 
individual litigant or the member of a class) that arises from the other party's actions pursuant to this 
Security Instrument or that alleges that the other party has breached any provision of, or any duty owed by 
reason of, this Security Instrument, until such Borrower or Lender has notified the other party (with such 
notice given in compliance with the requirements of Section 15) of such alleged breach and afforded the 
other party hereto a reasonable period after the giving of such notice to take corrective action. If 
Applicable Law provides a time period which must elapse before certain action can be taken, that time 
period will be deemed to be reasonable for purposes of this paragraph. The notice of acceleration and 
opportunity to cure given to Borrower pursuant to Section 22 and the notice of acceleration given to 
Borrower pursuant to Section 18 shall be deemed to satisfy the notice and opportunity to take corrective 
action provisions of this Section 20. 
21. Hazardous Substances. As used in this Section 21: (a) "Hazardous Substances" are those 
substances defined as toxic or hazardous substances, pollutants, or wastes by Environmental Law and the 
following substances: gasoline, kerosene, other flammable or toxic petroleum products, toxic pesticides 
and herbicides, volatile solvents, materials containing asbestos or formaldehyde, and radioactive materials; 
(b) "Environmental Law" means federal laws and laws of the jurisdiction where the Property is located that 
relate to health, safety or environmental protection; (c) "Environmental Cleanup" includes any response 
action, remedial action, or removal action, as defmed in Environmental Law; and (d) an "Environmental 
Condition" means a condition that can cause, contribute to, or otherwise trigger an Environmental 
Cleanup. 
Borrower shall not cause or permit the presence, use, disposal, storage, or releaSe of any Hazardous 
Substances, or threaten to release any Hazardous Substances, on or in the Property. Borrower shall not do, 
nor allow anyone else to do, anything affecting the Property (a) that is in violation of any Environmental 
Law, (b) which creates an Environmental Condition, or (c) which, due to the presence, use, or release of a 
Hazardous Substance, creates a condition that adversely affects the value of the Property. The preceding 
two sentences shall not apply to the presence, use, or storage on the Property of small quantities of 
Hazardous Substances that are generally recognized to be appropriate to normal residential uses and to 
maintenance of the Property (including, but not limited to, hazardous substances in consumer products). 
Borrower shall promptly give Lender written notice of (a) any investigation, claim, demand, lawsuit 
or other action by any governmental or regulatory agency or private party involving the Property and any 
Hazardous Substance or Environmental Law of which Borrower has actual knowledge, (b) any 
Environmental Condition,inc1uding but not limited to, any spilling, leaking, discharge, release or threat of 
release of any Hazardous Substance, and (c) any condition caused by the presence, use or release of a 
Hazardous Substance which adversely affects the value of the Property. If Borrower learns, or is notified 
by any governmental or regulatory authority, or any private party, that any removal or other remediation 
of any Hazardous Substance affecting the Property is necessary, Borrower shall promptly take all necessary 
remedial actions in accordance with Environmental Law. Nothing herein shall create any obligation on 
Lender for an Environmental Cleanup. 
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NON-UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows: 
22. Acceleration; Remedies. Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration following 
Borrower's breach of any covenant or agreement .in this Security Instrument (but not prior to 
acceleration under Section 18 unless Applicable Law provides otherwise). The notice shall specify: (a) 
the default; (b) the action required to cure the default; (c) a date, not Jess than 30 days from the date 
the notice is given to Borrower, by which the default must be cured; and (d) that failure to cure the 
default on or before the date specified in the notice may result in .acceleration of the sums secured by 
this Security Instrument and sale of the Property. The notice shall further inform Borrower of the 
right to reinstate after acceleration and the right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence of 
a default or any other defense of Borrower to acceleration and sale. If the default is not cured on or 
before the date specified in the notice, Lender at its option may require immediate payment in full of 
aU sums secured by this Security Instrument without further demand and may invoke the power of 
sale and any other remedies permitted by Applicable Law. Lender shall be entitled to collect all 
expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this Section 22, including, but not limited to, 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of title evidence. ' 
If Lender invokes the power of sale, Lender shall execute or cause Trustee to execute written 
notice of the occurrence of an event of default and of Lender'S election to cause the Property to be 
sold, and shall cause such notice to be recorded in each county in which any part of the Property is 
located. Lender or Trustee shall mail copies of the notice as prescribed by Applicable Law to 
Borrower and to other persons prescribed by Applicable Law. Trustee shall give public notice of sale 
to the persons and in the manner prescribed by Applicable Law. After the time required by 
Applicable Law, Trustee, without demand on Borrower, shall sell the Property at public auction to 
the highest bidder at the time and place and under the terms designated in the notice· of sale in one or 
more parcels and in any order Trustee determines. Trustee may postpone sale of all or any parcel of 
the Property by public announcement at the time and place of any previously scheduled sale. Lender 
or its designee may purchase the Property at any saJe. 
Trustee shall deliver to the purchaser Trustee's deed conveying the Property without any 
covenant or warranty, expressed or impHed. The recitals in the Trustee's deed shall be prima facie 
evidence of tbe truth of the statements made therein. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale in 
the following order: (a) to all expenses of the sale, including, but not limited to, reasonahle Trustee's 
and attorneys' fees; (b) to all sums secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) any excess to the 
person or persons legally entitled to it. 
23. Reconveyance. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall 
request Trustee to reconvey the Property and shall surrender this Security Instrument and all notes 
evidencing debt secured by this Security Instrument to Trustee. Trustee shall reconvey the Property 
without warranty to the person or persons legally entitled to it. Sucb person or persons shall pay any 
recordation costs. Lender may charge such person or persons a fee for reconveying the Property, but only 
if the fee is paid to a third party (such as the Trustee) for services rendered and the charging of the fee is 
permitted under Applicable Law. 
24. Substitute Trustee. Lender may, for any reason or cause, from time to time remove Trustee and 
appoint a succeSSOr trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder. Without conveyance of the Property, the 
successor trustee shall succeed to all the title, power and duties conferred upon Trustee herein and by 
Applicable Law, 
25. Area and Location of Property. Either the Property is not more than 40 acres in area or the 
Property is located within an incorporated city or village. 
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BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and covenants contained in this 
Security Instrument and in any Rider executed by Borrower and recorded with it. 
Witnesses; 
JULIE G. BARNSON 
______________________ (S~) 
-Borrower 
_______________________ (S~) _____________ (Seal) 
·Borrower -Borrower 
______________ (Seal) ______________ (Seal) 
·Borrower -Borrower 
_______________ (S~) ____________________ (S~) 
-Borrower -Borrower 
MFlD7770 (09/2006) 1 047-147610-1 




STATE OF IDAHO, County ss: 
On this J Q day of '-1I\..DVe,~ 
(I.a.A·'~ .. ~fZ~ ~~ 
a t:rorary Public in and for said county and state, personally appeared 
2006 ,before me, 
JULIE G. BARNS ON I -A)t UlNAR'IH8B HOMl!l"M -
, 
known or proved to me to be the person(s) who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to 
me that he/she/they executed the same. 
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my 
certificate flISt above written. 
CATHERINE CLARK 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
MFID7770 (09/2006) I 047-147610-1 
~ -SAUOI 10509) 
and year in this 
Commission Expires 1Q-5..()1 
Residing in Eagle. Idaho 
Page 15 of 15 
Inltlal'~ 
Form3013 1/01 
ADJUSTABLE RATE RIDER 
Payment Option 
THIS ADJUSTABLE RATE RIDER is made this 10TH day of NOVEMBER, 2006 
and is incorporated into and shall be deemed to amend and supplement the Mortgage, Deed 
of Trust, or Security Deed (the "Security Instrument") of the same date given by the 
undersigned ("Borrower") to secure Borrower's · Adjustable Rate Note (the "Note") to 
HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL, LLC (F/K/A HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL NETWORK, INC.) 
("Lender") of the same date and covering the property described in the Security Instrument 
and located at: 
28123 SILO WAY 
WILDER, ID 83676 
[Property Address) 
THE NOTE CONTAINS PROVISIONS THAT WilL CHANGE THE INTEREST 
RATE AND THE MONTHLY PAYMENT. THERE MAY BE A LIMIT ON THE 
AMOUNT THAT THE MONTHLY PAYMENT CAN INCREASE OR DECREASE. 
THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT TO REPAY COULD BE GREATER THArJ THE 
AMOUNT ORIGINALLY BORROWED, BUT NOT MORE THAN THE LIMIT 
STATED IN THE NOTE. 
ADDITIONAL COVENANTS. In addition to the covenants and agreements made in the 
Security Instrument, Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows: 
Lender or anyone who takes the Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payments 
under the Note is called the n Note Holder." 
A. INTEREST RATE AND MONTHLY PAYMENT CHANGES 
The Note provides for changes in the interest rate and the monthly payments, as follows: 
2. INTEREST 
(AI Interest Rate 
Interest will be charged on unpaid Principal until the full amount of Principal has been 
paid. I will initially pay interest at a yearly rate of 1. 0000 %. The interest rate I 
will pay may change. 
The interest rate required by this Section 2 is the rate I will pay both before and after any 
default described in Section 7(B) of the Note. 
(B) Interest Rate Change Dates 
The interest rate I will pay may change on the first day of JANUARY, 2007 
and on that day every month thereafter. Each date on which my interest rate could change is 
PAYMENT OPTION MULTISTATE ADJUSTABLE RATE RIDER 10/05 
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called an "Interest Rate Change Date." The new rate of interest will become effective on 
each Interest Rate Change Date. Although the interest rate may change monthly, my monthly 
payment will be recalculated in accordance with Section 3. 
IC) Interest Rate Umit 
My interest rate will never be greater than 9.9500 %. 
101 Index 
Beginning with the first Interest Rate Change Date, my adjustable interest rate will be 
based onan Index. The "Index" is the "Twelve-Month Average" of the annual yields on 
actively traded United States "treasury Securities adjusted to a constant maturity of one 
year as published by the Federal Reserve Board in the Federal Reserve Statistical Release 
entitled ."Selected Interest Rates (h.15)" (the "Monthly Yields"), The Twelve Month Average 
is determined by adding together the Monthly Yields for the most recently available twelve 
months and dividing by 12. The most recent Index figure available as of the date 15 days 
before each Interest Rate Change Date is called the "Current Index;" 
If the Index is no longer available, the Note Holder will choose a new index that is based 
upon comparable information. The Note Holder will give me notice of this choice. 
(E) Calculation of Interest Rate Changes 
Before each Interest Rate Change Date, the Note Holder will calculate my new interest 
rate by adding THREE AND ONE FOURTH 
percentage point(s) ( 3.2500 %1 to the Current Index, The Note Holder 
will then round the result of this addition to the nearest one-eighth of one percentage point 
(0.125%). Subject to the limit stated in Section 2(C) above, the result of this addition will be 
my new interest rate until the next Interest Rate Change Date. 
3. PAYMENTS 
(A) Time and Place of Payments 
I will make a payment every month. 
I will make my monthly payments on the first day of each month beginning on 
JANUARY lST, 2007 . I will make these payments every month until I have paid all the 
Principal and interest and any other charges that I may owe under the Note. Each monthly 
payment will be applied as of its scheduled due date and will be applied to interest before 
Principal. If, on DECEMBER 1ST, 2036 , I still owe amounts under the Note, I will 
pay those amounts in full on that date, which is called the "Maturity Date." 
Initials: /1J2-. 
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I will make my monthly payments at 1687 114TH AVE., SE, . SUITE 100 , 
BELLEVUE, WA 98004 
or at a different place if required by the Note Holder. 
(B) Minimum Payment; Amount of My Initial Monthly Payments 
My "Minimum Payment" is the minimum amount the Note Holder will accept for my 
monthly payment, which the Note Holder will determine in accordance with this· Section 3(B), 
or Section 3(0), 3(F) or 3(G), below, as applicable. 
Each of my initial Minimum Payments will be in the amount of U.S. 
$ 1, OBS . 86 , until a new Minimum Payment is required as provided below. 
(el Payment Change Dates 
My Minimum Payment may change as required by Section 3(D) below beginning on the 
first day of JANUARY, 200 B , and on that day every 12th month thereafter. Each of these 
dates is called a "Payment Change Date." My Minimum Payment also will change at any time 
Section 3(F) or 3(G) below requires me to pay a different amount. 
I will pay at least the amount of my new Minimum Payment each month beginning on 
each Payment Change Date or as provided in Section 3(F) or 3(G) below. 
(01 Calculation of Monthly Payment Changes 
Before each Payment Change Date, the Note Holder will calculate the amount of the 
monthly payment that would be sufficient to repay the unpaid Principal that I am expected to 
owe at the Payment Change Date in full on the Maturity Date in substantially equal 
installments at the interest rate effective during the month preceding the Payment Change 
Date. The result of this calculation is called the" Full Payment. · 
Unless Section 3(F) or 3(G) below requires me to pay a different amount, my new 
Minimum Payment that will be effective on a Payment Change Date will be in the amount of 
the Full Payment, except that my new Minimum Payment will be limited to an amount that 
will not be more than 7.5% greater than the amount of my last Minimum Payment due before 
the Payment Change Date (this limitation is called the ·Payment Change Cap") . The. Payment 
Change Cap applies only to the Principal and interest payment and does not apply to any 
escrow payments the Note Holder may require under the Security Instrument. 
(E) Additions to My Unpaid Principal 
My monthly payment could be less than or greater than the amount of the interest 
portion of the monthly payment that would be sufficient to repay the unpaid Principal lowe at 
the monthly payment date in full on the Maturity Date in substantially equal payments. For 
each month that my monthly payment is less than the interest portion, the Note Holder will 
subtract the amount of my monthly payment from the amount of the interest portion and will 
add the difference to my unpaid Principal . The Note Holder also will add interest on the 
. amount of this difference to my unpaid Principal each month. The interest rate on the interest 
added to Principal will be the rate required by Section 2 above. For each month that my 
monthly payment is greater than the interest portion, the Note Holder will apply the payment 
as provided in Section 3(A). 
Initials: CD.-
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(F) Limit on My Unpaid Principal; Increased Monthly Payment 
My unpaid Principal may never exceed a maximum amount equal to 115% of the 
Principal amount I originally borrowed. Because of my paying only limited monthly payments, 
the addition of unpaid interest to my unpaid Principal under Section 3(E) above could cause 
my unpaid Principal to exceed that maximum amount when interest rates increase. In that 
event, on the date that my paying my monthly payment would cause me to exceed that limit, 
I will instead pay a new monthly payment in an amount that would be sufficient to repay my 
then unpaid Principal in full on the Maturity Date in substantially equal installments at the 
interest rate effective during the preceding month, regardless of the Payment Change Cap. 
This amount will be my new Minimum Payment. This means that my Minimum Payment may 
change more frequently than annually. This new.Minimum Payment amount will remain in 
effect until at least the next regular Payment Change Date, unless another recalculation of my 
Minimum Payment is required by this Section prior to such Payment Change Date. 
(G) Required Full Payment 
Regardless of the Payment Change Cap, on the TENTH Payment Change Date and on 
each succeeding fifth Payment Change Date thereafter, I will begin paying the Full Payment as 
my Minimum Payment until my monthly payment changes again. I also will begin paying at 
least the Full Payment as my Minimum Payment on the final Payment Change Date. 
(H) Payment Options 
After the first Interest Rate Change Date, each month the Note Holder may provide me 
with up to three additional payment options (in addition to the Minimum Payment) that are 
greater than the Minimum Payment, which are called to Payment Options." I may be given the 
following Payment Options: 
(i) Interest Only Payment: the amount that would pay the interest portion of the 
monthly payment at the current interest rate. The Principal balance will not be 
decreased by this Payment Option. 
(ii) Fully Amortized Payment: the amount necessary to pay the loan off (including all 
Principal and interest) at the Maturity Date in substantially equal installments. This 
Payment Option is calculated on the assumption that the current interest rate will 
remain in effect until the loan is paid in full. however. the current interest rate may 
in fact change every month. 
(iii) 15 Year Amortized Payment: the amount necessary to pay the loan off (including all 
Principal and interest) within a fifteen (15) year period from the first payment due 
date in substantially equal installments. This Payment Option is calculated. on the 
assumption that the current rate will remain in effect until the loan is paid in full. 
however, the current interest rate may in fact change every month. 
Payment Options will only be available if they are greater than the Minimum Payment. 
(I) Failure to Make Adjustments 
If for any reason the Note Holder fails to make an adjustment to the interest rate or 
payment amount as described herein, regardless of any notice requirement, I agree the Note 
Holder may, upon discovery of such failure, then make the adjustment as if they had been 
made on time. I also agree not to hold the Note Holder responsible for any damages to me 





that may re.sult from the Note Holder's failure to make the adjustment and to let the Note 
Holder, at its option, apply any excess monies that I may have paid to partial Prepayment of 
unpaid Principal. . 
4. NOTICE OF CHANGES 
The Note Holder will deliver or mail to me a notice of any changes in the amount of my 
monthly payment before the effective date of any change. The notice will include information 
required by law to be given to me and also the title and telephone number of a person who 
will answer any question I may have regarding the notice. 
B. TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY OR A BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN BORROWER 
Uniform Covenant 18 of the Security Instrument is amended to read as follows: 
Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. As used in this 
Section 18, "Interest in the Property" means any legal or beneficial interest in the 
Property, including, but not limited to, those beneficial interests transferred in a 
bond for deed, contract for deed, installment sales contract or escrow agreement, 
the intent of which is the transfer of title by Borrower at a future date to a 
purchaser. 
If all or any part of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or 
transferred (or if Borrower is not a natural person and a beneficial interest in 
Borrower is sold or transferred) without Lender's prior written consent, Lender may 
require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument. 
However; this option shall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise is prohibited 
by Applicable Law. Lender also shall not exercise this option if: (a) Borrower causes 
to be submitted to Lender information required by Lender to evaluate the intended 
transferee as if a new loan were being made to the transferee; and (b) Lender 
reasonably determines that Lender's security will not be impaired by the loan 
assumption and that the risk of a breach of any covenant or . agreement in this 
Security Instrument is acceptable to Lender. 
To the extent permitted by Applicable Law, Lender may charge a reasonable fee 
as a condition to Lender's consent to the loan assumption. Lender also may require 
the transferee to sign an assumption agreement that is acceptable to Lender and that 
obligates the transferee to keep all the promises and agreements made in the Note 
and in this Security Instrument. Borrower will continue to be obligated under the 
Note and this Security Instrument unless Lender releases Borrower in writing. 
If Lender exercises the option to require immediate payment in full, Lender shall 
give Borrower notice of acceleration. The notice shall provide a period of not less 
than 30 days from the date the notice is given in accordance with Section 1 5 within 
which Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If Borrower 
fails to pay these sums prior to the expiration of this period, Lender may invoke any 
remedies permitted by this Security Instrument without further notice or demand on 
Borrower. 





BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and covenants contained 
in this Adjustable Rate Rider. 
C)A Ie. ~S~ (Seail 
-Borrower 
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SECOND HOME RIDER 
THIS SECOND HOME RIDER is made this 10TH day of NOVEMBER, 2006 
and is incorporated into and shall be deemed to amend and supplement the Mortgage, Deed 
of Trust, or Security Deed (the "Security Instrument") of the same date given by the 
undersigned (the "Borrower" whether there are one or more persons undersigned) to secure 
Borrower's Note to 
HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL, LLC' (F/K/A HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL NETWORK, INC.) 
(the "Lender") of the same date and covering the Property described in the Security 
Instrument (the "Property"), which is located at: 
28123 SILO WAY 
WILDER, ID 83676 
[Property Address) 
In addition to the covenants and agreements made in the Security Instrument, Borrower 
and Lender further covenant and agree that Sections 6 and 8 of the Security Instrument are 
deleted and are replaced by the following; 
6. Occupancy. Borrower shall occupy, and shall only use, the Property as 
Borrower's second home. Borrower shall keep the Property available for Borrower's 
exclusive use and enjoyment at all times, and shall not subject the Property to any 
timesharing or other shared ownership arrangement or to any rental pool or 
agreement that requires Borrower either to rent the Property or give a management 
firm or any other person any control over the occupancy or use of the Property. 
8. Borrower's Loan Application. Borrower shall be in default if, during the Loan 
application process, Borrower or any persons or entities acting at the direction of 
Borrower or with Borrower's knowledge or consent gave materially false, misleading, 
or inaccurate information or statements to Lender (or failed to provide Lender with 
material information) in connection with the Loan. Material representations include, 
but are not limited to, representations concerning Borrower's occupancy of the 
Property as Borrower's second home. 
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BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and covenants contained 
in this Second Home Rider. 
~ '0, 6rn~:~: 
IE G. BARNSON 
_____________ (Seal) 
-Borrower 
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Are the grantor(s) JULIE G. BARNSON, AN UNMARRIED WOMAN and TRANSNATION TITLE is the trustee, 
and tiMERS" MORTGAGE ELECTRONlC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., SOLELY AS NOMINEE FOR 
LENDER HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL, LLC (FKA HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL NETWORK, INC.) is the 
beneficiary under that certain Deed of Trust dated 1111012006, and recorded on 11/14/2006, Book, Page, as 
Instrument No. 200690998, and fe-recorded, records of Canyon County, Idaho. 
The undersigned, who is the present beneficiary under said Deed of Tmst desires to appoint a new trustee in the 
place and instead of the original trustee named above; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in view of the premises, the undersigned hereby appoints FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY clo Executive Trustee Services, Inc. 15455 San Fernando Mission Blvd., Suite 208 
Mission Hills, Ca 91345, as successor trustee under said Deed of Trust, to have all the powers of said original 
trustee, effective forthwith. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. the undersigned beneficiary has hereunto set his hand; if the undersigned is a 
corporation, it has caused its corporate name to be signed and affixed hereunto by its duly authorized officer(s). 
Dated: June 26, 2007 MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRA nON SYSTEM, INC. 
State ofCalifomia 
County of Los Angeles }SS 
NT SECRETARY 
On 6/2612007 before me, the undersigned, Dee C. Ortega a Notary Public in and for said State, personally appeared 
Elizabeth Yeranosian personally known to me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the 
person(s) whose name(s) is/are subscribed and sworn to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that 
he/she/they executed the same in hislher/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by hislher/their signature(s) on the 
instrument the person(s) acted, executed the instrument. 
WlmESS~6! 
Signature. _______________ _ 
Dee C. Ortega 
State of Idaho } 
5S. 
County of Canyon .. , 
I hereby certify t at the foregOIng Instrument IS 
a true and co t c py of the original as the 
same appearr ,'n t 's '9~' 
DATED \ U 





DEe C. ORTEGA 
Commission # 1612151 
Notary Publle • CaUfornia f 
lO$ Angeles Counly -
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TRUSTEE'S DEED 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY (herein called Trustee) as Successor Trustee under the 
Deed of Trust hereinafter particularly described, does hereby Bargain, Sell and Convey, without warranty, to 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC, herein called Grantee whose current address is: 
c/o GMAC Mortgage Corporation, 500 Enterprise Road, Suite 150, Horsham, PA 19044 a1l of the real property 
situated in the County of Canyon, state of Idaho described as follows: 
LOT 4 IN BLOCK I OF RIVERBEND SUBDIVISION, CANYON COUNTY, IDAHO, ACCORDING TO 
THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF, FILED IN BOOK 34 OF PLATS, AT PACE 2, RECORDS OF SAID 
COUNTY. 
This conveyance is made pursuant to the powers conferred upon Trustee by the Deed of Trust between JULIE G. 
BARNSON, AN UNMARRIED WOMAN, as Grantor, and TRANSNATION TITLE, as Trustee, and MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRA TION SYSTEMS,INC.,(tlMERS") AS NOMINEE FOR HOMECOMINGS 
FINANCIAL, LLC (FIKJA HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL NETWORK, INC.), as Beneficiary, dated 11/10/2006, 
recorded 11114/2006, as instrument No. 200690998, Book Page, and re-recorded , mortgage records of Canyon 
County, Idaho, and after the fulfillment of the conditions specified in said Deed of Trust authorizing this conveyance 
as follows: 
(1). Default occurred in the ob ligations for which such deed of trust was given as security and the beneficiary made 
demand upon the said trustee to sell property pursuant to the terms of said deed of trust. Notice of Default was 
recorded 212612009, as Instrument No. 2009·009415, Book, Page, mortgage records of Canyon County, Idaho and 
in the office of each County in which the property described in said deed of trust, or any part thereof, is situated, the 
nature of such default being as set forth in said Notice of Default. Such default still existed at the time of sale. 
(2). After recording of said Notice of Default, trustee gave notice of the time and place of the sale of said property 
by registered or certified mail, by personal service upon the occupants of said premises and by publishing in a 
conspicuous place on said premises and by publishing in a newspaper of general circulation in each of the counties 
in which the property is situated as more fully appears in affidavits recorded at least 20 days prior to the date of sale 
as Instrument No. 2009029759, Instrument No. 2009029760, and Instrument No. 2009029761 Mortgage records of 
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ID-167373-C 
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(3). The provisions, recitals and contents of the Notice of Default referred to in paragraph (I) supra and of the 
Affidavits referred to in paragraph (2) supra shall be and they are hereby 
incorporated herein and made an integral part hereoffor all purposes as though set forth herein at length. 
(4). All requirements of law regarding the mailing, personal service, posting, publication and recording of the notice 
of default, and Notice of Sale and for all other notices have been complied with. 
(5). Not less than 120 days elapsed between the giving of Notice of Sale by registered or certified mail and the sale 
of the property. 
(6). Trustee, at the time and place of sale fixed by said Notice, at public auction, in one parcel, struck off to Grantee, 
being the highest bidder thereof, the property herein described for the sum of $)99,556.36, subject however to all 
prior liens and encumbrances. No person or corporation offered to take any part of said property less than the whole 
thereof for the amount of principal, interest, and advanced costs. 
Dated: 7/912009 
State of tA ) S5. 
} 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY 
~. 
MARIA DELATORRE, ASST sec 
Countyof ~ 
On l'Lv"~ before me, latnaA Kennedv ' a Notary Public personally 
appeared, rv1AR1A DE LA TORRE who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to the 
person(s) whose narne(s} is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that 
he/she/they executed the same in his/her/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by hislher/their 
signature(s) on the instrument the person(s}. or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted. 
executed the instrument. 
I certify under penalty of pe~ury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing paragraph is 
true and correct. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal 
SIGNATURE ~ 
State of Idahg } 
SS. 
392 
Robert B. Bums, ISB No. 3744 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
rbb@moffatt.com 
23095.0001 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
~f~AM~ E 0 
" '·~-_P.M 
NOV 3 0 2010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 




JULIE G. BARNS ON, an unmarried woman; 
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a 
Delaware corporation, as nominee for 
Homecomings Financial, LLC (f/kJa 
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), a 




RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE 
HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware limited 
liability company, 
Defendant/Intervenor. 
Case No. CV 07-8274 
ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM IN 
INTERVENTION 
ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM IN INTERVENTION - 1 Client: 1850451 . 1 
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/~F 
PlaintiffParkWest Homes LLC (ParkWest), in answer to the Counterclaim in 
Intervention, dated November 12, 2010 (the "Counterclaim"), filed in this action by Defendant! 
Intervenor Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential"), denies each and 
every allegation not expressly admitted hereinbelow. 
ANSWER 
1. ParkWest admits the averments in paragraphs 1-11, inclusively, and 13 of 
the Counterclaim. 
2. In response to paragraph 12 ofthe Counterclaim, ParkWest admits that an 
actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Residential and ParkWest concerning their 
respective rights in and to the property at issue and that ParkWest contends its lien arising out of 
the "Mechanic's Lien" recorded on November 28,2006, as Instrument No. 200694511, Official 
Records of Canyon County, Idaho, is both (a) valid for work or labor ParkWest provided and 
materials it supplied during the time it was a duly registered contractor under applicable Idaho 
law, and (b) senior and superior to the interest in the property at issue held by Residential. 
3. ParkWest denies the averments in paragraph 14 of the Counterclaim. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
4. Residential has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
5. Because Residential had actual and/or constructive notice of Park West's 
Mechanic's Lien as of the date of the Trustee's Deed recorded July 20,2009, as Instrument 
No. 2009036841, Official Records of Canyon County, Idaho, Residential's interest in the 
property at issue is subject to (a) the senior and superior rights of Park West in said property, and 
(b) the "law of the case" established by the decision in Park West Homes LLe v. Barnson, 149 
ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM IN INTERVENTION - 2 Client: 1850451 .1 
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Idaho 603, 238 P.3d 203 (2010), including all matters that were embraced by the judgment from 
which the first appeal was taken but not raised in that appeal. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
6. ParkWest has been required to engage legal counsel to defend against the 
claims asserted by Residential in its Counterclaim and is therefore entitled to recover its 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the defense ofthis action pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 
45-513, 12-120, and/or 12-121. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, ParkWest prays for judgment as follows: 
1. that the Counterclaim be dismissed with prejudice and Residential take 
nothing thereby; 
proper. 
2. for an award of Park West's reasonable attorney's fees and costs; and 
3. for such other and further relief as the Court may determine to be just and 
DATED this 29th day of November 2010. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
rns 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM IN INTERVENTION - 3 Client: 1850451 . 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of November 2010, I caused a true 
and correct copy ofthe foregoing ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM IN INTERVENTION to 
be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Stephen C. Hardesty 
Ryan T. McFarland 
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WLEY LLP 
877 W. Main St., Ste. 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise,ID 83701-1617 
Facsimile (208) 954-5223 and (208) 954-5236 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM IN INTERVENTION - 4 
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Client: 1850451.1 
Stephen C. Hardesty ISB No. 4214 
Ryan T. McFarland ISB No. 7347 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: (208) 344-6000 




DEC 02 2010 
CAf'.!Y9N ,~OUNiY CI.,EAK 
8 RAVN!1 O!~UiY 
Attorneys for Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc, as 
nominee for Homecomings Financial, LLC (flk/a Homecomings Financial 
Network, Inc.) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
P ARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
liability company, ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JULIE G. BARNSON, an unmarried woman; 
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a 
Delaware corporation, as nominee for 
Homecomings Financial, LLC (flk/a 
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), a 




RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE 
























Case No. CV 07-8274 
AFFIDAVIT OF RYAN T. 
MCFARLAND IN SUPPORT OF 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 
COMPEL 
AFFIDAVIT OF RYAN T. MCFARLAND IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION TO COMPEL - 1 
397 05000.0047.2151946.1 
Ryan T. McFarland, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
nominee for Homecomings Financial, LLC (f/kla Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.) 
("MERS") in the foregoing action and make this affidavit on my own personal knowledge. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Adjustable Rate 
Note secured by the first MERS Deed of Trust at issue in this action. The initial interest rate on 
that Note is listed as 1.0%, which became variable at 3.25% above the twelve-month average of 
the annual yields on United States Treasury Securities, effective January 2007. The initial 
monthly payment on that Note was $1,085.86. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct of the Note secured by the 
second MERS Deed of Trust at issue in this action. The monthly payments on that Note were 
$439.77. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of Park West Homes 
LLC's 2010 Annual Report which I accessed via the Idaho Secretary of State's website on 
December 1, 2010. The Report lists David Zawadzki as a member of Park West, and it lists the 
address of the property at issue in this case (the "Property") as ParkWest's mailing address. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the Amended 
Complaint For Possession Of Real Property And For Ejectment filed by Residential against Julie 
G. Bamson and David Zawadzki in The District Court Of The Third Judicial District Of The 
State OfIdaho, In And For The County Of Canyon, Case No. CV-2009-0011397-C. That action 
was originally commenced on October 28,2009. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of a letter sent to me by 
counsel for ParkWest Homes LLC ("ParkWest") on October 13, 2010. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RYAN T. MCFARLAND IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION TO COMPEL - 2 
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7. Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of a series of e-mail 
exchanges between me and counsel for ParkWest in October and November 2010. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of a November 4,2010 e-
mail exchange between me and counsel for ParkWest. 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of an e-mail exchange 
between me and counsel for ParkWest in October and November 2010 
10. Further your affiant sayeth naughA 
----~~---------------------------
Ryan T: McFarland 
STATE OF IDAHO 





I, Teri French, a Notary Public, do hereby certify that on this 1-::>+ day of December, 
2010, personally appeared before me Ryan T. McFarland, who, being by me first duly sworn, 
declared that he is an attorney of record for Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc, as nominee for Homecomings Financial, LLC (f/k/a Homecomings Financial 
Network, Inc.) in the foregoing action, that he signed the foregoing document as an attorney for 
Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc, as nominee for Homecomings 
Financial, LLC (f/k/a Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), and that the statements therein 
contained are true. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the 
day and year in this certificate first above written. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My commission expires June 27, 2014 
AFFIDAVIT OF RYAN T. MCFARLAND IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION TO COMPEL - 3 
399 05000.0047.2151946.1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ay of December, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF RYAN T. MCFARLAND IN SUPPORT OF 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
each of the following: 
Robert B. Bums 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
David E. Wishney 
Attorney at Law 
300 W. Myrtle Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, ID 83701-0837 
[Attorney for Defendant Julie G. Barnson] 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
~and Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
~ Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
__ Te1ecopy 
AFFIDAVIT OF RYAN T. MCFARLAND IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION TO COMPEL - 4 
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ADJUSTABLE RATE NOTE 
Payment Option 
THIS NOTE CONTAINS PROVISIONS THAT WilL CHANGE THE INTEREST RATE AND THE 
MONTHLY PAYMENT. THERE MAY BE A LIMIT ON THE AMOUNT THAT THE MONTHLY 
PAYMENT CAN INCREASE OR DECREASE. THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT TO REPAY COULD BE 
GREATER THAN THE AMOUNT ORIGINAllY BORROWED, BUT NOT MORE THAN THE LIMIT 
STATED IN THtS NOTE. 
NOVEMBER 10TH, 2006 
[Date) 
28123 SILO WAY, WILDER, ID 83676 






In return for a loan !hat I have received, I promise to pay U.S. $ 337, 600 . 00 (this is called 
"Principal"), plus interest, to the order of Lender. The Principal amount may increase as provided in this Note. Lender is 
HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL, LLC (P/K/A HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL NETWORK, INC.) 
r will make all payments under this Note in the form of cash, check or money order. 
I understand that Lender may transfer this Note. Lender or anyone who takes this Note by aansfer and who is entitled 
to receive payments under this Note is called !he "Note Holder .• 
2. INTEREST 
(A) Interest Rate 
Interest will be charged on unpaid Principal until the full amount of Principal has been paid. I will initially pay interest 
at a yearly rate of l.OOOO %. The interest rate I will pay may change. 
The interest rate required by this Section 2 is the rate I will pay both before and after any default described in Section 
7(B) of this Note. 
(B) Interest Rate Cbange Dates 
The interest rate I will pay may change on the first day of JANUARY, 2007 , and on that day every month 
thereafter. Each date on which my interest rate could change is called an "Interest Rate Change Date. n The new rate of 
interest will become effective on each Interest Rate Change Date. Although the interest rate may change monthly. my 
monthly payment will be recalculated in accordance with Section 3. 
(C) Interest Rate Limit 
My interest rate will never be greater than 9.9500 %. 
(D) Index 
Beginning with the first Interest Rate Change Date, my adjustable interest rate will be based on an Index:. The "Index:" 
is !he "Twelve-Month Average" of !he annual yields on actively traded United States Treasury Securities adjusted to a 
constant maturity of one year as published by !he Federal Reserve Board in the Federal Reserve Statistical Release 
entitled "Seleeted Interest Rates (h.1S)" (the "Monthly Yields"). The Twelve Month Average is determined by adding 
together the Monthly Yields for the most recently available twelve months and dividing by 12. The most recent Index 
figure available as of the date 15 days before each Interest Rate Change Date is called !he "Current Index." 
PAYMENT OPTION MULTISTATE ADJUSTABLE RATE NOTE 10/05 
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If the Index is no longer available. the Note Holder will choose a new index that is based upon comparable 
information. The Note Holder will give me notice of this choice. 
(E) Calculation of Interest Rate Changes 
Before each Interest Rate Change Date, the Note Holder will calculate my new interest rate by adding 
THReE AND ONE FOURTH percentage point(s) 
( 3.2500 %) to the Current Index. The Note Holder will then rt1und the result of this addition to the nearest 
oue-eighth of one percentage point (0.125%). Subject to the limit slated in Section 2(C) above, the result of this addition 
will be my new interest rate until the next Interest Rate Change Date. 
3. PAYMENTS 
(A) Time and Place of Payments 
I will make a payment every month. 
1 will make my monthly payments on the fIrst day of each month beginning on JANUARY 1ST, 2007 
I will make these payments every month until I have paid all the Principal and interest and any other charges that I may owe 
under this Note. Each monthly payment will be applied as of its scheduled due date and will be applied to interest before 
Principal. If, on DECEMBER 1ST, 2036 , I still owe amounts under this Note, I will pay those 
amounts in full on that date, which is called the "Maturity Date .• 
I will make my monthly payments at 1687 114TH AVE., SE, SUITE ~OO, BELLEVUE, WA 98004 
or 
at a different place if required by the Note Holder. 
(B) Minimum Payment; Amount of My Initial Monthly Payments 
My "Minimum Payment" is the minimum amount the Note Holder will accept for my monthly payment, which the 
Note Holder will determine in accordance with this Section 3(B), or Section 3(D}, 3(F) or 3(G). below. as applicable. 
Each of my initial Minimum Payments will be in the amount ofD.S. $ l, 085.86 
until a new Minimum Payment is required as provided below. 
(C) Payment Change Dates 
My Minimum Payment may change as required by Section 3(D) below beginning on the flISt day of 
JANUARY I 200 B , and on that day every 12th month thereafter. Each of these dates is called a 'Payment Change 
Date.· My Minimum Payment also will change at any time Section 3(F) or 3(G) below requires me to pay a different 
amount. 
I will pay at least the amount of my new Minimum Payment each month beginning on each Payment Change Date or as 
provided in Section 3(F) or 3(G) below. 
(D) Calculation of Monthly Payment Changes 
Before each Payment Change Date, the Note Holder will calculate the amount of the monthly payment that would be 
suffIcient to repay the unpaid Principal that I am expected to owe at the Payment Change Date in full on the Maturity Date 
in substantially equal installments at the interest rate effective during the month preceding the Payment Change Date. The 
result of this calculation is called the ftFuIl Payment. ,. , 
Unless Section 3(F) or 3(G) below requires me to pay a different amount, my new Minimum Payment that will be 
effective on a Payment Change Date will be in the amount of the Full Payment. except that my new Minimum Payment will 
be limited to an amount that will not be more than 7.5 % greater than the amount of my last Minimum Payment due before 
tlJe Payment Change Date (this limitation is called the "Payment Change Cap"). The Payment Change Cap applies only to 
the Principal and interest payment and does not app1l, to any escrow payments the Note Holder may require under the 
Security Instrument (as deftned in Section 11 of this Note, below). 
7754109 (0005).0% 
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(E) Additions to My Unpaid Principal 
My monthly payment could be less than or greater than the amount of the interest portion of the monthly payment that 
would be sufficient to repay the unpaid Principal lowe at the monthly payment date in full on the Maturity .Date in 
substantially equal payments. For each month that my monthly payment is less than the interest ponion. the Note Holder 
will subtract the amount of my monthly payment from the amount of the interest portion and will add the difference to my 
unpaid Principal. The Note Holder also will add interest on the amount of this difference to my unpaid Principal each 
month. The interest rate on the interest added to Principal will be the rate required by Section 2 above. For each month that 
my monthly payment is greater than the interest portion, the Note Holder will apply the payment as provided in Section 
3(A). 
(F) Limit on My Unpaid Principal; Increased Monthly Payment 
My unpaid Principal may never exceed a maximum amount equal to 115% of the Principal amount I originally 
borrowed. Because of my paying only limited monthly payments, the addition of unpaid interest to my unpaid Principal 
under Section 3(E) above could cause my unpaid Principal to exceed that maximum amount when interest rates increase. In 
that event, on the date that my paying my monthly payment would cause me to exceed that limit, I will instead pay a new 
monthly payment in an amount that would be sufficient to repay my then unpaid Principal in fulJ on the Maturity Date in 
substantially equal installments at the interest rate effective during th~ prec;eding month, regardless of the Payment Change 
Cap. This amount will he my new Minimum Payment. This means that Il).y Minimum Payment may change more frequently 
than annually. This new Minimum Payment amount will remain in effect until at least the next regular Payment Change 
Date, unless another recalculation of my Minimum Payment is required by this Section prior to such Payment Change Dare. 
(G) Required Full Payment 
Regardless of the Payment Change Cap, on the TENTH Payment Change Date and on each sucCeeding futh 
Payment Change Date thereafter, I will begin paying the Full Payment as my Minimum Payment until my monthly payment 
changes again. I also will begin paying at least the Full Payment as my Minimum Payment on the f'mal Payment Change 
Date. 
(H) Payment Options 
After the fIrst Interest Rate Change Date, each month lhe Note Holder may provide me with up to three additional 
payment options (in addition to the Minimum Payment) that are greater than the Minimum Payment, which are called 
"Payment Options." I may be given the following Payment Options: 
(i) Interest Only Payment: the amount that would pay the interest portion of the monthly payment at the current 
interest rate. The Principal balance will not be decreased by this Payment Option. 
(ii) Fully Amortized Payment: the amount necessary to pay the loan off (including all Principal and interest) at 
the Maturity Date in substantially equal installments. This Payment Option is calculated on the assumption that 
rhe current interest rate will remain in effect until the loan is paid in full, however, the current interest rate 
may in fact change every month. 
(iii) 15 Year Amortized Payment: the amount necessary to pay the loan off (mcluding all Principal and interest) 
within a fIfteen (15) year period from the first payment due date in substantially equal installments. This 
Payment Option is calculated on the assumption that the current rate will remain in effect until the loan is paid 
in full, however. the current interest rate may in fact change every month. 
Payment Options wilJ (lnly be avaiJable if they are greater than the Minimum Payment. 
(l) Failure to Make Adjustments 
If for any reason the Note Holder fails to make an adjustment to the interest rate or payment amount as described in 
this Note, regardless of any notice requirement, I agree the Note Holder may, upon discovery of such failure. then make the 
adjustment as if they had been made on time. I also agree not to hold the Note Holder responsible for any damages to me 
that may result from the Note Holder's failure to make the adjustment and to let the Note Holder. at its option, apply any 
excess monies that I may have paid to partial Prepayment of unpaid Principal. 
4. NOTICE OF CHANGES 
The Note Holder will deliver or mail to me a notice of any changes in the amount of my monthly payment before the 
effective date of any change. The notice will include information required by law to be given to me and also the title and 
telephone number of a person who will answer any question I may have regarding the notice. 
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5. BORROWER'S RIGHT TO PREPAY 
I have the right to make payments of Principal at any time before they are due. A payment of Principal only is known 
as a "Prepayment." When I make a Prepayment, I will tell the Note Holder in writing that I am doing so. I may not 
designate a payment as a Prepayment if I have not made all the monthly payments due under this Note. 
I may make a full Prepayment or partial Prepayments without paying any Prepayment charge. The Note Holder will 
use my Prepayments to reduce the amount of Principal that lowe under this Note. However, the Note Holder may apply my 
Prepayment to the accrued and unpaid interest on the Prepayment amount before applying my Prepayment to reduce the 
Principal amount of this Note. If I make a partial Prepayment, there will be no changes in the due dates of my monthly 
payments unless the Note Holder agrees in writing to those changes. My partial Prepayment may reduce the amount of my 
monthly payments after the flrst Payment Change Date following my partial Prepayment. However, any reduction due to my 
partial Prepayment may be offset by an interest rate increase. 
6. LOAN CHARGES 
If a law, which applies to this loan and which sets maximum loan charges, is fmally interpreted so that the interest or 
other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with this loan exceed tl:le permitted limits, lhen: (a) any such 
loan charge shall be reduced by the amount necessary to reduce the charge to the permitted limit; and (b) any sums already 
collected from me that exceeded permitted limits will be refunded to mc. The Note Holder may choose to make this refund 
by reducing the Principal lowe under this Note or by making a direct payment to me. If a refund reduces Principal; the 
reduction will be treated as a partial Prepayment. 
7. BORROWER'S FAILURE TO PAY AS REQUIRED 
(A) Late Cbarges for Overdue Payments 
If the Note Holder bas not received at least the full amount of any Minimum Payment by the end of 15 
calendar days after the date it is due, I will pay a late charge to the Note Holder. The amount of the charge will be 
5.0000 % of my overdue Minimum Payment. I will pay this late charge promptly but only once on each late 
payment. 
(B) Default 
If I do not pay at least the full amount of each Minimum Payment on the date it is due, I will be in default. 
(C) Notice of Default 
If I am in default, the Note Holder may send me a written notice telling me that if 1 do not pay the overdue amount by 
a certain date, the Note Holder may require me to pay immediately the full amount of Principal that has not been paid and 
all the interest that lowe on that amount. That date must be at least 30 days after the date on which the notice is mailed to 
me or delivered by other means. 
(D) No Waiver By Note Holder 
Even if, at a time when I am in default, the Note Holder does not require me to pay immediately in full as described 
above, the Note Holder will still have the right to do so if I am in default at a later time. 
(E) Payment of Note Holder's Costs and Expenses 
If the Note Holder has required me to pay immediately in full as descnbed above, the Note Holder will have the right 
to be paid back by me for all of its costs and expenses in enforcing this Note to the extent not prohibited by applicable law. 
These expenses include, for example, reasonable attorneys' fees. 
8. GIVING OF NOTICES 
Unless applicable law requires a different method, any notice that must be given to me under this Note will be given by 
delivering it Or by mailing it by first class mail to me at the Property Address above or at a different address if I give the 
Note Holder a notice of my different address. 
Unless the Note Holder requires a different method, any notice that must be given to the Note Holder under this Note 
will be given by mailing it by first class mail to the Note Holder at the address stated in Section 3(A) above or at a different 





9. OBLIGATIONS OF PERSONS UNDER TIllS NOTE 
If more than one person signs this Note, each person is fully and personally obligated to keep all the promises made in 
this Note, including the promise to pay the full amount oWed. Any person who is a guarantor, surety or endorser of !his 
Note is also obligated to do these things. Any person who takes over these obligations, including me obligations of a 
guarantor, surety or endorser of this Note, is also obligated to keep all the promises made in this Note. The Note Holder 
may enforce its rights under this Note against each person individually or against all of us together. This means that anyone 
of us may be required to pay all the amounts owed under this Note. 
IO.WAIVERS 
I and any other person who has obligations under this Note waive the rights of Presentment and Notice of Dishonor. 
"PIesentment~ means the right to require the Note Holder to demand payment of amounts due. wNotice of Dishonor" means 
the right to require the Note Holder to give notice to other persons that amounts due have not been paid. 
11. SECURED NOTE 
In addition to the protections given to the Note Holder under this Note, a Mortgage, Deed of Trust, or Security Deed 
(the nSecurity Instrument-), dated the same date as this Note, protects the Note Holder from possible losses that might result 
if I do not keep the promises that I make in this Note. That Security Instrument describes how and under what conditions I 
may be required to make immediate payment in full of all amounts lowe under this Note. Some of these conditions read as 
follows: 
Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. As used in this Section 18, "Interest in 
the Property" means any legal or beneficial interest in the Property, including, but not limited to, Ihose 
beneficial interests transferred in a bond for deed, contract for deed, installment sales contract or escrow 
agreement, the intent of which is the transfer of title by Borrower at a future date to a purchaser. 
If all or any part of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or transferred (or if Borrower is 
not a natural person and a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred) without Lender's prior written 
consent, Lender may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument. 
However, this option shall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise is prohibited by Applicable Law. 
Lender also shall not exercise this option if: (a) Borrower causes to be submitted to Lender information 
required by Lender to evaluate the intended transferee as if a new loan were being made to the transferee; and 
(b) Lender reasonably determines that Lender's. security will not be impaired by the loan assumption and that 
the risk of a breach of any covenant or agreement in this Security Instrument is acceptable to Lender. 
To the extent permitted by Applicable Law, Lender may charge a reasonable fee as a condition to 
Lender's consent to the loan assumption. Lender also may require .the transferee to sign an assumption 
agreement that is acceptable to Lender and that obligates the transferee to keep all Ihe promises and agreements 
made in the Note and in this Security Instrument. Borrower will continue to be obligated under the Note and 
this Security Instrument unless Lender releases Borrower in writing. 
If Lender exercises the option to require immediate payment in full, Lender shall give Borrower notice of 
acceleration. The notice shall provide a period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given in 
accordance with Section 15 within which Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If 
Borrower fails to pay these sums prior to the expiration of this period, Lender may invoke any remedies 
permitted by this Security Instrument without further notice or demand on Borrower. 
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j NOTE I 
~P~.I?J;:R.'+.QhH .•.. , ..... ~.9.q?: ...... ............... . ..... !1!i;R+.l?I;lW, ........................... , Idaho 
DalL Cfry 
.?Il.~,,} ... !?;J;W .. !'i!',¥. ..................................................... I'{;U4?};:R ............................. t .. ;J;P. ... fl~.~.7.if 
Fropmy AlidnII City Slott Z1P Code 
~. DEFlNlTIONS 
The headings at the begilUling of each section are for convenience only and are not to be used in interpreting 
the text of the section. "00" means the terms that apply to this loan. "I.' "me" or "my' means each Borrower 
who signs this note and each other person or legal entity (including guarantors; endorsers. and sureties) who 
agrees to pay this note (together referred to as ·us"). The Lender is !\<!~'.~<;?M'!l~)")!'~.~S11-. ~~I~I)\f~.!'f(¥!'Al>:< .. ~!<m~~'!ClAL 
'You' or 'your" means the Lender and its successors and assigns. NE'(WORJ<:.'14C.) 
2. BORROWE~'S PROMISE TO PAY 
For value received.l promise to pay to you, or your order. the PRINCIPAL sum of .~R+X .. 'J::Ij.Q ............ . 
. +gRV.$.~ •• 'fJIiR •• ~Qffl?!W.Q •• !\.MI?.1'!R(J.qQ ........................................................................ Dollars 
$ .............. :17.1.?9!l.·.P.Q .... plus interest. No additional advances are contemplated under this Note. 
3. INTEREST 
1 agree to pay interest on the outstanding principal balance at the rate of ..... ;t.;!.,.U?9 .. % per year until the 
full amount of principal has been paid. Interest accrues on the principal remaining unpaid from time to time. until 
paid in full. The interest rate and other charges on this loan will never exceed the bighest rate or charge allowed 
by law for this loan. 
ACCRUAL METHOD: Interest will be calculated on a .•.. :?QD.?\l ............................................. .. 
oasis. For interest calculatiofl, the accrual method will determine tllc number of days in a year. If no accruaJ 
method- is Slated. then you may use any reasonable accrual method for calculating intere.~t. 
4. PAYMENTS 
I agree [0 pay this note in monthly payments. 1 will make my monthly payment on the .... f.+1w.r. ......... day 
of each month be,inning on .HffiWll-Rr. .. +~':L:, ... ~.Q~7 ....... The monthly payment will be $ ............ :l;;J.~.,:n . 
I will make these payments every month until I have paid all of the principal and interest and any other charges 
described below that I may owe under this note or until my balloon payment is due, if a balloon payment is 
indicated below. Unless otherwise required by law, each payment I make on this loan will be applied first to any 
charges lowe other than principal and interest, then to interest that is due, and finally to principal. The fioal 
payment of the entire unpaid balance of principal :and interest will be due P.?9~11!l)i=,ij. .. ;t.§.'.!'., ... +.9.~.l. ... which il; 
called the "Maturity Dale. ' 
The actual amount of my final payment will depend on my payment record. If nny payment: due under this 
loan does not equal or exceed the amount of interest duc. you may, at your option, increase tlle amount of the 
payment due and all future pay.ments to an amount that will payoff this loan in equal payments over the 
remaining term of this loan. subjcct to any balloon payment indicated below. 
I will make my monthly payments at .. p.:.Q., .. ~Q~ •• 1I.9.~.Q~~.r .. K!l;r.Jg,.~ ... f!'Ul:1~?1 ...................... .. 
... ........... ....... ................... ............ or at a different: place if required by you. 
I have the right to make payments of principal at any time before they are due. A payment of principal only is 
known as a ·prepayment:.· When I make a prepayment, I will tell you in writing that I am doing so. I may make 
a full prepayment or partial prepayments without paying any prepayment penalty. you will use all of my 
prepayments to reduce the amount of principal that lowe under this nOle. I must still ma~e each later payment: in 
the original amount as it becomes due untU this note is paid in full, 
ru BALLOON PAYMENT. If any scheduled payment of a consumer loan (other than one primarily for an 
agricultural purpose or one secured by a fiISt lien on real property) is more than twice as large as the average 
of earlier scheduled payments, I have the right to refinance that payment WiUlout penalty at the lime it is due, 
and on [cUllS no less favorable than this original transaction. This right docs not appJy: (1) to the CXlent that 
the payment schcdule has been adjusted to my seasonal or irregul;u: income or obligations; (2) if the collateral 
is a second deed of trust or mortgage on a 1 to 4 family dwelling occupied by me; .(3)- at the time of the 
balloon payment you offer me the other options required by rule of the Administrator of the Idaho Credit 
Code; or (4) this trans;lction qualifies as an alternative mortgage transaction under federal laW. 
LATE CHARGE: t agree 10 pay a late charge on the portion of any payment JIUIde more than 15 calendar 
days after it is due equal to 5% of the unpaid amount, or $1S.00, whichever is greater. I will pay this late charge 
only once on each late payment. No late charge will be assessed on any payment when the only delinquency is 
due to late fees assessed on earlier payments and the payment Is otherwise a full payment. 
S. SECUlUTY 
My obli&a.tions \lIIdcr tnis nole are sepatalely secu;ed by a Deed of Trust dated the same date as this nole. 
Any present or future agreement securing any other debt lowe you also will secure the payment: of this loan. 
However. property securing another debt will not secure this loan if such, property is: (1) my principal dwelling 
and you fall to provide any required notice of right of rescission; (2) household goods; (3) land and the principal 
amount of this loan is one thousand dollaIS or less; or (4) real property that you have a secured interest in by first 
mortgage or first deed of trust. 
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6. APPLICABLE LAW: This note and any agreement securing this note will be governed by the laws of the 
state of Idaho. The fact that any part of this note cannot be enforced will not affect the rest of this note. Any 
change to this note or any agreement securing Ulis note must be in writing and signed by you and me. 
7. COM:MlSSrONS: I understand and agree that you (or your affiliate) will earn conunissions or fees on any 
insurance products, and may earn such fees on other services, that I buy ilirough you or your affIliate. 
8. PAYMENTS BY LENDER: If you are authorized 10 pay, on my behalf, chllrges I am obligated to pay (such 
.s property insurance premiumS), then you may treat those payments made by you as advances and add them to 
the unpaid principal under this .note, or you may demand immediate payment of the charges. 
9. nEAL ESTATE OR nESlDENCE SECURITY: If this note is secured by real estate or a residence tilat is 
personal propeny, the existence of a default and your remedies for such a default will be detennined by 
applicable law, by the tenns of any separate instrument creating the security interest and, to tile extent not 
prohibited by law and not contrary to the tcnns of the separate security instrument, by this agreement. 
10. ASSUMPTION: This note and any document securing It cannot be assumed by someone buying tile secured 
property from me. TIlis will be true unless you agree in writing to the contrary. Without such an agreement. if I 
try to transfer any interest in the property securing this note, I will be in default on this loan. You may proceed 
against me under any due on sale clause in the security agreement, whlch is incorporated by reference. 
l1.l>EFAULT: Subject to any limitations in tile "REAL ESTATE OR RESIDENCE SECURITY" paragraph 
aboyc, I will be in default on this note if any of the following occur: 
(1) 1 fail to make a payment as required by this loan: or 
(2) You believe that the prospect of receiving payment or perfonnance from me or of realizing on the Property 
is significantly impaired. 
12. nEMEDIES: Subject to the limitations of any applicable right to cute and any limitations in the "REAL 
ESTATE OR RESIDENCE SECURITY" paragraph above, if 1 am in default on this loan or any agreement 
securing this loan, you may: 
(1) Make unpaid principal, earned interest and aU other agreed cilarges r owe you under this loan immediately 
due; 
(2) Demand morc security or new parties obligated to pay this loan (or both) in return for not using any other 
remedy; 
(3) Make a claim for any and all insurance benefits or refunds thaI may be available on my default; 
(4) Usc any remedy yO\1 have under stale or fedel'1lllaw; and 
(5) Use any remedy given 10 you in any agreement securing this loan. 
By choosing anyone or more of these remedies you do not give up your right to use another remedy later. By 
deciding not to use any remedy should I be in dcfaull, you do not give up your right to consider the event a 
default if it happens again. 
13. COLLECTION COSTS AND ATIORNEY'S FEES: I agree to pay you all reasonable costs you incur to 
collect this debt or r""lile on any security. Unless prohlbitcdby law. this includes reasonable attorney's fees you 
incur after my default, provided the attorney is not your salaried employee. This provision also shall apply if I 
file a petition or any other claim for rclief under any bankruptcy rule or law of the United States. or if such 
petition or other claim for relief is filed against me by another. 
14. WAIVER: I waive (to the extent permitted by law) demand. presentment. protest. notice of dishonor and 
notice of protest. 
15. OBLIGATIONS INDEPENDENT: I understand that my obligation to pay all of the anlounts owed under 
this loan. is independent of the obligation of any other person who has also agreed to pay it. You may, without 
notice, release me or any of us. give up any rIght you may have against any of us. extend new credit to any of us, 
or renew or change this note one or more times and for any tenn, and 1 will still be obligated to pay this loan. 
You may, without notice, fail to perfect your security interest in, impair, or release any security and I will stHI 
be obligated to pay this loan. 
16.CREDIT INFORMATION: 1 agree that from time to time you may receive credit infonnation about me 
from others, including other lenders and credit reponing a&encies. I agree that you may furnish on a regular basis 
credit and experience infonnation .regarding my loan to others seeking such information. To the exlen~ pCmUued 
by law, I agree that you will not be liable for any claim arising from the usc of infonnation provided to you by 
others or for providing such information to others. I will giVe you any financial stalements or'infonnation that 
you fcel is necessary. All financial statements and information I give you will be correct and complete. 
17. PURCHASE MONEY LOAN, If this is a purchase money loan, you may include thc name of the seller on 
the check or draft for this loan. 
lS.RETURNED CHECK CHARGE: If any payment on this note is made with a check that is returned or 
dishonored, J agree to pay you a $20.00 fcc. 
SIGNATURES: I AGREE TO THE TERMS OF TillS NOTE. [ have received a copy of this note. 
~/<4 ... &.G.1~z?............ . ... .!(~/~.~(??r:. ................................. .. ~;~Ul! O. nAltNSOH -SorrOW6' Date -Borrower 
... -.~ .......... , ............. ,.~ ............. ~.. . .... ....... . ..... . ............... , ....................... .. ......................... . 
Date ·Borrow" Date ·Ootrowo( 
(Sign Original Ollly) 
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Annual. Report for W 32267 http://www.sos servletiTransform.X1'v1LDoc?URL=\20 1 007 
No. W 32267 Due no later than Jul 31, 2010 
2. Registered Agent and Address 
(NO PO BOX) 
Return to: 
Annual Report Form 
JEFFREY ZAWADZKI 
SECRETARY OF STATE 1. Mailing Address: Correct in this box if needed. 2527 SHERIDAN AVE 
700 WEST JEFFERSON NAMPA ID 83686 PARKWEST HOMES LLC 
PO BOX 83720 DAVID M ZAWADZKI 
BOISE, ID 83720-0080 28123 SILO WAY 
WILDER ID 83676 3 . .fWli Registered Agent Signature: * 
NO FILING FEE IF 
RECEIVED BY DUE DATE 
4. Limited Liability Companies: Enter Names and Addresses of at least one Member or Manager. 
Office Held Name Street or PO Address City State Country Postal Code 
MEMBER DAVID ZAWADZKI 8773 QUAIL RIDGE DR NAMPA ID USA 83686 
5. Organized Under the Laws of: 6. Annual Report must be signed.* 
ID Signature: David Zawadzki Date: 07/22/2010 
W32267 Name (type or print): David Zawadzki Title: Member 
Processed 07/22/2010 * Electronically provided signatures are accepted as original signatures. 
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LAUREL I. HANDLEY (ID BN 7651) 
PITE DUNCAN, LLP 
4375 Jutland Drive 
Suite 200; P.O. Box 17934 
San Diego, CA 92177-0934 
Telephone: (858) 750-7600 
Facsimile: (619) 590-1385 
E-mail: lhandley@piteduncan.com 
F I A.k~M. 
FEB 1 9 2ft10 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC, its successors and/or 
assigns 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE 
HOLDINGS, LLC, its successors and/or 
assigns 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV09-11397 
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 
POSSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY AND 
FOR EJECTMENT 
v. Fee Amount: $88.00 
JULIE G. BARNS ON, DAVID ZAWADZKI Fee Category: G3 
and DOES II through X, inclusive, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC, its successors 
and/or assigns, by and through its attorney of record, Laurel!. Handley, and as and for a complaint 
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Plaintiff is the owner of certain real property located at 28123 Silo Way, Wilder, ID 83676 
("Property"). Plaintiff purchased the Property at a trustee's sale and a Trustee's Deed was issued on 
July 9,2009. Ten days have elapsed since the date of the trustee's sale and Plaintiff is entitled to 
possession of the Property pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-1506. Plaintiff is, as a result of the trustee's 
sale, the rightful owner thereof. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of the Trustee's Deed by 
which Plaintiff took title to the premises. 
Defendants remains in possession of the Property and is deemed a tenant at sufferance. A 
demand letter has been sent to Defendants, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B, 
requiring that Defendants vacate the Property. Although Plaintiff was entitled to possession 10 days 
after the trustee's sale, Plaintiff gave Defendants additional time to vacate the Property. However, 
Defendants have failed to comply with the terms of the demand letter and has failed to surrender 
possession of the Property to Plaintiff. 
II. 
After filing the initial complaint in this matter, Plaintiffbecame aware that Defendant David 
Zawadzki is also an occupant and in possession of the Property. Plaintiffhas amended the complaint 
to name Defendant David Zawadzki as Doe I. Plaintiff alleges that in addition to the known 
Defendants, the parties sued herein as fictitious Defendants are claiming an interest in the real 
property described in this Complaint through possession or otherwise. The names, capacities and 
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III. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120, Defendant(s) are responsible for all attorneys' fees in the 
sum of$375, filing fee in the amount of$88, and service of process of$110, and if this matter is 
contested, such amount shall be set by the Court. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffprays for judgment as follows: 
1. That Defendants be declared to be in unlawful of the Property; 
2. That Defendants be ordered to relinquish possession of the Property to Plaintiff; 
3. That a writ of assistance or writ of possession be issued by the Court; 
4. That Defendants be ordered to pay attorneys' fees in the amount of$375 if this matter 
be uncontested, and if contested, such amount shall be set by the Court, and all costs incurred in this 
action; and 
5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 
Dated: p/o/ ( 0 PITE DUNCAN, LLP 
BY~ 
Laurel!. Handley Z 
Attorney for Plaintiff Residential undmg 
Real Estate Holdings, LLC 
COMPLAINT FOR POSSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY - 3 -
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TRUSTEE'S DEED 
FlRST AMERICAN TitLE INSURANCE COMPANY (herein called TlUStec) as Succcssor Trustee under the 
Deed of Trust hereinafter particularly described, does bereby Bargain. Sell and Convey. without warranty, to 
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC, herein called Grantee whose current address is: 
c/o GMAC Mortgage Corporation, 500 Enterprise Road, Suite ISO, Horsham. PA 19044 all of the real propcrty 
situated in the County of Canyon. state ofldaho described as follows: 
LOT .. IN BWCK I OF RIVERBEND SUBDIVISION, CANYON COUNTY, IDAHO, ACCORDING TO 
THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF, FILED IN BOOK 34 OF PLATS, AT PACE 2, RECORDS OF SAID 
COUNTY. 
This conveyance is made pursuant to the powers conferred upon Trustee by the Deed of Trust between JULIE G. 
BARNSON, AN UNMARRIED WOMAN, as Grantor, and TRANSNA nON TITLE, as Trustell, and MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRA nON SYSTEMS,INC.,("MERS") AS NOMINEE FOR HOMECOMINGS 
FINANCIAL, LLC (FIKlA HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL NETWORK, INC.), as Beneficiary, dated t IIH)I2006. 
recorded 1111412006, as instrument No. 200690998, Book Page. and re-recorded , mortgage records of CaI1Yon 
County. Idaho, and after the fulfillment of the conditions specified in said Deed ofTrust authorizing this conveyance 
as follows: 
(l), Default occulTed in the obligations for which such deed of trust was given as security and the beneficiary made 
demand upon the said trustee to sell property pursuant 10 the tenns of said deed of trust. Notice of Default was 
recorded 212612009, as Instrument No. 2009-009415, Book. Page. mortgage records of Canyon County, Idaho and 
in the office of each County in which the property described in said deed of trust, or any part thereof, is situated, the 
nature of such default being as set forth in said Notice of Default. Such default still existed at the time of sale. 
(2). After recording of said Notice of Default, trustee gave notice of the time and place of the sale of said property 
by registered or certified mail. by personal service upon the occupants of said premises and by publishing in a 
conspicuous place on said premises and by publishing in a newspaper of general circulation in each of the counties 
in which the property is situated as more fully appears in affidavits recorded at least 20 days prior to the date of sale 















,-.------------ ----- -- ... 
ID-J67373-C 
7471476101 
(3). The provisions, recitals and contents of the Notice of Default referred to in paragraph (l) supra and of the 
Affidavits referred to in paragraph (2) supra shall be and they are hereby 
incorporated herein and made an integral part hereof for all purposes as though set forth herein at Jength. 
(4). All requirements of law regarding the mailing, personal service. posting. publiastion and recording of the notice 
of defau It, and Notice of Sale and for all other notices have been complied with. 
(5). Not less than ) 20 days elapsed between the giving of Notice of Sale by registered or certified mail and the sale 
of the property. 
(6). Trustee, at the time and place of sale fix.ed by said Notice, at public auction, in one parcel, struck off to Grantee, 
being the highest bidder thereof, the property herein described for the sum of $199,556.36, subject however to all 
prior liens and encumbrances. No person or corporation offered to take any part of said property less than the whole 
thereoffor the amount of principal, interest, and advanced costs. 
Dated: 7/9n009 FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY 
MMtADaATORRE,ASSTSEc 
fA-State of ) 55. 
Countyof ~ ) 
On l'U,'~ before me, r....A ~ , a Notary Public personally . 
appeared, tAAR\A DE LA TORRE who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to the 
person{s) whose name(s} lsIare subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that 
he/she/they executed the same In hiS/her/their authorized capacity(les), and that by hls/her/their 
signature(s) on the instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of'which the person(s} acted, 
executed the instrument. 
I certify under penalty of pe~ury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing paragraph Is 
true and correct. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal 
@ 
LAURA A. KENNEDY 
CommIssion. 1819999 
... ~~. Notary Public· California I 
, .~ Onnge County -
M,' r.omm tiplrt' Oct 17. 2012 






,teven W, Pile CAlNVIWA 
John D. Duncan ~A 
Peter J. Salmon 
::AIID/UTIWA 
David Eo McAllister 
;Z/CAIHIIOMJTIWA 
Rochelle L. Stanford 
• =.«:lIVWA 
lu.epbiDe E. Salmon 
;KIAZICAINY 
L. u rei I. H.adler 
iVCNIDINV 
Daniel R. Gamez CAJTX 
Eddie R. Jim ... ez CAlNVtrX 
SusaD l- Petit ~A 
Douel __ A. ToIeaoAZC4 
CUOD& M. NlU)'u CAINV 
C •• per J. RaakiD CAlOR 
Charles A. Correia CA 
"c1odle A. WhilloD CA 
8ri ... A. P.lDo CAI1:\WA 
July 14, 2009 
DEMAND FOR POSSESSION 
JULIE O. BARNSON 
and All Occupants of the Premises 
28123 SILO WAY 
WILDER, ID 83676 . 
Re: Demand for Possession of Real Property Located at 28123 Silo Way, Wilder, ID 83676; 
Our File No.: 000001-1121560 
Dear Julie G. Barnson: 
~riotoPberM.-McDermOIt A:g--you' maybe aware~-a "foreclosure saie--of-the p"tOperty referenced' above- occilrfed ort : The·' 
lillian A. 8eabowCA purchaser of the property is currently entitled to possession of the property pursuant to Idaho Code 
~~:;;a;.~M~~:;~ Cd §45 -15 06(11). 
Or __ LCallaulLCA.__ --------- - ., .. --- .. -----------.---.--
'4.talle T. Npyea CA 
Caroline M. Robert CA 
:-;""aU M. Ande ....... CA 
Ellen ella CAMN 
lose It.. Garci. ci 
!;;rio L. Laner C.A 
"neela M. FOOb.iIIl CA 
Jacque A. Grubu CAINV 
lobn B. Ademo CA 
Willi .... L. Plnrid,e CA 
Chriotopber L PetenooCA 
Kalie l- JobnaoaCA 
w,.;w" • &.un.eIq 
1375 Jutland Drive, s.a..1OO 
• O. Box 17933 
i.n 0;.110, CA 92177.09)) 
"'flUi", • Ewe';',. 
1l7S Jutland on"" Suite lOll 
l O. 60 .. t793. 
; ... 0..,0. CA 92177-0934 
.... (15&) 750.7600 
',.: (619) S9tJ..I3.l 
Orange Coun!v 
K.erry W. Frmicll CAINV 
I!'.lana J. MOeder CA 
~7J.'!J l~':"J°rrx 
1820 E. First St" Ste. 420 
>allta Ana. CA ',12705 
'h: (714) 285-2633 
'ax: (714) 285·2668 
4rizona O{flce 
:harles L. Firestein 
'hoeni><. AZ 
f/awali O(flce 
)avid 8. Ro ..... 




Nimam P. Weaver. Jr. 
ian Antonio, TX 
DEMAND IS HEREBY MADE for possession of the property which is commonly known as 
ADDRESS OF PROPERTY HERE. 
Please vacate the property within fifteen (15) days of the date of this letter if (i) you are the original 
owner or a successor owner of the property. or (ii) within ninety (90) days after service on you of this 
Notice in the event you are a tenant or subtenant of the property. and not one of the owners of the 
property. If you fail to do so, a lawsuit will be brought against you for possession of the property. 
As part of the lawsuit, we will ask the court to order payment of all attorney fees and costs incurred 
in pursuing this matter . 
If you would like to arrange a move-out date, please contact our office at (858) 750-7600. Thank 
you for your cooperation. 
EXHIBITD 
Anomeys licensed to practice in Alaska, Arizona. California, Hawaii 
Idaho. Nevada, New York. Oregon. Texas. Utah and Washington 
See abovt OT visit WW14'.plteduncalLcom Tt: indivlduallltlornq IIdmiss{ons. 
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Moffitt Thomas 
MOFFATT THOMAS BARRETT ROCK & FIELDS, CHTD. 
John W. Barren 
Richard C Fields 
John S. Simko 
JohnC. Ward 
D. James Manning 
David B. Lincoln 
Gary T. Dance 
Larry C. Hunter 
Randall A. Peterman 
I'vfark S. Prusynski 
Scephen R. Thomas 
Glenna M. Chri5t~nsen 
Gerald T. Husch 
Scott L. Campbell 
Robert B. Burns 
Michael E. Thomas 
Pacricia M. Olsson 
Christine E. Nicholas 
Bradley J Williams 
Lee Radford 
Michaela. Roe 
Nancy J. Garrett 
David S. Jensen 
James L. Martin 
C. Clayton Gill 
Michael W. McGreaham 
David P. Gardner 
Julian E. Gabiola 
Tara Martens 
Kimberly D. Evans Ross 
Jon A. Stenquist 
Mark C. Peterson 
Tyler J. Anderson 
Jason G. Murr-ay 
Ryan T. McFarland 
Andrew J. Waldera 
Dylan B. Lawrence 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Paul D. McFarlane 
Tyler]. Henderson 
C. Edward Cather III 
Benjamin C. Ritchie 
Noah G. Hillen 
Matthew J. McGee 
David]. Dance 
Mindy M. Willman 
Robert E. Bakes, of counsel 
Wi/lis C. Moffatt, 1907-1980 
Eugene C. Thomas, 1931-2010 
Kirk R. He/vie, 1956-2003 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
877 W. Main St., Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ill 83701 
October 13, 2010 
Re: ParkWest Homes LLC v. MERS (Case No. CV 07-8274) 






US Bank Plaza Building 
101 S Capitol Blvd 10th FI 
PO Box 829 
Boise Idaho 83701 0829 
2083452000 
8004222889 
208 385 5384 Fax 
www.moffatt.com 
My client provided me last week with copies of a recorded deed and related documentation 
establishing that the residence at issue in the referenced lawsuit was sold last year by trustee's 
sale to Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential Funding"). Pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 45-1508, such sale foreclosed and terminated all interest in the property 
covered by the deeds of trust in which MERS claims an interest. In re Wiebe, 353 B.R. 906, 
912 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2006). 
Although a party to a suit may under many circumstances continue to represent the interests of 
a successor by virtue ofI.R.C.P. 25(c), Rule 25(c) appears not to apply where there is a sale of 
assets by public sale. See R.J. Enstrom Corp. v. Interceptor Corp., 555 F.2d 277,280-81 
(1997) (affirming trial court's determination that a secured creditor's public sale under the UCC 
was not a transfer of interest for purposes of Rule 25( c)). Accordingly, absent an acceptable 
consent by Residential Funding to MERS representing Residential Funding as its nominee in 
the present lawsuit, I intend to promptly file a motion for summary judgment against MERS 
based on the referenced trustee's sale. See Carrington v. Crandall, 63 Idaho 651, 657 (1942) 
("appellant, having parted with all his interest in and to the land and water right, having failed 
and refused to apply for an order of substitution of the proper party to the action, and his 
transferee having made no application, or otherwise indicating that the proceedings be 
continued in the name of appellant, was no longer in a position to maintain the action"). Any 
consent of Residential Funding should be in writing, be signed by an authorized officer of 
Residential Funding, and expressly state that Residential Funding (i) is the current owner of the 
Client:1802431.1 
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Ryan T. McFarland 
October 13, 2010 
Page 2 
real property at issue in this lawsuit (Case No. CV 07-8274), (ii) designates MERS to be its 
nominee in this lawsuit, (iii) waives its right to intervene in this lawsuit, and (iv) acknowledges 
and agrees that it will be bound by the tenns of any judgment entered against MERS in this 
lawsuit. Please promptly confinn whether you intend to provide, and believe you are in a 
position to provide, a consent of Residential Funding on the foregoing tenns. 
Additionally, please note that, absent your prompt confinnation that you intend to provide the 
requested written consent of Residential Funding just described, I intend to file next week a 
motion for a protective order and a motion to quash with respect to the deposition notices and 
subpoenas you served me with last week. Conversely, if you will promptly provide me with the 
requested confinnation, I will accept service of your subpoena on behalf of David Zawadzki, as 
you requested yesterday, so that your depositions of Park West Homes and Zawadzki can go 
forward as noticed. 
Finally, although I have enclosed with this letter both my client's second set of discovery 
requests on MERS and a 30(b)(6) deposition notice ofMERS, please note that I am willing to 
vacate the noticed deposition on the condition that MERS provides unqualified admissions to 
Requests for Admission Nos. 5 through 24, inclusively. 















Ryan McFarland [rmcfarland@hawleytroxell.com] 
Monday, November 01,201010:58 AM 
Bob Burns 
Stephen C. Hardesty 
RE: ParkWest Homes v. MERS [DMSMSG1.FID352497] 
Attachments: DOC.PDF; Stipulation to Intervene.pdf; Order to Intervene.pdf 
Bob: 
Page 1 of7 
Please see the attached Stipulation. If it is acceptable, please sign and return and I will file it with the 
Court. Of course, if you have any questions or changes please don't hesitate to contact me. 




Ryan T. McFarland 
Attorney 
8n fv1ain Street, Suite 1000 
p,O, Box 1617 




HA \VLEY TROXELL 
Attorneys and Counselors 
This e-mail message from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is intended only for named recipients. It contains information 
that may be confidential, privileged, attorney work product, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law, If you have received 
this message in error, are not a named recipient, or are not the employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to a named 
recipient, be advised that any review, disclosure, use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this message or its contents is strictly 
prohibited, Please notify us immediately at 208,344,6000 if you have received this message in error, and delete the message, 
From: Bob Burns [mailto:RBB@moffatt.com] 
Sent: Friday, October 29, 20104:13 PM 
To: Ryan McFarland 
Cc: David Zawadzki 
Subject: RE: ParkWest Homes v. MERS [DMSMSG1.FID352497] 
Thanks for the confirmation, Ryan. Bob 
From: Ryan McFarland [mailto:rmcfarland@hawleytroxell.com] 
Sent: Friday, October 29, 20104:11 PM 
To: Bob Burns 
Cc: Stephen C. Hardesty 
Subject: RE: ParkWest Homes v. MERS [DMSMSG1.FID352497] 
Bob: 




Ryan T. McFarland 
Attorney 
877 iV1ain Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 




HA \VLEY TROXELL 
Attorneys and Counselors 
Page 2 of7 
This e-mail message from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is intended only for named recipients. It contains information that may 
be confidential, privileged, attorney work product, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message in 
error, are not a named recipient, or are not the employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to a named recipient, be advised that any 
review, disclosure, use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this message or its contents is strictly prohibited. Please notify us immediately at 
208.344.6000 if you have received this message in error, and delete the message. 
From: Ryan McFarland [mailto:rmcfarland@hawleytroxell.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, October 27, 20103:10 PM 
To: Bob Burns 
Cc: Stephen C. Hardesty 




Ryan T. McFarland 
Attorney 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 




HA \VLEY TROXELL 
Attorneys and Counselors 
This e-mail message from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is intended only for named recipients. It contains information that may 
be confidential, privileged, attorney work product, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message in 
error, are not a named recipient, or are not the employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to a named reCipient, be advised that any 
review, disclosure, use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this message or its contents is strictly prohibited. Please notify us immediately at 
208.344.6000 if you have received this message in error, and delete the message. 
From: Bob Burns [mailto:RBB@moffatt.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, October 27,20102:41 PM 
To: Ryan McFarland 
Cc: David Zawadzki 
Subject: RE: ParkWest Homes v. MERS [DMSMSG1.FID352497] 
Ryan, this e-mail will confirm our agreement of a few minutes ago vacating all noticed depositions in this action 
12/112010 419 
Page 3 of7 
and the due date for MERS' answers and responses to Plaintiff's Second Set of Requests for Admission, 
Interrogatories, and Requests for Production of Document, with the understanding that either of us may reset our 
respective depositions and/or the due date for MERS' answers and responses upon not less than ten days written 
notice to the other. As we discussed, the purpose of this agreement is to give you time to prepare a stipulated 
motion for the intervention in this action of Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC, as the purchaser of the 
subject property by trustee's sale. I look forward to receiving your proposed form of the stipulated motion 
sometime this week. Please advise immediately if the foregoing does not accurately set forth our agreement, so 
that I might timely complete and file, if necessary, the plaintiff's motions for summary judgment and for a 
protective order staying any discovery by MERS in this action. Bob 
Robert B. Burns 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chtd. 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
P. O. Box 829 






From: Ryan McFarland [mailto:rmcfarland@hawleytroxell.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, October 26, 2010 2:47 PM 
To: Bob Burns 
Cc: Stephen C. Hardesty 
Subject: RE: ParkWest Homes v. MERS [DMSMSG1.FID352497] 
Bob: 
My client is still evaluating how to proceed. For now, we intend to proceed with ParkWest Homes' deposition as 
noticed. Will you accept service of the subpoena on David Zawadzki and agree that his deposition may be taken 
concurrently with ParkWest's? 
Ryan 
Ryan T. McFarland 
Attorney 
877 f\iain Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 




HA WLEY TROXELL 
Attomeys and Counselors 
This e-mail message from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is intended only for named recipients. It contains information that may 
be confidential, privileged, attorney work product, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message in 
error, are not a named recipient, or are not the employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to a named recipient, be advised that any 
review, disclosure, use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this message or its contents is strictly prohibited. Please notify us immediately at 
208.344.6000 if you have received this message in error, and delete the message. 
From: Bob Burns [mailto:RBB@moffatt.com] 
Sent: Monday, October 25, 2010 7:27 PM 
To: Ryan McFarland 
121112010 420 
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Cc: David Zawadzki 
Subject: RE: ParkWest Homes v. MERS [DMSMSGl.FID352497] 
Ryan, can you please provide me with an update on where things stand concerning the consent or substitution of 
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC, as discussed in my letter to you of October 13. Also, could you 
please provide me with any authority you have holding (or supporting your contention) that a trustee's sale or 
foreclosure constitutes a "transfer of interest" under IRCP 25(c). Thanks. Bob 
Robert B. Burns 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chtd. 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
P. O. Box 829 






From: Bob Burns 
Sent: Friday, October 15, 20104:10 PM 
To: 'Ryan McFarland' 
Subject: RE: ParkWest Homes v. MERS [DMSMSGl.FID352497] 
Sure, Ryan, let me know as soon as you know. Bob 
From: Ryan McFarland [mailto:rmcfarland@hawleytroxell.com] 
Sent: Friday, October 15, 2010 4:02 PM 
To: Bob Burns 
Cc: Stephen C. Hardesty 
Subject: RE: ParkWest Homes v. MERS [DMSMSGl.FID352497] 
Bob: 
I have reviewed your letter and forwarded to my client. We are evaluating how to respond. Initially, I point out 
that we have successfully briefed Rule 25 before and it simply does not require dismissal - I do not believe you 
can obtain summary judgment based on the transfer of interest. Also, please be advised that the MERS 
employee with personal knowledge of this case is in Texas, so we will need to travel to Texas to depose MERS. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, I agree that the transfer of interest in light of the foreclosure should be dealt 
with. Please allow my clients an additional week to respond to your demand. 
Sincerely, 
Ryan 
Ryan T. McFarland 
Attorney 
877 ~1ain Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box .16.17 




HA WLEY TROXELL 
Attorneys and Counselors 
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Page 5 of7 
This e-mail message from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is intended only for named recipients. It contains information that may 
be confidential, privileged, attorney work product, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message in 
error, are not a named recipient, or are not the employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to a named recipient, be advised that any 
review, disclosure, use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this message or its contents is strictly prohibited. Please notify us immediately at 
208.344.6000 if you have received this message in error, and delete the message. 
From: Bob Burns [mailto:RBB@moffatt.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, October 13, 20109:43 AM 
To: Ryan McFarland 
Subject: RE: ParkWest Homes v. MERS [DMSMSG1.FID352497] 
Ryan, please review the attached letter (the original with the referenced attachments will be hand delivered to you 
later today) and then give me a call to discuss. Bob 
From: Ryan McFarland [mailto:rmcfarland@hawleytroxell.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, October 12, 2010 11 :44 AM 
To: Bob Burns 
Cc: Stephen C. Hardesty 
Subject: RE: ParkWest Homes v. MERS [DMSMSG1.FID352497] 
Sob: 
I have recently hand-delivered to you a number of things, including a check for the payment of costs on appeal, 
MERS' Answer, the signed scheduling stipulation, notices of deposition of David Zawadzki, ParkWest Homes, and 
Julie Barnson, and notices of subpoenas to Zawadzki and Samson. Will you accept service of the subpoena on 
Zawadzki? I have attached both an acceptance of service and the subpoena here. Please advise. 
Thanks, 
Ryan 
Ryan T. McFarland 
Attorney 
877 ~'1ajn Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 




HA \VLEY TROXELL 
Attorneys and Counselors 
This e-mail message from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is intended only for named recipients. It contains information that may 
be confidential, privileged, attorney work product, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message in 
error, are not a named recipient, or are not the employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to a named recipient, be advised that any 
review, disclosure, use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this message or its contents is strictly prohibited. Please notify us immediately at 
208.344.6000 if you have received this message in error, and delete the message. 
From: Ryan McFarland [mailto:rmcfarland@hawleytroxell.com] 
Sent: Friday, October 01, 2010 11:08 AM 
To: Bob Burns 
Cc: Stephen C. Hardesty 
Subject: RE: ParkWest Homes v. MERS [DMSMSG1.FID352497] 
Sob: 
1211/2010 422 
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Durann Parra 
From: Bob Burns [RBB@moffatt.com] 
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 201012:12 PM 
To: Ryan McFarland 
Cc: Stephen C. Hardesty; David Zawadzki 
Subject: RE: ParkWest Homes v. Residential [DMSMSG1.FID352497] 
Ryan, I prefer that we pursue your final alternative. Accordingly, in accordance with our prior agreement, 
ten days notice is hereby given that MERS' answers and responses to Plaintiff's Second Set of Requests 
for Admission, Interrogatories, and Requests for Production of Documents (originally due on 11/12/10) 
are now due on or before Monday, November 15, 2010. 
Also, before wasting more time and money on preparing your MSJ, you might consider the holding in 
Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 586 (1983) (a "deed of trust conveys to the trustee nothing more than a 
power of sale, capable of exercise upon the occurrence of certain contingencies (such as default in 
payment) and leaves in the trustor a legal estate comprised of all incidents of ownership .... "). In any 
event, if you file your motion we will contest it and add our fees on to the already sizable tab that is 
accumulating for payment when the property is foreclosed. Bob 
Robert B. Burns 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chtd. 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 







From: Ryan McFarland [mailto:rmdarland@hawleytroxell.com] 
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 20108:54 AM 
To: Bob Burns 
Cc: Stephen C. Hardesty 
Subject: FW: ParkWest Homes v. Residential [DMSMSG1.FID352497] 
Bob: 
I just left you a voice mail message about this matter. Please call or e-mail at your convenience. 
As you can probably surmise from the Answer/Counterclaim of Residential, we are prepared to ask the 
Court to rule that, as a matter of law, ParkWest's lien is void as to Residential, based on ParkWest's 
failure to name the Trustee of the Deed of Trust as a Defendant. That Motion would not require any 
discovery. 
The purpose of my e-mail is to ask you whether it makes sense to hold off on discovery to save attorneys 
fees and costs pending the resolution of that legal issue. If so, that would require that we stipulate to 
extend the trial date and discovery deadlines. I am cognizant of your concern that we not prolong this 
case unnecessarily, so to address that concern I am willing to agree on a schedule for filing the Motion 
for Summary Judgment and for re-commencing discovery after the Court's decision. I am thinking that I 
could have a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by December 1, 2010, and could take the depositions 
of ParkWest Homes and David Zawadzki within 30 days of a decision on our Motion or Summary 
Judgment. 
1211/2010 423 
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Alternatively, I am prepared to re-notice the depositions of ParkWest Homes and David Zawadzki and we can 
conduct discovery while we litigate the legal issues referenced above. If you prefer this alternative, please advise 
if you are willing to accept service of a subpoena for David Zawadzki and of ParkWest's and Zawadzki's available 
deposition dates in November. 
Finally, please advise if your client has any interest in making another effort to settle this dispute. 
Thanks, 
Ryan 
Ryan T. McFarland 
Attorney 
877 fvlain Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys and Counselors 
This e-mail message from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley. LLP is intended only for named recipients. It contains information that may 
be confidential. privileged, attorney work product, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message in 
error, are not a named recipient, or are not the employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to a named recipient, be advised that any 
review, disclosure, use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this message or its contents is strictly prohibited. Please notify us immediately at 
208.344.6000 if you have received this message in error, and delete the message. 
NOTICE: This e-mail,includingattachments. constitutes a confidential attorney-client communication. It is not intended for transmission to, or receipt 
by. any unauthorized persons. If you have received this ccmmunication in error, do not read it Please delete it from your system without copying it, 
and notify the sender by reply e-mail or by calling (208) 345-2000, so that our address record can be corrected. Thank you. 
NOTICE: To compiy Wittl certain U.S. Treasury regulations. we inform you ttlat, unless expressly stated otherwise, any U.S. federal tax advice 
contained in tllis e-mail, including attachments, is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used. by any person for tile purpose of avoiding 
any penalties that may be imposed by the Internal Revenue Service, 
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Durann Parra 
From: Ryan McFarland 
Sent: Monday, November 15, 20103:12 PM 
To: 'Bob Bums' 
Cc: Stephen C. Hardesty 
Subject: RE: ParkWest Homes v. MERS [DMSMSG1.FID352497] 
Bob: 
Page 1 of 5 
Rule 25 allows the "action [to] be continued ... against the original party," MERS. Engstrom stands for 
just that principle. Like in Engstrom, Residential is not "a continuation of" MERS or Homecomings. 
Therefore, like in Engstrom it would have been inappropriate for the court to join Residential as a 
Defendant, over Residential's objection, because the Court does not have jurisdiction to enforce 
ParkWest's lien against Residential: ParkWest failed to timely name First American as a Defendant, and 
ParkWest's lien expired under I.e. 45-510. So did any jurisdiction to enforce the lien against First 
American or its successor, Residential. Residential has intervened, pursuant to ParkWest's stipulation, to 
ensure that its rights are not affected by any action the Court may take with respect to MERS. 
If ParkWest still had a claim against MERS, then the right result under Engstrom would be for the action 
to continue as against MERS (the Engstrom plaintiff brought an action "to recover property damage" 
against the defendant for the defendant's negligence, a claim that survived the public sale of the 
defendant's corporate assets); however, as MERS no loner has an interest in the property, ParkWest no 
longer has a claim against MERS. 
Ryan 
Ryan T. McFarland 
Attorney 
877 Hain Street., Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 




HA WLEY TROXELL 
Attorneys and Counselors 
This e-mail message from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is intended only for named recipients. It contains information 
that may be confidential, privileged, attomey work product, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you have received 
this message in error, are not a named recipient, or are not the employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to a named 
recipient, be advised that any review, disclosure, use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this message or its contents is strictly 
prohibited. Please notify us immediately at 208.344.6000 if you have received this message in error, and delete the message. 
From: Bob Burns [mailto:RBB@moffatt.com] 
Sent: Monday, November 15,201010:11 AM 
To: Ryan McFarland 
Cc: Stephen e. Hardesty; David Zawadzki 
Subject: RE: ParkWest Homes v. MERS [DMSMSG1.FID352497] 
Thank you for your prompt response, Ryan. Before I respond to your below proposal, and in light of R. J. 
Enstrom Corp. v. Interceptor Corp., 555 F.2d 277, 281 (10th Cir. 1977), could you please provide me with 
any authority that you may have holding (or even suggesting) that a trustee's sale constitutes a transfer of 
interest for purposes of Rule 25(c). In addition, could you please provide me with any authority you may 
12/1/2010 425 L.J 
Page 2 of5 
have holding or suggesting that a beneficiary under a deed of trust (or a mortgagee under a mortgage) continues 
to hold an interest in property after the property is sold at a trustee's sale (or public sale). Please understand that 
ParkWest intends to proceed as I've outlined below absent your providing this requested authority. Bob 
From: Ryan McFarland [mailto:rmcfarland@hawleytroxell.com] 
Sent: MondaYI November 151 2010 9:48 AM 
To: Bob Burns 
Cc: Stephen C. Hardesty 
Subject: RE: ParkWest Homes v. MERS [DMSMSG1.FID352497] 
Bob: 
Thanks your e-mail. In response to your allegationsl I direct you to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c) which 
vindicates "MERS conduct [in this litigation] after the the July 91 20091 trustee's sale of the subject property." 
We cannot agree with your demands numbered (1) and (2) below. You remain free to ask those same questions 
of Residential l and in factI you have asked several of them in Plaintiffs First Set Of Requests For Admissionl 
Interrogatoriesl And Requests For Production Of Documents To Defendant/Intervenor. 
We do believe that we can structure a stipulated judgment in such a way as to save your clients and Residential 
the cost of litigating Residential's Motion to Dismiss. Please prepare a proposed stipulation that we can discuss 
with our clients. 
SincerelYI 
Ryan 
Ryan T. McFarland 
AttorneY 
STl Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 




HA WLEY TROXELL 
Attorneys and Counselors 
This e-mail message from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is intended only for named recipients. It contains information that may 
be confidential, privileged, attorney work product, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message in 
error, are not a named recipient, or are not the employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to a named recipient, be advised that any 
review, disclosure, use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this message or its contents is strictly prohibited. Please notify us immediately at 
208.344.6000 if you have received this message in error, and delete the message. 
From: Bob Burns [mailto:RBB@moffatt.com] 
Sent: FridaYI November 121 20104:39 PM 
To: Ryan McFarland 
Cc: Stephen C. Hardesty; David Zawadzki 
Subject: RE: ParkWest Homes v. MERS [DMSMSG1.FID352497] 
Ryan, I received today and reviewed your motions for a protective order and to dismiss MERS. Please note that I 
plan on filing both a motion to compel and an opposition to your motion to dismiss, together with seeking an 
award of attorney fees and sanctions, unless we can get something promptly worked out. The basis for 
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my motions would be grounded in MERS' conduct after the July 9, 2009, trustee's sale of the subject property, 
including MERS' opposition to the then-pending appeal (see, e.g., the representation on page 1 of Respondent's 
Brief that "MERS holds deeds of trust of unquestioned validity covering the property at issue in this 
case ... "), MERS' filing an answer last month claiming an interest in the property in question (see, e.g., the 
allegation in paragraph 3 that MERS "claims an interest" in the subject property), and MERS' scheduling 
depositions and otherwise prosecuting a defense of its claimed interest in property that it now admits it has held 
no interest in since the trustee's sale last year. My suggested resolution to this unfortunate situation is as follows: 
1. MERS would provide unqualified admissions to ParkWest's pending RFAs 14 through 24; 
2. Residential Funding would stipulate that the exhibits referenced in the foregoing RFAs (Le., Exhibits G-L) are 
admissible into evidence at trial; and 
3. ParkWest and MERS would stipulate to the entry of judgment against MERS establishing that MERS has no 
continuing interest in the subject property. 
Provided we can get all this resolved next week, MERS can go about its way without responding to ParkWest's 
additional pending discovery (including avoiding deposition), and I will not pursue a claim for attorney fees or 
sanctions under either Idaho Code 12-121 or Rule 11. Please advise not later than the close of business next 
Monday (November 15) if your clients are willing to pursue my proposed resolution, as otherwise I will need to 
proceed with preparing my motion and opposition. I look forward to hearing from you soon. Bob 
Robert B. Burns 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chtd. 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
P. O. Box 829 






From: Bob Burns 
Sent: Wednesday, October 13, 2010 9:43 AM 
To: 'Ryan McFarland' 
Subject: RE: ParkWest Homes v. MERS [DMSMSG1.FID352497] 
Ryan, please review the attached letter (the original with the referenced attachments will be hand delivered to you 
later today) and then give me a call to discuss. Bob 
From: Ryan McFarland [mailto:rmcfarland@hawleytroxell.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, October 12, 2010 11:44 AM 
To: Bob Burns 
Cc: Stephen C. Hardesty 
Subject: RE: ParkWest Homes v. MERS [DMSMSG1.FID352497] 
Bob: 
I have recently hand-delivered to you a number of things, including a check for the payment of costs on appeal, 
MERS' Answer, the signed scheduling stipulation, notices of deposition of David Zawadzki, ParkWest Homes, and 
Julie Sarnson, and notices of subpoenas to Zawadzki and Barnson. Will you accept service of the subpoena on 
Zawadzki? I have attached both an acceptance of service and the subpoena here. Please advise. 
Thanks, 
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Robert B. Bums, ISB No. 3744 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
rbb@moffatt.com 
23095.0001 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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JULIE G. BARNSON, an unman-ied woman; 
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRA nON SYSTEMS, INC., a 
Delaware corporation, as nominee for 
Homecomings Financial, LLC (flkJa 
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), a 




RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE 
HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware limited 
liability company, 
Defendant/Intervenor. 
Case No. CV 07-8274 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The present action was filed on August 7, 2007, by PlaintiffParkWest Homes 
LLC ("ParkWest") to enforce its mechanic's lien in certain Canyon County real property (the 
"Property") then owned by Defendant Julie G. Bamson and with respect to which Defendant 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") was the designated beneficiary under 
two recorded deeds of trust. 
After MERS was granted summary judgment against ParkWest, and pending 
ParkWest's successful appeal of the judgment, MERS conveyed the Property to Defendant 
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential") in July 2009 by a trustee's sale 
and deed effected by MERS' designated trustee, First American Title Insurance Company ("First 
American"). Wholly ignoring the Supreme Court's decision in the prior appeal in this lawsuit 
and the application of the "law of the case" doctrine, Residential now moves for summary 
judgment on the grounds that First American was not named as a defendant. However, nowhere 
is it contended by anybody that First American held any interest in the Property at any time other 
than in its capacity as MERS' trustee. And in this regard, the Supreme Court has established 
that, under Idaho law, a deed of trust conveys nothing more to a trustee than a power of sale. 
Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 586, 671 P.2d 1048,1049 (1983) ("We hold that the deed of 
trust conveys nothing more than a power of sale ... "). 
Based on the points and authorities discussed below, Residential's motion for 
summary judgment based on First American not having been sued should be denied in all 
respects. 
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II. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS 
In addition to the "Undisputed Facts" set forth in the Memorandum in Support of 
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Memorandum"), filed November 17, 2010, the following facts are material to the resolution of 
Residential's pending motion: 
1. ParkWest was registered as a contractor by the State ofIdaho on May 2, 
2006, and commenced construction of improvements on the Property on May 18, 2006, which 
was six months before MERS' two deeds of trust were recorded. Affidavit of David Zawadzki, 
filed November 10, 2008, ~ 3. 
2. Upon filing this lawsuit ParkWest caused a lis pendens to be recorded 
against the Property by the Canyon County Recorder as Instrument No. 2007055927 on 
August 13,2007, which was two years before Residential acquired an interest in the Property, 
and caused an amended lis pendens to be recorded as Instrument No. 2007062387 on 
September 13,2007.' 
3. As expressly held by the Supreme Court in the prior appeal in this lawsuit, 
ParkWest Homes LLC v. Barnson, 149 Idaho 603, 238 P.3d 203 (2010) [hereinafter "Barnson"]/ 
(a) ParkWest's "lien was valid for labor and materials supplied after [ParkWest] registered" as a 
I The court is requested to take judicial notice of Park West's two recorded lis pendens 
attached hereto as Exhibit A, pursuant to LR.E. 201. 
2 The court is requested to take judicial notice of the marked excerpts from the cited 
opinion attached hereto as Exhibit B, pursuant to LR.E. 201. 
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contractor, and (b) "ParkWest is entitled to a lien for work or labor it provided and materials it 
supplied during the time it was duly registered."3 Id. at 604 & 608, 238 P.3d at 204 & 208. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Residential Is Bound by the Supreme Court's Prior Determination That 
ParkWest's Mechanic's Lien Is Valid. 
The basis for Residential's pending motion is "that because Park West did not 
commence an action against Residential's predecessor in interest to the property at issue ... 
within six months of filing the Mechanic's Lien (the "Lien") at issue in this case as required by 
3 Pursuant to established Idaho precedent, the foregoing determinations now constitute 
the law of the case and are not subject to further challenge in this litigation. See Hawley v. 
Green, 124 Idaho 385,392,860 P.2d 1, 8 (Ct. App. 1993): 
In Capps v. Wood, 117 Idaho 614, 790 P.2d 395 
(Ct.App.1990) (Capps II), we dealt with a similar timeliness issue. 
In that quiet title case, the Capps failed to raise the issue of an 
alleged settlement agreement initially and in the first appeal, Capps 
v. Wood, 110 Idaho 778,718 P.2d 1216 (1986) (Capps I). The 
Capps raised the issue before the district court on remand from the 
Supreme Court's reversal of summary judgment for the defendants 
in Capps 1. In Capps II, we held that the settlement agreement 
issue was not viable because "under the 'law of the case' principle, 
on a second or subsequent appeal the courts generally will not 
consider errors which arose prior to the first appeal and which 
might have been raised as issues in the earlier appeal." Capps II, 
117 Idaho at 618, 790 P.2d at 399; see also Red Bluff Mines, Inc. v. 
Indus. Com 'n of Ariz., 144 Ariz. 199,696 P.2d 1348, 1353 
(Ct.App.1984) (question that could have been raised on earlier 
appeal in workers' compensation case but was not, cannot be 
considered on second appeal). Hawley has not shown why the 
equitable estoppel issue was not raised in the district court prior to 
Hawley I, or stated differently, she has not pointed to any new or 
additional fact or circumstance arising after the remand order 
which gave rise to the estoppel issue. Because the estoppel 
argument was clearly available to Hawley prior to Hawley I, we 
will not address the issue. 
Accord Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705,709-10,201 P.3d 1282, 1286-87 (2009). 
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Idaho Code section 45-510, the Lien is void as to Residential." Motion4 2. But, of course, 
contrary to Residential's contention, the Supreme Court expressly mled the Lien to be valid in 
Barnson. And based on the authorities cited in note 3, supra, that determination constitutes the 
law of the case. 
Although the term "law of the case" is not even mentioned by Residential in its 
Memorandum, Residential has previously argued to this court that the doctrine does not prevent 
litigation of lien-validity issues that were not raised on appeal in Barnson, citing as support the 
opinion in Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 9 P.3d 1204 (2000) 
[hereinafter Cogeneration II]. Residential's argument that the decision in Cogeneration II 
somehow supports an exception to the doctrine is meritless. 
Thus, in the first appeal in that lawsuit, the Supreme Court articulated the 
dispositive issue on appeal and the court's holding as follows: 
The dispositive issue in this appeal is the validity and effect 
ofIPUC's order that Cogeneration post the second security 
installment. Idaho Power contends that Cogeneration cannot 
sustain a force majeure defense in the face ofIPUC's order to post 
the security "for the public interest." We disagree. 
* * * 
For these reasons, the trial court should not have granted 
partial summary judgment but should have allowed Cogeneration 
to litigate whether an event of force majeure protected it from 
default in posting the second security installment on January 1, 
1994. 
Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 129 Idaho 46, 49,921 P.2d 746,749 (1996) [hereinafter 
Cogeneration I]. Or in sum, the express purpose of the Supreme Court's reversal and remand in 
4 Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
November 17,2010. 
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Cogeneration I was to allow the defendant to litigate the issue of force majeure before the trial 
court. 
Nevertheless, the defendant argued in Cogeneration II that the very issue the 
Supreme Court remanded to be litigated-i.e., whether an event of force majeure protected the 
defendant-was subsumed and established by the decision in Cogeneration I and was not 
therefore subject to litigation. Not surprisingly, both the trial court and Supreme Court rejected 
this remarkably disingenuous contention. Cogeneration II, 134 Idaho at 747, 9 P.3d at 1213. 
Accordingly, the decision in Cogeneration II in no way undercuts the rule established by the 
cases cited in Note 3, supra, proscribing the litigation of new arguments that could have earlier 
been raised challenging the validity of Park West's Lien. 
Moreover, because Residential acquired its interest in the Property after ParkWest 
recorded its lis pendens, Residential is bound by the Supreme Court's determination in Barnson. 
The "lis pendens" doctrine is summarized in Sartain v. Fidelity Financial 
Services, Inc., 116 Idaho 269,775 P.2d 161 (Ct. App. 1989), as follows: 
The doctrine of lis pendens refers to the common law 
principle that when a third party-with actual or constructive 
notice of a pending action involving real property-acquires an 
interest in that real property from a party to the action, then the 
third party takes subject to the rights of the parties in the action as 
finally determined by the judgment or decree. 
Id. at 272, 775 P.2d at 164 (multiple citations omitted). And as further explained in Corpus Juris 
Secundum, the doctrine applies equally to a purchaser acquiring its interest pendente lite as to a 
purchaser acquiring its interest after the entry of final judgment: 
A properly filed lis pendens binds subsequent purchasers or 
encumbrancers to all proceedings evolving from the litigation. 
Thus a person whose conveyance is recorded after the filing of a 
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notice of pendency is bound by all proceedings taken in the action 
after such filing. 
54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens § 46 (2005) (footnotes omitted). 
Accordingly, Residential is bound by the Supreme Court's prior determination in 
Barnson that ParkWest's Lien is valid by application of the doctrines oflaw ofthe case and lis 
pendens. 
B. Residential's Contention That ParkWest's Lien Is Void as to Residential Is 
Contrary to Idaho Law. 
Needless to say, if counsel for Residential actually believed ParkWest was 
required to name MERS' trustee as a party in order to enforce Park West's Li en, opposing 
counsel would have raised the issue in support of the first motion for summary judgment they 
filed. The reasons opposing counsel were right in not then making the arguments they now 
present to the court are discussed below. 
ParkWest does not dispute Residential's initial argument that ParkWest's Lien 
was lost with respect to any unnamed party's interest in the Property. See Memorandum 13 
c ... Idaho case law is clear that the result of a lien claimant's failure to name a defendant in a 
lien foreclosure action is that the claimant loses its lien against the property in regard to the 
unnamed party's interest."). This is without doubt the law in Idaho. See, e.g., Bonner Building 
Supply, Inc. v. Standard Forest Products, Inc., 106 Idaho 682, 686, 682 P.2d 635, 639 (Ct. App. 
1984) [hereinafter Standard] (plaintiff s failure to name defendant Standard as a defendant "left 
Standard's interest in the property unaffected by the foreclosure."). However, to say ParkWest's 
Lien was lost as to First American's interest in the Property is but the beginning of the inquiry, 
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as (i) precisely what interest in the Property First American once held must next be determined,5 
followed by a determination of (ii) the legal effect of Park West not foreclosing on such interest. 
Residential argues with respect to the first of these issues that MERS' deeds of 
trust conveyed legal title to First American, citing Idaho Code Section 45-1502 and the decision 
in Defendant A v. Idaho State Bar, 132 Idaho 662, 665, 978 P.2d 222,225 (1999). Again 
ParkWest does not dispute Residential's argument, at least up to this point. However, the 
extremely limited extent of First American's interest under Idaho law has been wholly ignored 
by Residential-which interest was defined in the case relied upon for the holding in Defendant 
A: Long v. Williams, supra, 105 Idaho at 586, 671 P.2d at 1049 ("We hold that the deed of trust 
conveys to the trustee nothing more than a power of sale ... "). Or as explained in Willis v. 
Realty Country, Inc., 121 Idaho 312, 824 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1991): 
Under Idaho law, a deed of trust is a mortgage with a power of 
sale; the legal title is conveyed to the trustee solely for the purpose 
of security. The deed of trust leaves in the grantor a legal estate 
which entitles the grantor to possession of the property and all 
incidents of ownership; the exception to this is the trustee's power 
to sell the property in the event of the grantor's default on the 
underlying obligation. 
Id. at 314 n.2, 824 P.2d at 889 (citing Long v. Williams). Thus, the only interest held by First 
American and "lost" to ParkWest was the power of sale under the two MERS' deeds of trust, 
with all other interests in the Property being held by the defendants named in this action. 
In light of its manifest problem under Idaho law, Residential cites to precedent 
from other states to answer the ultimate question: the legal effect of Park West not foreclosing on 
First American's power of sale established under the two MERS' deeds of trust. The decisions 
5 First American, of course, no longer holds any interest in the Property as a result of the 
trustee's deed it delivered to Residential. Memorandum 4 (Undisputed Fact No. 10). 
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of courts in foreign states, however, are rendered inapplicable to Idaho as a result of Idaho Code 
Section 45-1302. See Standard, 106 Idaho at 685,682 P.2d at 638 ("no statute mandates the 
joinder of specific parties to a lien foreclosure action. In fact, I.C. § 45-1302 indicates to the 
contrary. "). 6 
Indeed, not only does the Idaho authority quoted and relied upon by Residential 
establish that First American was not a necessary party to this action, but Residential ultimately 
admits this fact after arguing just the opposite for six pages. Compare Memorandum part IV.B, 
at p. 8 ("First American Was A Necessary Party To ParkWest's Lien Foreclosure Action.") 
(bolding in original), with Memorandum 15 ("Under the rule articulated in Bonner Building 
Supply, Inc. v. Standard Forest Products, Inc. and elsewhere, ParkWest was not strictly required 
to name First American or Residential as Defendants in this action, but the failure to do so left 
First American's interest in the Property unaffected by ParkWest's foreclosure action."). 
ParkWest fully concurs with Residential's immediately foregoing summary ofIdaho law, as 
established by the decision in Standard. 
6 Idaho Code Section 45-1302 was amended this year to provide as follows: 
In any suit brought to foreclose a mortgage or lien upon 
real property or a lien on or security interest in personal property, 
the plaintiff, cross-complainant or plaintiff in intervention may 
make as party defendant in the same cause of action, any person 
having, claiming, or appearing to have or to claim any title, estate, 
or interest in or to any part of the real or personal property 
involved therein, and the court shall, in addition to granting relief 
in the foreclosure action, determine the title, estate or interest of all 
parties thereto in the same manner and to the same extent and 
effect as in the action to quiet title. 
(Emphasis added.) The amendment did not alter the permissive character of the statute, as held 
in Standard. 
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Accordingly, based on the established law of Idaho that a deed of trust conveys to 
a trustee nothing more than a power of sale, the only interest held by First American and "lost" to 
ParkWest was the power of sale itself. And based on the lis pendens recorded against the 
Property long before Residential's purchase, Residential's interest in the Property can be no 
greater than that of the other defendants in this lawsuit, Julie Barnson and MERS. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Residential's motion for summary judgment should be 
denied in all respects. 
DATED this 23rd day of December 2010. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
s 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 




JULIE G. BARNS ON, an unmarried woman; 
BLACK HAWKE CONSTRUCTION 
LENDING, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a 
Delaware limited liability company; and 
DOES 1-10; 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 07-8274 
LIS PENDENS 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that an action was commenced on August 7, 2007, 
in the above-entitled court by PlaintiffParkWest Homes LLC against Defendants Julie G. 
Barnson, Black Hawke Construction Lending, LLC, and Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc. seeking foreclosure of a mechanic's lien in Plaintiffs favor on the real property 
LIS PENDENS - 1 
EXH~9 A 
BO'_MT2:660887.1 
located in Canyon County, Idaho, having a street address of28123 Silo Way, Wilder, Idaho, and 
more particularly described as follows: 
Lot 4 in Block 1 of River bend Subdivision, according to the 
official plat thereof, filed in Book 34 of Plats at Page 2, Official 
Records of Canyon County, Idaho. 
DATED this 8th day of August 2007. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
MOFFATT, THOMAS,BARRETT,RoCK& 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
s - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
On this 8th day of August 2007, before me a Notary Public in and for said State, 
personally appeared ROBERT B. BURNS, known or identified to me (or proved to me on the oath 
of ), to be the person whose name is subscribed to the 
within instrument, and who acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official 
seal the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
LIS PENDENS - 2 
~-&~R~~ 
440 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires $ k4;lo 9 
} 
BOI_MT2:660887.1 
2 a 070 6 2 387 
HECGRDED 
RobertB.Burns, ISBNo. 3744 2GG7 Sf? 13 flPl9 36 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
rbb@moffatt.com 
23-095.1 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 




JULIE G. BARNSON, an unmarried woman; 
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRA.TION SYSTEl\1S, INC., a 
Delaware corporation, as nominee for 
Homecomings Financial, LLC (£'k:/a 
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), a 
Delaware limited liability company; and 
DOES 1-10; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 07-8274 
AMENDED LIS PENDENS 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that an action was commenced on August 7,2007, 
in the above-entitled court by PlaintiffParkWest Homes LLC against Defendants Julie G. 




Bamson and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. seeking foreclosure ofa mechanic's 
lien in Plaintiff's favor on the real property located in Canyon County, Idaho, having a street 
address of28123 Silo Way, Wilder, Idaho, and more particularly described as follows: 
Lot 4 in Block 1 of River bend Subdivision, according to the 
official plat thereof, filed in Book 34 of Plats at Page 2, Official 
Records of Canyon County, Idaho. 
This Amended Lis Pendens is made in amendment of that certain Lis Pendens 
recorded by the Canyon County Recorder as Instrument No. 2007055927 on August 13,2007. 
DATED this 11th day of September 2007. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
MOFFATT, THO.tv1AS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
On this 11 th day of September 2007, before me a Notary Public in and for said 
State, personally appeared ROBERT B. BURNS, known or identified to me (or proved to me on the 
oath of ), to be the perSOll whose name is subscribed to the 
within instrument, and who acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official 
seal the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
~~~R~ 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires ':;-/&14:;1:> '9 
~ , 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 th day of September 2007, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED LIS PENDENS to be served by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
David E. Wishney 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
300 West Myrtle, Suite 200 
Post Office Box 837 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile (208) 342-5749 
AMENDED LIS PENDENS - 3 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
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c 
Supreme Court ofIdaho, 
Boise, June 2010 Term. 
PARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Julie G. BARNS ON, an unmarried woman; Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., a Delaware cor-
poration, as nominee for Homecomings Financial, LLC 
(flkla Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.,) a 
Delaware limited liability company; and Does 1-10, De-
fendants-Respondents. 
No. 36246-2009. 
June 25, 2010. 
Background: Home builder brought action to foreclose 
on mechanics lien. The Third Judicial District Court, 
Canyon County, Gordon W. Petrie, J., dismissed com-
plaint on grounds that mechanics' lien was void, and 
entered judgment in mortgagee's favor on finding that 
mortgagee's deeds of trust were superior to mechanics' 
lien. Builder appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Eismann, CJ., held that: 
(I) mechanics' lien statute did not require builder to 
state in claim of lien that it had deducted offsets and 
credits; 
(2) mechanics' lien was not invalid for builder's failure 
to state that he believed claim to be "just"; 
(3) claim of lien substantially complied with verifica-
tion requirement; 
(4) district court had duty to sua sponte raise issue of 
legality of construction contract; 
(5) builder was entitled to enforce mechanics' lien to ex-
tent of claim for labor and materials supplied following 
registration under Construction Act; and 
(6) mortgagee was not entitled to award of attorney fees 




(I) Mechanics' Liens 257 €:;:;;>5 
257 Mechanics' Liens 
2571 Nature, Grounds, and Subject-Matter in Gener-
al 
257k5 k. Construction of lien laws in general. 
Most Cited Cases 
Mechanics' Liens 257 ~116 
257 Mechanics' Liens 
257III Proceedings to Perfect 
257kl16 k. Nature and form in general. Most 
Cited Cases 
The mechanic's lien statutes are liberally construed in 
favor of those to whom the lien is granted, and to create 
a valid lien the claimant must substantially comply with 
the statutory requirements. West's tC.A. § 45-501 et 
seq. 
12l Mechanics' Liens 257 ~148 
257 Mechanics' Liens 
257III Proceedings to Perfect 
. 257kI33 Form and Contents of Claim or State-
ment 
257kl48 k. Statement as to credits and offsets. 
Most Cited Cases 
Mechani~s lien statute requiring that claim of lien con-
tain statement of claimant's demand, "after deducting all 
just credits and offset" did not require home builder to 
actually state in claim that it had deducted offsets and 
credits. West's I.C.A. § 45-507(3). 
(3) Mechanics' Liens 257 ~148 
257 Mechanics' Liens 
257IJJ Proceedings to Perfect 
257kl33 Form and Contents of Claim or State-
ment 
257kl48 k. Statement as to credits and offsets. 
Most Cited Cases 
The mechanics' lien claimant is required t(l oedn!':! all 
just credits and offsets when determining the amount of 
the claim, but is not required to allege that such deduc-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Oligo US Gov. Works. 
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pursued bel-ow. Most Cited Cases 
Home builder was not entitled to appellate review of 
claim that construction contract with customer, ex-
ecuted when builder was not registered under Construc-
tion Act, was ratified by subsequent registration, where 
claim was not presented to trial court. West's I.C.A. § 
54-5204. 
[11] Licenses 238 €;:;:::>39.43(l) 
238 Licenses 
2381 For Occupations and Privileges 
238k38.5 Rights and Remedies of Unlicensed or 
Unauthorized Persons and of Persons Dealing with 
Them in General 
238k39.43 Contractors 
238k39.43(1) k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Although home builder was not entitled to compensa-
tion for labor and materials supplied during period of 
time that it was not registered under Construction Act, it 
was entitled to enforce mechanics' lien to extent of 
claim for labor and materials supplied following regis-
tration. West's I.C.A. § 54-5208. 
[12] Licenses 238 ~1l(5) 
238 Licenses 
238l For Occupations and Privileges 
238k I 0 Subjects of License or Tax 
238kJ J Occupations and Employments in 
General 
238kll(5) k. Contractors. Most Cited 
Cases 
Although work done by a contractor while unregistered 
under the Construction Act is illegal, work done after it 
is registered is certainly legal. West's LC.A. § 54-5208. 
(I3] Licenses 238 ~39.43(l) 
238 Licenses 
2381 For Occupations and Privileges 
238k38.5 Rights and Remedies of Unlicensed or 
Unauthorized Persons and of Persons Dealing with 
Them in General 
238k39.43 Contractors 
238k39.43(1) k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
In order to bring an action to collect compensation for 
work or labor performed and materials supplied in a 
construction project, the contractor must allege and 
prove that he was a duly registered contractor under the 
Contractor Act or exempt from registration at all times 
during the performance of such act or contract. West's 
I.C.A. § 54-5208. 
/14J Mortgages 266 ~186(6) 
266 Mortgages 
266III Construction and Operation 
266III(D) Lien and Priority 
266k186 Proceedings to Determine and Estab-
lish Rights 
266kI86(6) k. Hearing and determination. 
Most Cited Cases 
Mortgagee was not entitled to award of attorney fees on 
home builder's appeal from determination that builder'S 
mechanics' lien was not superior to deed of trust recor-
ded by mortgagee, where mortgagee was not prevailing 
party on appeal. West's I.C.A. § ) 2-12). 
*204 Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, 
Chartered, Boise, for appellant. Robert B. Bums argued. 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, Boise, for re-
spondent Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, 
Inc. Ryan T. McFarland argued. 
EISMANN, Chief Justice. 
This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing an action 
to foreclose a mechanic's lien because: (a) the notice of 
lien did not substantially comply with the requirements 
of Idaho Code § 45-507, and (b) the construction con-
tract was void because the contractor had not registered 
under the Idaho Contractor Registration Act before it 
negotiated and signed the contract. We hold that the 
claim of lien substantially complied with Idaho Code § 
45-507 and that the lien was valid for labor and materi-
als supplied after the contractor registered. We therefore 
vacate the judgment ofthe district court and remand this 
case for further proceedings. 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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within· this state without being registered as required in 
this chapter." Idaho Code § 54-5204. MERS relies upon 
Barry v. Pacific West Construction, inc., 140 Idaho 827, 
832, 103 P.3d 440,445 (2004), in which this Court sua 
sponte held a contract between the general contractor 
. and a subcontractor on a public works project was void 
for the failure of the subcontractor to have a public 
works license as required by law and urges the same 
result here. 
ParkWest contends that the district court erred in sua 
sponte raising the issue of the illegality of the construc-
tion contract. The district court did not err in sua sponte 
raising that issue. In Barry we held that "this Court lias 
a duty to raise the issue of illegality," id., and the dis-
trict court had the same duty. 
[10] ParkWest does not challenge the district court's 
holding that the construction contract was void because 
ParkWest was not registered at the time it signed the 
contract. Rather, it argue~ that after it registered on May 
2, 2006, Bamson ratified the construction contract. That 
issue. was not presented to the district court, and so we 
will not consider it on appeal. Lopez v. Farm Bureau 
Mut. ins: Co. of Idaho, 148 Idaho 515,519,224 P.3d 
llO4, 1108 (20lO). Had ParkWest wanted the district 
court to consider that issue before the appeal, ParkWest 
could have filed a motion for reconsideration. 
[II] The district court also implicitly held that ParkW-
est's lien was void because its construction contract was 
void. Citing Idaho Code § 54-5208, MERS agrees. That 
statute states, insofar as is relevant, "A contractor who 
is not registered as set forth in this chapter, unless oth-
erwise exempt, shall be denied and shall be deemed to 
hy,Ve conclusively waived any right to place a lien upon 
real property as provided for in chapter 5, title 45, Idaho 
Code." This statute does not invalidate or waive ParkW-
est's lien. 
[12] A mechanic's lien is granted for "the work or labor 
done ... or materials furnished." Idaho Code § 45-50). It 
is not granted simply for entering into a construction 
contract. Idaho Code § 54-5208 is written in the present 
tense. It states, "A contractor who is not registered as 
set forth in this chapter .... " (Emphasis added). Thus, the 
contractor is denied a lien for work or labor done or ma-
terials furnished in the construction during the period 
that the contractor is not registered. Although work 
done by ParkWest while unregistered was illegal, work 
done after it registered was certainly legal. See Farrell 
v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 6I1, 200 P.3d 1153.1160 
(2009) (work performed while an architect was unli-
censed was illegal. but work performed after he was li-
censed was legal). This construction is consistent with: 
. Idaho Code § 54-5217(2) (emphasis added) which 
provides: 
No person engaged in the business or acting in the 
capacity of a contractor, unless otherwise exempt, 
may bring or maintain any action in any court of this 
state for the collection of compensation for the per-
formance of any act or conn:act for which registration 
is required by this chapter without alleging and prov-
ing that he was a duly registered contractor, or that he 
was otherwise exempt as provided for in this chapter, 
01 all times during the performance of such act or 
contract. 
[J 3] In order to bring iill action to collect compensation 
for work or labor performed and materials supplied in a 
construction project, the contractor must allege and 
prove that he was a duly registered contractor or exempt 
from registration "at all times during the performance of 
such act or contract." Thus, Park West is entitled to a Ii-I 
en for work or labor it provided and materials it sup-
plied during the time that it was duly registered. To hold -('---
otherwise would mean that a contractor who violated 
the Act would be forever barred from obtaining a mech-
anic's lien. 
*209 In this case, the uncontroverted evidence was that 
ParkWest was registered under the Contractor Act at all 
times during the period that it furnished work or labor 
or supplied materials in constructing Barnson's house. 
Therefore, it is entitled to a lien on the property. 
C. Did the District Court Err in Holding that Park-
West Did Not Allege a Claim for Unjust Enrich-
ment? 
«J 20 I 0 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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CAr~YON CqlJNTY CLERK 
IS RAYNFl, OepUiY 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant Residential Funding Real Estate 
Holdings, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
P ARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
liability company, ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JULIE G. BARNSON, an unmarried woman; 
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a 
Delaware corporation, as nominee for 
Homecomings Financial, LLC (f/k/a 
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), a 
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Case No. CV 07-8274 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL 
ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL 
ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
447 05000.0047.2190699.1 
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential"), by and through its 
counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, hereby files this Reply Memorandum 




Residential owns the property at issue in this case (the "Property") free and clear of 
ParkWest Homes LLC's ("ParkWest") mechanic's lien (the "Lien") because Residential 
acquired the Property from First American Title Insurance Company ("First American"), who 
held legal title to the Property free and clear of the Lien. When ParkWest filed this instant 
lawsuit, it did not name First American as a Defendant - under Idaho Code section 45-507, 
"proceedings [were not] commenced" against First American "to enforce [the L]ien"- and 
therefore, the Lien expired as to First American. More than two years later, when First 
American exercised its power of sale, it conveyed the Property free and clear of the Lien to 
Residential. The rule that a lien is void as to all parties having an interest in the property but not 
named in a lien enforcement action is a fundamental tenant ofIdaho's mechanic's lien law. The 
application of that principal here - that a lien is lost as to a deed of trust if the trustee is not 
named as a party - is literally hornbook law, adhered to universally by states throughout the 
country who have considered the question. Therefore, Residential respectfully requests that this 
Court enter summary judgment in its favor. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Residential Established Its Right To Summary Judgment. 
Residential has established its right to summary judgment as follows: 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL 
ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
448 05000.0047.2190699.1 
• First, Residential set forth these underlying facts, which are not in dispute: on 
November 14,2006, Julie Barnson ("Barnson"), the owner ofthe Property, caused two Deeds of 
Trust to be recorded against the Property, both of which listed Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc. ("MERS") as the beneficiary, Transnation Title ("Transnation") as the "Trustee," 
and Homecomings Financial, LLC (flkla Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.) as the 
"Lender;" two weeks later, ParkWest recorded its Lien against the Property; on June 28,2007, 
First American was appointed as the Trustee of the first Deed of Trust; on August 7,2007, 
ParkWest commenced this action against only Barnson and MERS - ParkWest never named 
Transnation or First American as defendants in this action; and on July 20, 2009, First American 
conveyed the Property to Residential via Trustee's Deed. As ParkWest does not dispute these 
facts, only the legal consequence of them, this case is ripe for summary judgment. 
• Next, Residential set forth Idaho Code section 45-510, which provides that six 
months after a mechanic's lien is filed it becomes void unless "proceedings be commenced in a 
proper court within that time to enforce such lien." 
• Residential set forth the ample Idaho case law strictly construing that six-month 
deadline. Perhaps the most striking example is Willes v. Palmer, 78 Idaho 104, 298 P.2d 972 
(1956), in which the lien claimant properly recorded its mechanic's lien against a home owned 
by husband and wife and timely filed an enforcement action, but named only husband as a 
defendant. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the six month time frame in which to foreclose a 
lien "is more than a mere statute oflimitations which is waived ifnot pleaded; that it is a 
limitation ... upon the right or liability itself; and that the lien is lost as against the interest of 
any person not made a party to an action to enforce it within the six month period." Because the 
wife was not named as a defendant, "The action [was] not ... brought against [the wife] within 
the six month period, [and therefore] the lien as to her interest in the property was wholly lost." 
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• Other Idaho decisions strictly enforcing the requirement that all persons with an 
interest in the liened property be named within six months include Palmer v. Bradford, 86 Idaho 
395,401,388 P.2d 96 (1963) (holding that ifIdaho Code section 45-510 is not complied with 
"no jurisdiction exists in the court to enforce the lien. When the limit fixed by statute for 
duration of the lien is past, no lien exists, any more than ifit had never been created"). See also 
Western Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Gem State Lumber Co., 32 Idaho 497,501, 185 P. 554 (1919); 
D.W Standrod & Co. v. Utah Implement-Vehicle Co., 223 F. 517, 518 (9thCir. 1915); 
Continental & Commercial Trust v. Pacific Coast Pipe Co., 222 F. 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1915); and 
Utah Implement-Vehicle Co. v. Bowman, 209 F. 942,947-48 (D. Idaho 1913). 
• Next, Residential set forth Idaho Code sections 45-1202 and 45-15l3, which 
make clear that a deed of trust is a conveyance of legal title to the trustee of the deed of trust. 
• Next, Residential set forth the hornbook law that 
In a jurisdiction in which a deed of trust or mortgage is effective as 
a transfer oflega! title to the secured party, the trustee of a deed of 
trust recorded before attachment of a mechanic's lien is a 
necessary party to a suit to enforce the mechanic's lien; if the 
trustee is not a party to the enforcement suit, the mechanic's lien 
cannot be enforced. Thus, the court in such a case must have 
jurisdiction over the person of the trustee before the court can 
divest the trustee of title. 
52 AM. JUR. 2D Mechanics' Liens § 369 (2010). 
• Next, Residential cited to decisions from courts throughout the country that have 
held that a mechanic's lien is void as to persons who take title to property via a trustee of a deed 
of trust. See Heyward & Lee Construction Co., Inc., v. Sands, Anderson, Marks, & Miller, 249 
Va. 54,58,453 S.E.2d 270, 273 (1995); Walt Robbins, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 232 Va. 43,348 
S.E.2d 223 (1986); Riley v. Peters, 194 Cal.App.2d 296,15 Cal.Rptr. 41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); 
Lunsford v. Wren, 64 W.Va. 458,63 S.E. 308,311 (1908); Johnson v. Bennett, 6 Colo.App. 362, 
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367,40 P. 847, 849 (Ct. App. 1895); Schillinger Fire-Proof Cement & Asphalt Co. v. Arnott, 14 
N.Y.S. 326, 329 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1891); and Columbia Building & Loan Ass 'no V. Taylor, 25 
Ill.App. 429 (1887). 
• Residential then showed that these sister-state decisions are in harmony with the 
jurisdictional principle adhered to in Idaho. See Weyyakin Ranch Property Owners' Ass 'n, Inc. 
v. City of Ketchum, 127 Idaho 1,2-3,896 P.2d 327,328-29 (1995) (holding that the trial court 
never obtained jurisdiction over elected city officials where the plaintiffs "failed to name the 
elected officials individually"); Collier Carbon & Chemical Corp. V. Castle Butte, Inc., 109 
Idaho 708, 710, 710 P.2d 618,620 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the trial court "lacked 
jurisdiction initially to enter ... judgment" against persons who were not named as defendants in 
their individual capacity in the complaint). 
• Finally, Residential cited the Court to two additional factually-similar cases: 
Bonner Building Supply, Inc. V. Standard Forest Products, Inc., 106 Idaho 682, 682 P.2d 635 
(Ct. App. 1984) (discussed in greater detail below), and Sawyer Nurseries V. Galardi, 181 
Cal.App.3d 663, 226 Cal.Rptr. 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that notwithstanding that the 
trustee and beneficiary of a deed of trust, as well as the purchaser of the property at trustee's sale 
had notice of the mechanic's lien, the lien claimant's failure to timely commence its foreclosure 
action meant that the purchaser took title free and clear of the mechanic's lien). 
B. ParkWest Has Not Provided The Court Any Basis For Denying Summary Judgment 
To Residential. 
In response to Residential's Motion for Summary Judgment, ParkWest has failed to 
adequately justify its failure to name First American as a defendant. ParkWest makes four 
arguments in opposition, which are addressed as follows: 
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ParkWest argues that the Supreme Court decision issued in this case validates 
Park West 's Lien. This argument is insufficient to allow ParkWest to prevail against Residential 
for two reasons. First, ParkWest reads - and would have this Court read - the Supreme Court 
decision too broadly. The only issues before the Supreme Court were: 
(1) Did the district court err in holding that ParkWest's claim of 
lien did not substantially comply with Idaho Code § 45-507? 
(2) Did the district court err in holding that ParkWest's claimed 
lien was unenforceable because the construction contract was void 
for failure to comply with the Contractor's Act? 
(3) Did the district court err in holding that ParkWest did not plead 
a claim for unjust enrichment? 
(4) Is MERS entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal? 
ParkWest Homes LLC v. Barnson, 238 P.3d 203,205 (Idaho 2010). The Supreme Court's 
decision must be interpreted in light of those issues, as no other issues were before the Court. 
As set forth in the concurrently-filed Motion in Limine, the "law of the case" doctrine 
does not prevent litigation of issues that were not before the Supreme Court. In Idaho Power Co. 
v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738,9 P.3d 1204 (2000) (Cogeneration II), Cogeneration 
argued that the district court erred when, on summary judgment following remand from 
Cogeneration I, the district court refused to recognize a statement regardingforce majeure made 
by the Supreme Court in the Cogeneration I decision; instead, the district court had ruled that the 
force majeure issue had not been before the Supreme Court on Cogeneration I, and therefore that 
the Supreme Court statement onforce majeure was dictum and force majeure could be litigated 
by the trial Court. In its Cogeneration II decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the district 
court: 
We agree that the issue ... was not foreclosed by our opinion in 
Cogeneration I. The district court correctly perceived the relevant 
portion of our opinion in Cogeneration I as dictum since the issue 
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· .. was not an issue properly before the Court at that time and was 
not essential to the ultimate disposition of that case. Therefore, we 
hold that the district court did not err in its interpretation or 
application of our ruling in Cogeneration I 
Id. As the Supreme Court itself recognized in its Park West opinion, the Supreme Court cannot 
consider issues on appeal that were not presented to the district court. ParkWest v. Barnson, 149 
Idaho 603,608,238 P.3d 203, 208 (201 0). In this case, issues concerning the validity of the lien 
outside the context of the verification and "statement of demand" requirements of Idaho Code 
section 45-507 and the Idaho Contractor Registration Act have never been before the Court 1 , and 
thus any statement made by the Supreme Court on extraneous issues were not "necessary to the 
decision," and MERS may rightfully argue these issues at or before trial. 
1 Such issues include, without limitation: 
(i) Whether the nature of the relationship between Bamson and ParkWest gives rise to the lien. There is good 
evidence which will be submitted at trial (if necessary) that Bamson and David Zawadzki ("Zawadzki"), 
the principal behind ParkWest, entered into a business partnership wherein Bamson obtained a construction 
loan to purchase the residential lot and to pay for the construction of the property, Zawadzki/ParkWest 
performed the labor, and the parties intended to sell the home and split the profits. The "construction 
contract" was thus not the true expression of the parties' arrangement, but a mere formality required by the 
construction lender. Such a partnership arrangement, which has never before been presented to this Court 
in this case, would not entitle ParkWest to a mechanic's lien. See Russell Damrell v. Margaret A. Creager, 
42 Colo. App. 281,599 P.2d 262 (Ct. App. 1979). 
(ii) Whether ParkWest's admitted failure to comply with Idaho's pre-contract disclosures requirement means 
that, under Idaho Code sections 45-525 and 48-608, ParkWest is not entitled to any recovery in this case. 
(iii) Whether or not ParkWest has already been paid in full for the reasonable value of the materials and 
services provided by ParkWest, from the proceeds of the construction loan, and other in-kind and cash 
payments from Bamson. 
(iv) The interest priority and applicability ofIdaho Code section 45-510 as articulated herein; 
(v) Whether the work performed by ParkWest gives rise to a lien; 
(vi) Moreover, ParkWest must also establish that it complied with all other elements ofIdaho Code section 45-
507 that have not been before any court, including that the Lien was filed within 90 days after completion 
oflabor and services, that the Lien correctly identified the name of the owner and the person by which 
ParkWest was employed, that the Lien contains a description of the Property sufficient for identification, 
and that notice was properly given as required by section 45-507(5). 
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Also, ParkWest misconstrues the Court's holding in ParkWest. The Court specifically 
held: 
We hold that the claim of lien substantially complied with Idaho 
Code § 45-507 and that the lien was valid for labor and materials 
supplied after the contractor registered. 
ParkWest, 149 Idaho at 603, 238 P.3d at 203. The sentence contains dependent clauses: gIVen 
the limited issues before the Court, the Court held that only that the lien was facially valid under 
Idaho Code section 45-507 (as to the verification and "statement of demand" requirements). It is 
nonsensical to suggest that the Court was holding that the lien was also valid for every other 
purpose-such as validity under Idaho Code section 45-510 and those identified above-when 
the Court's own opinion held that it was not addressing issues that were not presented to the 
district court. Neither party has yet asked the district court to decide any lien issues outside of 
the verification and "statement of demand" requirements of Idaho Code section 45-507 and the 
Idaho Contractor Registration Act, and thus to interpret ParkWest to resolve additional issues is 
an unreasonable and unlawful construction ofthe case. 
ParkWest cites to Hawley v. Green, 124 Idaho 385, 860 P.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1993) (Hawley 
II). Hawley II is inapplicable to this case because it is procedurally opposite from this instant 
case. In Hawley, the Plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against her doctors. The 
doctors, defendants there as MERS and Residential are here, obtained a grant of summary 
judgment on statute oflimitations grounds. Id. 860 P.2d at 2. Hawley, the Plaintiff there as 
ParkWest is here, appealed, as ParkWest did in this case. The Supreme Court found an issue of 
fact and remanded the case. Id. at 6. On remand, the district court ultimately granted summary 
judgment a second time to the doctors on statute oflimitations grounds. !d. at 3. On the second 
appeal, Hawley raised equitable estoppel as a defense to the statute of limitations claim. Id. at 7. 
The Supreme Court found that Hawley, the appellant should have raised equitable estoppel as a 
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defense to a statute of limitations claim at the trial court level prior to the first appeal, and 
therefore, was barred from raising it on the second appeal: 
Hawley has not shown why the equitable estoppel issue was not 
raised in the district court prior to Hawley I, or stated differently, 
she had not pointed to any new or additional fact or circumstance 
arising after the remand order which gave rise to the estoppel issue. 
Because the estoppel argument was clearly available to Hawley 
prior to Hawley I, we will not address the issue. 
Id. at 8. In Hawley II, the plaintiff-appellant was barred from raising, on a second appeal, issues 
that the appellant should have raised previously. Hawley II does not stand for the proposition 
that a defendant-respondent is barred, on remand, from raising issues that have never been 
brought before the Court by either party. 
Similarly, ParkWest's reliance on Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 201 P.3d 1282 (2009) 
does not support ParkWest's expansive reading of the Supreme Court's decision entered 
previously. In Taylor, the plaintiff Taylor brought suit against Maile and shortly thereafter the 
district court granted Maile's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. Taylor appealed, and the 
Supreme Court reversed in part. On remand, the district court granted Taylor's motion for 
summary judgment. Maile subsequently appealed, challenging for a second time Taylor's 
standing. The Supreme Court identified two kinds of issues that cannot be re-litigated under the 
"law of the case" doctrine: 
The 'law of the case' doctrine provides that when 'the Supreme 
Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle 
or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement 
becomes the law ofthe case, and must be adhered to throughout its 
subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent 
appeal. The "law of the case" doctrine also prevents consideration 
on a subsequent appeal of alleged errors that might have been, but 
were not, raised in the earlier appeal.' 
Id. 201 P.3d at 1286 (internal citations omitted). Thus, where an issue has already been before 
the Court, or where the appellant in the first appeal should have raised the issue, it cannot be re-
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litigated. On the other hand, the Taylor Court expressly stated that issues and facts that were 
"not part of the record during the first appeal [and] could not have been raised [during the first 
appeal] should thus [be] reexamine[d]." Id. at 1287. As applied to this instant case, Taylor 
stands for the proposition that the only issues barred from now being litigated are those that were 
before the Supreme Court (e.g., the facial validity of the Lien as to the verification and 
"statement of demand" requirements ofIdaho Code section 45-507 and the Idaho Contractor's 
Registration Act) and issues that ParkWest, as the appellant, should have raised. Additional 
issues concerning the validity of the Lien - such as those identified herein - "could not have 
been raised [during the first appeal]" because they had not been presented to or decided by this 
Court, and therefore they may properly be brought now. 
Secondly, even ifthis Court is willing to read the Supreme Court decision as broadly as 
ParkWest does, a grant of summary judgment in favor of Residential is not inconsistent with 
such a reading. That is, this Court can decide that the Lien is valid against MERS' beneficial 
interest in the Property (though MERS no longer has such an interest), and Barnson's interest in 
the Property (a judgment against Barnson' s interest has already been entered), and rule, in 
accordance with Idaho law, that the Lien expired as against First American's interest and is 
consequently void as to Residential's interest. That was, in fact, precisely the result in Bonner 
Bldg. Supply v. Standard Forest Prods., 106 Idaho 682, 682 P.2d 635 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984), 
where Bonner filed a mechanic's lien, the property was then sold to Standard at a sheriffs sale, 
and then Bonner brought a mechanic's lien foreclosure action against the former property owners 
but failed to name Standard as a defendant. Id. 682 P.2d at 636-37. Bonner obtained a judgment 
against the named defendants (Id. at 637), but the Supreme Court held: 
Because Bonner failed to foreclose against Standard within six 
months of the filing of its claim of lien, it lost its lien against the 
property in regard to Standard .... Bonner's lien was extinguished 
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Id. at 639. 
[as to Standard]. Standard's interest in the property should be 
confinned by the district court, free of Bonner's lien. 
Relatedly, ParkWest argues that Residential is bound by the Supreme Court's decision 
because ParkWest recorded a lis pendens. The analysis here is the same: even if this Court 
reads the Supreme Court's decision as ParkWest does, i.e., as holding that ParkWest's Lien is 
valid for all purposes, that Lien is still only valid as to the named parties. Idaho Code section 5-
505, Idaho's lis pendens statute, makes clear that a lis pendens provides notice only that there is 
an action pending between the named parties: 
In an action affecting the title or the right of possession ofreal 
property, the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint ... may 
file for record with the recorder of the county in which the property 
or some part thereof is situated, a notice of the pendency of the 
action, containing the names of the parties, the object of the action 
or defense, and a description of the property in that county affected 
thereby. From the time of filing such notice for record only shall a 
purchaser or incumbrancer of the property affected thereby be 
deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, 
and only of its pendency against parties designated by their real 
names. 
(emphasis added). Under the language of the statute, the lis pendens gives notice only of the 
pendency ofthe lawsuit as against the named parties. ParkWest's lis pendens thus gave 
Residential constructive notice only that ParkWest had commenced an action against Bamson 
and MERS, not First American from whom Residential acquired title to the Property. In fact, as 
Residential acquired the Property more than six months after the lawsuit had commenced, 
Residential could have safely assumed that the Lien had expired as to First American and that 
Residential could take title from First American free and clear of the Lien. 
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The case cited by ParkWest to support this "lis pendens" argument - in fact, the very 
language quoted by ParkWest - supports a finding that Residential takes title subject only to the 
rights of the parties to the lawsuit: 
The doctrine of lis pendens refers to the common law principal that 
when a third party - with actual or constructive notice of a pending 
action involving real property - acquires an interest in that real 
property from a party to the action, then the third party takes 
subject to the rights of the parties ill the action as finally 
determined by the judgment or decree. 
Sartain v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 116 Idaho 269, 272, 775 P.2d 161, 164 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(emphasis added). Thus, Residential can only be said to have taken title subject to the Court's 
determination of the rights of Barns on and MERS; however, Residential's title does not derive 
from these parties, but from First American, against whom the Lien is void. Neither Sartain nor 
any other case holds that the filing of a lis pendens is an adequate substitute for naming as 
defendants all parties with an interest in the liened property. 
A "lis pendens does not purport, by itself, to establish or to change anyone's legal rights. 
[The filing of a lis pendens] does not mean that any underlying legal rights have been altered." 
Jerry J Joseph c.L. U Insurance Assoc., Inc. v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 557, 789 P.2d 1146, 
1148 (Ct. App. 1990). Idaho courts have never held that a lis pendens was sufficient to bind 
purchasers where the lien had expired under Idaho Code section 45-510. In Palmer v. Bradford, 
86 Idaho 395, 388 P.2d 96 (1963), the Supreme Court took note of the fact that the lien claimant 
had "caused a lis pendens to be regularly filed." Id., at 388 P.2d at 98. Nevertheless, the Court 
held that because "No proceedings of any kind were commenced by appellants to enforce their 
lien within six months ... the lien therefore became unenforceable and is not entitled to priority 
over respondents' mortgage lien" (ld., 399 P.2d at 99-100), notwithstanding the fact that a lis 
pendens had been recorded. 
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The Supreme Court decision in this case simply does not state that the Lien is senior to 
Residential's interest, or that it is senior to the interest of First American, Residential's 
predecessor in interest. In fact, the Supreme Court decision makes no ruling as to lien priority at 
all (as that issue, along with a host of others, was simply not before the Court). 
Next, ParkWest argues that the only interest held by First American and lost to ParkWest 
was the power of sale under the MERS' deeds of trust. It is unclear how this argument logically 
excuses ParkWest's obligation to name the trustee of the deed of trust as a defendant. Even if 
ParkWest's argument is accepted at face value, the reality is that by not timely commencing 
proceedings against First American to foreclose First American's power of sale, ParkWest lost 
the ability to do so; in consequence, when First American exercised its power of sale - which it 
was entitled to do following Bamson's default under the Deed of Trust2 - it did so free and clear 
of Park West's Lien, and Residential now owns the Property free and clear of Park West's Lien. 
Finally, ParkWest appears to argue that making First American a party to its lien 
foreclosure action was not required under Idaho Code section 45-1302 and Bonner Bldg. 
Supply. The problem with this argument, for ParkWest, is that while Bonner Building Supply 
does stand for the proposition that under Idaho Code section 45-1302 naming parties to a lien 
foreclosure action is optional, the upshot is that the interest of any unnamed party in the 
2 Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 671 P.2d 1048 (1983), cited by ParkWest, indicates that the latent power of sale 
becomes actual following the borrower's default, at which point all incidents of ownership are divested from the 
borrower and inhere in the trustee: 
The legal estate thus left in the trustor or his successors entitles them to the 
possession of the property until their rights have been fully divested by a 
conveyance made by the trustees in the lawful execution of their trust, and 
entitles them to exercise all of the ordinary incidents of ownership, in regard to 
the property, subject always, of course, to the execution of the trust. 
Id. 671 P.2d at 1050 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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foreclosed property is "unaffected by the foreclosure," and the lien is "lost ... against the 
property in regard to" such unnamed parties: 
Notwithstanding the option apparently created by the language of 
I.e. § 45-1302, we conclude that ... [i]f I.C. § 45-1302 were 
applied so as to tenninate the rights of other parties having an 
interest in the property, where they were not named in a lien 
foreclosure action simply at the election of the foreclosing 
claimant, issues of a constitutional dimension could arise. In such 
a case, holders of other recorded interests in the property could be 
deprived of valuable property interests without notice and 
opportunity to be heard - a deprivation of due process. We 
conclude that I.e. § 45-1302 should not be so applied. A statute 
must be construed to preserve its constitutionality. We thus ... 
hold that I.C. § 45-1302 does not enable a materialman to foreclose 
a lien as against other interested parties without giving them notice 
of the proceedings. 
Therefore, although Bonner was not required to name Standard 
as a party to the foreclosure action, under a literal reading of I.e. 
§ 45-1302, the failure to do so left Standard's interest in the 
property unaffected by the foreclosure. Because Bonner failed to 
foreclose against Standard within six months of the filing of its 
claim of lien, it lost its lien against the property in regard to 
Standard. For the purpose of the instant case, Bonner's lien was 
extinguished. Standard's interest in the property should be 
confirmed by the district court,free of Bonner's lien. 
Bonner Bldg. Supply 106 Idaho at 686 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Bonner 
Bldg. Supply should control this case: the failure of Park West to name First American as a party 
means that ParkWest's Lien was lost to First American, First American's interest in the Property 




For the reasons stated herein and in Residential's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Residential respectfully requests that this Court enter summary judgment in 
favor of Residential. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 1 ~ day of January, 2011. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
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Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC, ("Residential") by and 
through its counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, respectfully submits this 
memorandum in support of its motion in limine requesting that this Court declare that ParkWest 
Homes, LLC ("ParkWest") is required to prove up the validity of its mechanic's lien (the "Lien") 
as to each element not addressed by this Court or the Supreme Court, and allow Residential to 
raise any defenses to the Lien not addressed by this Court or the Supreme Court. Additionally, 
Residential respectfully moves this Court for an order in limine excluding ParkWest from using 
its contract (the "Contract") with Julie Barnson ("Bamson") as evidence of the value of 
ParkWest's Lien as this Court has already conclusively determined that the Contract is "void as 
an illegal contract." 
II. 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
Given the breadth of recent activity in this case, the Court is well familiar with the factual 
and procedural background of this action, and the Defendants will not reiterate it here. Instead, 
the Defendants will provide a short recitation of the few key facts that are pertinent to this 
motion. 
1. On October 2, 2008, Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Services, Inc. 
("MERS") filed a motion for summary judgment with this Court contending that ParkWest's lien 
was void because (i) the claim of lien did not substantially comply with the verification 
requirement of Idaho Code section 45-507(4) and (ii) ParkWest was not registered under the 
Idaho Contractor Registration Act when it entered into the construction contract. 
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2. On January 6, 2009, this Court granted MERS' motion for summary judgment, 
and entered judgment in favor of MERS on January 26, 2009. This Court specifically ruled that 
(i) the Lien "fails to contain any verification" that would comply with Idaho Code section 45-
507(4), (ii) the lien does not substantially comply with Idaho Code section 45-507(3)(a) because 
"there exists no 'statement of [ParkWest's] demand, after deducting all just credits and offsets,'" 
and (iii) the Contract was "void as an illegal contract." 
3. ParkWest appealed this Court's decision to the Idaho Supreme Court. On appeal, 
the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, holding that (i) ParkWest substantially complied with Idaho 
Code section 45-507 and (ii) ParkWest did not lose its lien rights under the Idaho Contractor 
Registration Act. However, the Supreme Court specifically noted that ParkWest did not 
challenge this Court's "holding that the construction contract was void because ParkWest was 
not registered at the time it signed the contract." 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Motion in Limine Permitting Evidence in the Trial Concerning the Validity of 
ParkWest's Lien. 
The Defendants are entitled to argue any lien-validity issues that have not previously 
been decided in this case. The "law of the case" doctrine does not compel a different result. The 
"law of the case" doctrine provides that: 
when "the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its 
opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such 
pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered 
to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and 
upon subsequent appeal." The "law of the case" doctrine also 
prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal of alleged errors 
that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal. 
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Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009) (citations omitted). 
Consequently, the "law of the case" doctrine prevents relitigation in two contexts-(1) where 
issues were fully decided in a previous appeal; and (2) where issues should have been, but were 
not, raised in the earlier appeal. 
1. The "Law of the Case" Doctrine Does Not Prevent Future Litigation of Lien-
Validity Issues That Were Not Before the Court in ParkWest. 
Lien-validity issues other than those specifically decided by this Court in MERS' January 
6,2009, Motion for Summary Judgment and the appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court in ParkWest 
Homes LLC v. Barnson, 149 Idaho 603, 238 P.3d 203 (2010), are relevant and may properly be 
litigated in the trial of this matter. Specifically, the only issues before the Supreme Court were: 
(1) Did the district court err in holding that ParkWest's claim of 
lien did not substantially comply with Idaho Code § 45-507? 
(2) Did the district court err in holding that ParkWest's claimed 
lien was unenforceable because the construction contract was void 
for failure to comply with the Contractor's Act? 
(3) Did the district court err in holding that ParkWest did not plead 
a claim for unjust enrichment? 
(4) Is MERS entitled to an award ofattomey fees on appeal? 
Id. at 605, 238 P.3d at 205. As recognized by the Supreme Court in its opinion in this case, the 
Court could not consider issues on appeal that were not presented to the district court. Id. at 608, 
238 P.3d at 208 ("That issue was not presented to the district court, and so we will not consider it 
on appeal."). In concluding that (i) ParkWest substantially complied with Idaho Code section 45-
507 and (ii) ParkWest complied with the Idaho Contractor Registration Act, the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that "the claim of lien substantially complied with Idaho Code § 45-507 and that the 
lien was valid for labor and materials supplied after the contractor registered." Id. at 604, 238 
P.3d at 204. Additionally, the Court held that "ParkWest is entitled to a lien for work or labor it 
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provided and materials it supplied during the time that it was duly registered." Id. at 608, 238 
P.3d at 208. This statement must be interpreted in light of the narrow issues before the Court. 
In Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 9 P.3d 1204 (2000) 
(Cogeneration 11), Cogeneration argued that the district court erred when, on summary judgment 
following remand from Cogeneration I, the district court refused to recognize a statement 
regardingforce majeure made by the Supreme Court in the Cogeneration I decision; instead, the 
district court had ruled that the force majeure issue had not been before the Supreme Court on 
Cogeneration I, and therefore that the Supreme Court statement on force majeure was dictum 
and force majeure could be litigated by the trial Court. In its Cogeneration II decision, the 
Supreme Court agreed with the district court: 
We agree that the issue ... was not foreclosed by our opinion in 
Cogeneration 1. The district court correctly perceived the relevant 
portion of our opinion in Cogeneration I as dictum since the issue 
... was not an issue properly before the Court at that time and was 
not essential to the ultimate disposition of that case. Therefore, we 
hold that the district court did not err in its interpretation or 
application of our ruling in Cogeneration 1. 
Id. at 746, 9 P.3d at 1212. In this case, issues1 concerning the validity of the lien outside the 
context of the verification and statement of demand requirements of Idaho Code section 45-
1 Such issues include, without limitation: 
(i) Whether the nature of the relationship between Barnson and ParkWest gives rise to the lien. There is good 
evidence which will be submitted at trial (if necessary) that Bamson and David Zawadzki ("Zawadzki"), 
the principal behind ParkWest, entered into a business partnership wherein Bamson obtained a construction 
loan to purchase the residential lot and to pay for the construction of the property, ZawadzkilParkWest 
performed the labor, and the parties intended to sell the home and split the profits. The "construction 
contract" was thus not the true expression of the parties' arrangement, but a mere formality required by the 
construction lender. Such a partnership arrangement, which has never before been presented to this Court 
in this case, would not entitle ParkWest to a mechanic's lien. See Russell Damrell v. Margaret A. Creager, 
42 Colo. App. 281,599 P.2d 262 (Ct. App. 1979). 
(ii) Whether ParkWest's admitted failure to comply with Idaho's pre-contract disclosures requirement means 
that, under Idaho Code sections 45-525 and 48-608, ParkWest is not entitled to any recovery in this case. 
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507(3)(a) and 45-507(4) and the Idaho Contractor Registration Act have never been before the 
Court, and thus any statement made by the Supreme Court on extraneous issues were not 
"necessary to the decision," and Residential may rightfully argue these issues at or before trial. 
The "law of the case" doctrine simply follows common sense: if the issue was litigated 
in or prior to the first appeal, it cannot be re-litigated in a subsequent appeal. If the issue was not 
litigated in or prior to the first appeal, it may be litigated for the first time following remand from 
the first appeal. The United States Supreme Court has held that "the phrase, law of the case, as 
applied to the effect of previous orders on the later action of the court rendering them in the same 
case, merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, 
not a limit to their power." Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436,444 (1912). There are a host 
of issues in this case that have never been litigated and which Residential should be permitted to 
argue. 
2. The "Law of the Case" Doctrine Does Not Prevent Future Litigation of Lien-
Validity Issues Because Those Issues Could Not Have Been Raised in the 
Earlier Appeal. 
Additionally, as noted above, the "law of the case" doctrine prevents relitigation of issues 
that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal. Taylor, 146 Idaho at 709, 201 
(iii) Whether or not ParkWest has already been paid in full for the reasonable value of the materials and 
services provided by ParkWest from the proceeds of the construction loan and other in-kind and cash 
payments from Bamson. 
(iv) The interest priority and applicability ofIdaho Code section 45-510 as articulated herein; 
(v) Whether the work performed by ParkWest gives rise to a lien; 
(vi) Moreover, ParkWest must also establish that it complied with all other elements of Idaho Code section 45-
507 that have not been before any court, including that the Lien was filed within 90 days after completion 
oflabor and services, that the Lien correctly identified the name of the owner and the person by which 
ParkWest was employed, that the Lien contains a description of the Property sufficient for identification, 
and that notice was properly given as required by section 45-507(5). 
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P.3d at 1286. The doctrine, similar to res judicata, is meant to "discourage[] piecemeal appeals." 
Capps v. Wood, 117 Idaho 614, 618, 790 P.2d 395, 399 (Ct. App. 1990). Importantly, this 
element of the doctrine only applies to the appellant in the first appeal, and is inapplicable in this 
case. Thus, if an appellant could have raised issues in the first appeal, but did not, the "law ofthe 
case" doctrine will prevent the litigation of those issues in the subsequent appeal. 
For example, in Hawley v. Green, 124 Idaho 385, 860 P.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1993) (Hawley 
11), the Plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against her doctors. The doctors, 
(defendants there as MERS and Residential are here) obtained a grant of summary judgment on 
statute of limitations grounds. 1d. at 386, 860 P .2d at 2. Plaintiff Hawley (as ParkWest is here) 
appealed. The Supreme Court found an issue of fact and remanded the case. 1d. On remand, the 
district court ultimately granted summary judgment a second time to the doctors on statute of 
limitations grounds. 1d. On the second appeal, Hawley raised equitable estoppel as a defense to 
the statute of limitations claim. 1d. The Supreme Court found that Hawley, as the appellant, 
should have raised equitable estoppel as a defense to a statute of limitations claim at the trial 
court level prior to the first appeal, and therefore, was barred from raising it on the second 
appeal: 
Hawley has not shown why the equitable estoppel issue was not 
raised in the district court prior to Hawley I, or stated differently, 
she had not pointed to any new or additional fact or circumstance 
arising after the remand order which gave rise to the estoppel issue. 
Because the estoppel argument was clearly available to Hawley 
prior to Hawley I, we will not address the issue. 
1d. at 392, 860 P.2d at 8. Consequently, the case stands for the proposition that the appellant may 
be barred from raising, on a second appeal, issues that the appellant should have raised 
previously. Accord Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 70{ 201 P.3d 1282 (2009) (finding that where an 
issue has already been before the Court on appeal, or where the appellant in the first appeal 
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should have raised the issue, the issue cannot be relitigated). Residential, the respondent in the 
appeal in this case, is not barred from raising additional issues related to the validity of 
ParkWest's Lien. 
B. Motion in Limine Excluding Evidence in the Trial Concerning the Validity of the 
Contract. 
The "law of the case" doctrine does bar ParkWest from using its Contract with Julie 
Barnson to establish the amount of its Lien. In the Memorandum Decision on Defendant 
Mortgage Electronic Systems, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court held that "the 
contract between PARKWEST and BARNSON [is] void as an illegal contract." Though it had 
every opportunity to do so, ParkWest did not appeal this Court's finding. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court expressly held that "ParkWest does not challenge the district court's holding that the 
construction contract was void because ParkWest was not registered at the time it signed the 
contract." Barnson, 149 Idaho at 608,238 P.3d at 208. 
Moreover, the California rule is that "the amount of the lien is limited to the "reasonable 
value of the labor, services, equipment, or materials furnished or for the price agreed upon by 
the claimant and the person with whom he or she contracted, whichever is less." TO. IX, LLC v. 
Superior Court, 165 Cal. App. 4th 140, 144-45 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). Thus, even if the Contract 
was not void and illegal, the Contract may not provide the basis for the Lien: ParkWest has not 
proved, for example, that it has fully performed the Contract. 
This Court should not allow the Contract to form the basis of the valuation of the Lien. 
In short, the value of the Lien must be determined independent of the Contract. 




Because other lien-validity issues are relevant and are not precluded by the "law of the 
case" doctrine, this Court should grant the Defendant's Motion in Limine, allowing the parties to 
litigate the lien-validity issues that were not before this Court or before the Supreme Court. 
Additionally, this Court should also exclude the use of the Contract as a basis for establishing the 
amount of Park West's Lien. 
d~ 
DATED THIS"'\ day of January, 2011. 
HAWLEY TROXELL 
. McFarland, ISB No. 7347 
eys for Defendant/Counterclaimant 
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC 
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